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I am amazed how often biologists, who pride themselves on being objective scien-
tists and who criticize the shibboleths of religion, react vehemently when anyone 
challenges the reality of the rank of species and tries to get rid of binomials. I have 
heard it so many times:
“We have always had binomials, there would be chaos without them!”
“We must have species in order to do ecology and conservation!”
“How dare you suggest that we get rid of species; they are real entities in the 
hierarchy of life!”
Species are truly the sacred cow of biology. Most biologists start their consid-
eration of species with an a priori assumption that they exist. For example Kunz 
(2012), in his book-length treatment entitled “Do Species Exist?”, never provides any 
good evidence that they do, he just assumes it. He makes tautological statements like: 
“If species did not exist, it would not even be possible to speak of the boundaries 
between them.” (p. 12). You could just as easily argue that “if the Tooth Fairy did not 
exist it would not even be possible to speak of how much she left under a child’s pil-
low.” Chung (2004) starts out a paper on the educational value of teaching students 
controversies over species concepts in biology by flatly taking it as “given that spe-
cies are real,” thus glossing over the most fundamental controversy.
More ink has been spilled on the concept of species than on any other concept in 
biology. We never seem to eliminate any species concept; rather the field evolves by one 
concept after another being added to the pile. It is too much to hope that another book on 
the topic (more ink!) can completely resolve the situation. However, a more modest goal 
might be achievable, via explaining why there has been such a diversity of views about 
species and following modern ideas of phylogenetic classification to their logical destina-
tion. Perhaps the resolution lies in a different direction than the ever-increasing pile of 
species concepts. May be we just need to sweep that pile away! May be all the centuries 
of angst have been due to people striving to define something that does not exist!
SUMMARY
This book will show that some of the persistent furor over species is based on real 
biology and real differences among organisms. The diversity of views is not seman-
tics, it reflects reality; the units traditionally called species in different organisms 
are different kinds of things and there is no way to make them the same. Just like 
the rank of genus, the rank of species is applied differently in different cases, in part 
because of actual biological differences. There is no way to fix this and make the 
ranks comparable across life. Instead, the modern idea of rankless phylogenetic clas-
sification, which is well-established at higher taxonomic levels, needs to be extended 
to the traditional species level. Something is indeed comparable about taxa, includ-
ing those named as species, but it is not (and cannot be) their ranks.
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Biodiversity is not just about species, it instead consists of the entire hierarchy of 
nested clades representing phylogenetic relationships among all organisms, together 
with their genetic and functional characteristics, spatial distributions, and ecologi-
cal relationships. There are many levels of lineages less and more inclusive than the 
traditional species level. Species and other taxon ranks are not comparable between 
groups, but lineages and clades are.
ORGANIZATION
The sequence employed in this book follows the author’s personal journey in think-
ing about species over a 40-year period. Nine papers, most co-authored as indicated, 
are reprinted (with permission), verbatim except that footnotes are renumbered con-
secutively from the front of the book, figures are renumbered consecutively for each 
chapter, and a few misspellings are corrected. Newly written material is added to the 
beginning of each chapter to explain how the reprinted papers in that chapter con-
nect. The discussion is entirely new material, and addresses what the future would 
look like if my recommendations to get rid of the species rank are followed. Different 
fonts are used to mark the distinction between newly written text and reprinted text.
I start the book following my initial orientation, which was trying to decide 
what the species rank should represent under current ranked codes of nomencla-
ture. Chapter 2 gives a quick review of the history and current variety of species 
concepts. I argue that some of the apparent chaos among differing ways of viewing 
species has to do with the fact that the evolutionary processes operating in differ-
ent branches of the tree of life really are different, and thus specialists in different 
groups of plants, animals, and fungi have rightly emphasized different criteria when 
lineages are diverged enough to be called species. My conclusion then, assuming 
we are going to keep the traditional species rank, was that a pluralistic approach is 
needed.
In Chapter 3, I consider the problem to be how to define species under the current 
codes of nomenclature. As an early adopter of phylogenetic systematics, my driving 
principle initially was: if taxa are to be phylogenetic, following the Hennigian revo-
lution of the 1970’s and 1980’s, then so should species. I and others made attempts 
in those days to forge a species concept that is compatible with Hennigian phyloge-
netic systematics or cladistics. Interestingly, nearly every approach to species any-
one had ever advocated previously was advocated by one cladist or another. Several 
such cladistic concepts have been called “the phylogenetic species concept,” thus 
leading to considerable confusion in the literature. Difficulties in arriving at a syn-
thesis include finding the right balance between primary systematic patterns (i.e., 
character evidence) and evolutionary process theories. Clearly, it makes no sense 
to apply a species concept that requires prior, specific knowledge of processes (e.g., 
reproductive behavior or ecological sorting). On the other hand, it is necessary that 
recognized species taxa be compatible with a phylogenetic system based on descent 
with modification, if that is to be adopted as the general reference system. One uni-
fied phylogenetic species concept (PSC) was proposed by me and colleagues in the 
1980’s, based on a generalized view of the meaning of phylogenetic criteria at any 
hierarchical level. The grouping criterion was monophyly, but since taxa at all levels 
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are monophyletic, a ranking criterion was needed to decide which monophyletic 
groups should be named at the rank of species. We felt this ranking criterion had 
to be pluralistic, with different criteria employed in different biological situations.
The ranking decision needed under this PSC for deciding which phylogenetic 
groups (clades) should be called species was clearly arbitrary, as was pointed out by 
friend and foe alike. Continued thinking about this problem prompted me to shift 
gears. Chapter 4 covers the next and most radical step I took in my own thinking. 
Starting in my 1999 paper I recognized that the “species problem” was a special case 
of the “taxon problem” that was already being addressed for higher taxonomic levels 
by advocates of phylogenetic nomenclature who wanted to remove ranks from clas-
sification. The species rank could be done away with following the same arguments. 
We need to transition to rankless classification “all the way down,” including the 
rank currently known as species.
In making that transition, however, it is important to ensure that the community 
can still do everything it is used to doing with species, both practically and theo-
retically. As discussed above, species have always been seen as fundamental by the 
general society and by many communities of researchers, such as conservation biol-
ogists, ecologists, and population geneticists. Those communities understandably 
need to be convinced there is a viable alternative before they would ever give up the 
species rank. Thus Chapter 5 explores the implications of a rankless phylogenetic 
approach to terminal taxa in both practice and theory. The ultimate argument is that 
is it not only possible to use rankless classification across biology, but better. Rather 
than imposing artificial conventions like ranks, if our taxonomic practices conform 
as close as possible to the processes operating in nature to shape biodiversity, we can 
produce a more useful classification across the board, for everyone from academic 
biologists to the public.
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The Need for 
Pluralism Because of 
Different Biologies 
in Different Taxa
The idea of basic biological “kind” has been with us a long time. There are several 
good histories (especially Wilkins 2009, 2018), so I will just give a quick summary 
for my purposes here. Some ancient (but still extant) approaches took a typological 
approach, relying on logical division with “defining” characters. A slightly more 
recent view came out of the polythetic “natural system” philosophy of taxonomy 
developed in the 19th Century (Stevens 1994) which viewed species not as defined 
by necessary and sufficient characters but as basic clusters of morphological varia-
tion – the “phenetic species concept.” This viewpoint still has many proponents 
(Levin 1979, Sokal & Crovello 1970, Zapata & Jiménez 2012), surprisingly even 
among some cladists who view a species as a basic cluster defined by characters 
with no requirement for evolutionary polarity or monophyly (Nelson & Platnick 
1981, Cracraft 1983, Nixon & Wheeler 1990). This view of species as basic clusters 
of organisms sharing similar traits gained new life with the advent of molecular 
data: many investigators say they aim to detect “boundaries” between species (e.g., 
Harrison & Larson 2014, Jain et al. 2018), ironically applying a phenetic species 
concept with genetic data.
Then there is the equally ancient approach to defining species that has to do with 
reproductive compatibility going back to folk agricultural observations that like pro-
duces like. This approach eventually resulted in the codification of the “biologi-
cal species concept” during the Modern Synthesis. This general approach also had 
numerous flavors, ranging from the classic isolation approach that emphasized dis-
covery of barriers to interbreeding (e.g., Dobzhansky 1937, Mayr 1996) to newer 
recognition approach that emphasized whether organisms recognize each other as 
potential mates or not (e.g., Paterson 1985). Once paleontologists got involved, this 
concept was extended to add a time dimension, envisioning breeding groups over 
geological time, the so-called “evolutionary species concept” (Wiley 1978). All 
these views are united in considering interbreeding relationships, or lack thereof, to 
be the main criteria for defining species.
These two big categories of species concepts both made attempts at “operationality” 
i.e., providing empirical criteria that a scientist can apply in a practical sense. Those 
criteria include measuring character variation via morphometrics or clustering DNA 
samples via RADseq (for applying the phenetic species concept), or doing controlled 
breeding experiments (for applying the biological species concept).
2
8 What, if Anything, Are Species?
There have also been purely theoretical species concepts based solely on consid-
erations of processes, which did not worry about providing criteria for application. 
These include such ideas as the “ecological species concept” (Van Valen 1976), in 
which species were viewed as those entities occupying unitary ecological niches. 
Another theoretical view favored by some philosophers is the concept of “species as 
individual” in which species were viewed as integrated, cohesive units with spatio-
temporal boundaries (Ghiselin 1974, Hull 1976). Another theoretical view with no 
particular operational criteria for application is the “general lineage concept” of 
de Queiroz (1999), which views species as some sort of unitary lineage. In none 
of these cases was any guidance given as to how one can apply empirical data to 
decide whether two organisms belong to the same species or not. Some (e.g., Hey 
2006) have even argued explicitly that it is a good thing to disregard all the different 
empirical criteria people have used, in favor of a purely theoretical “unified” view 
of species (begging the question about the utility of a theoretical construct with 
no application to the real world). Furthermore, in none of these author’s arguments 
was there a clear distinction between the species level and groupings at other levels, 
i.e., there could be groups filling ecological niches, or making up lineages, that are 
nested at more than one hierarchical level.
Finally, there have been various “phylogenetic” species concepts proposed. They 
are a heterogeneous lot – as noted above, some of these (e.g., Cracraft 1983, Nixon & 
Wheeler 1990) are really phenetic in that species are regarded as a cluster of organ-
isms that is homogeneous for characters and monophyly is explicitly ruled out by 
definition. That sort of species concept is clearly not phylogenetic and thus seems 
both misnamed and an unlikely basis for a phylogenetic system of classification. 
Another “phylogenetic species concept,” the one I will refer to by that name in this 
book, is the one I and co-authors developed, which tries to give both theoretical and 
operational criteria for defining species phylogenetically. In this view, species are the 
basal-most monophyletic groups that are named taxonomically. That concept will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter.
The goal of this chapter is to address the question of why so many different con-
cepts have been proposed. The first paper reprinted below (Mishler & Donoghue 
1982) argued that the primary reason for the existence of a species problem is that 
the species concepts and criteria outlined above conflict in most real cases – different 
concepts (and processes) “pick out” different groups in each particular case. In other 
words, the interbreeding groups often do not match the phenetic clusters, or the sets 
of organisms filling the same niche. If all species concepts led to recognition of the 
same entities, then there would not have been much controversy. But as it turns out, 
the differences among biologists promoting different species concepts are not pure 
semantics, bias, or stubbornness – it reflects a fundamental biological truth.
The processes influencing divergence of lineages are manifold, vary considerably 
in their action from group to group, and are often acting at cross purposes to each 
other. With the application of rapidly improving molecular tools, the recent literature 
provides an increasing number of examples of this heterogeneity in evolutionary 
processes, even in vertebrates, as well as in plants and microbes where it has been 
known for awhile. Cessation of interbreeding turns out often to not be the most 
important factor in primary divergence of lineages, despite what Mayr and others 
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argued. Thus the implied correspondence between interbreeding groups and groups 
defined by other criteria, relied on by many species concepts and explicitly stated by 
De Queiroz (1999), has been abundantly falsified.
The second paper reprinted below (Mishler 1985) brought in developmental con-
straints as another class of causal processes influencing the cohesion and divergence 
of lineages, that up until that point had not been introduced to the species debate, 
even though it was being hotly debated as an explanation for higher-level patterns 
of lineage divergence in macroevolution (Alberch 1980). Evolutionary divergence in 
phenotypes often follows lines of least resistance in modifications of developmental 
programs, and this could often be true at the primary divergence level as well.
The third paper reprinted below (Mishler & Budd 1990) is an introduction to a 
whole symposium (Systematic Botany 15:1) that addressed natural experiments that 
have played out over and over in both plants and animals. Asexual groups of organ-
isms (dismissed by Mayr and others as irrelevant aberrations to the biological species 
concept) actually provide excellent study systems for looking at the effects of pat-
terns of interbreeding on divergence. If there are distinctly differentiated lineages in 
asexual groups, then it must be due to processes other than interbreeding or cessation 
thereof, such as ecological or developmental constraints. Whether asexual reproduc-
tion is an evolutionary dead-end in the long run, or not, is a completely different 
issue. While it lasts, asexuality provides an invaluable way to factor out one of the 
big contenders in the species debates and detect how important the other processes 
might be. Asexual lineages are deserving of much more study, in comparison to their 
sexual relatives, in this regard.
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Species Concepts: 
A Case for Pluralism1
1 B.D. Mishler and M.J. Donoghue. 1982. Species concepts: a case for pluralism. Systematic 
Zoology 31: 491–503. [reprinted by permission]
“We must resist at all costs the tendency to superimpose a false simplicity on the 
exterior of science to hide incompletely formulated theoretical foundations.”
(Hull, 1970:37)
It has often been argued that it is empirically true and/or theoretically necessary 
that “species,” as units in nature, are fundamentally and universally different 
from taxa at all other levels. Species are supposed to be unique because they 
are individuals (in the philosophical sense, as opposed to classes) – integrated, 
cohesive units, with a real existence in space and time (Ghiselin, 1974; Hull, 
1978). Interbreeding among the members (parts) of a species and reproductive 
isolation between species are generally believed to account for their individual-
ity. These reproductive criteria are supposed to provide the greater objectivity of 
the species category and have been suggested as the criteria by which species 
taxa are to be delimited in nature.
Wake (1980) has pointed out that this conception of species forms the basis 
upon which Eldredge and Cracraft (1980) have built their formulation of evolu-
tionary process and phylogenetic analysis. In fact, this notion of species seems 
to underlie much of the recent and growing body of theory which, for conve-
nience, could be called macroevolutionary theory (Eldredge and Gould, 1972; 
Stanley, 1975; Gould, 1982). Moreover, most recent texts in systematics and 
ecology are predicated on the idea that species taxa are unique and fundamental 
(e.g., White, 1978; Ricklefs, 1979; Wiley, 1981). It is therefore important to assess 
carefully any claim that species do or should possess the properties of individu-
als, and whether breeding criteria are adequate indicators of individuality.
The “species problem” has yielded an enormous quantity of literature, and it is 
not the purpose of this paper to provide a review (for which see Mayr, 1957; Wiley, 
1978; and papers cited therein). Instead, we will (1) briefly characterize prevailing 
species concepts, (2) summarize some empirical observations that bear on the spe-
cies problem, (3) consider the respects in which species taxa as currently delimited 
by systematists do and do not have the properties of individuals, (4) discuss several 
choices with which we are faced if all the criteria of individuality are not always met.
We will argue that current species concepts are theoretically oversimplified. 
Empirical studies show that patterns of discontinuity in ecological, morphologi-
cal, and genetical variation are generally more complex than are represented by 
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these concepts. Criteria for what constitutes “important” discontinuity appear to 
vary in response to the vast differences in biology between groups of organisms. 
In our view, no single and universal level of fundamental evolutionary units 
exists; in most cases, species taxa have no special reality in nature. We urge 
explicit recognition and acceptance of a more pluralistic conception of species, 
one that recognizes the evident variety and complexity of “species situations.” 
We will conclude by exploring important consequences of this view for ecology, 
paleontology, and systematics.
Prevailing Species Concepts
A consensus appears to have been reached that species are integrated, 
unique entities. The so-called biological species concept emphasizes that 
species are reproductive communities within which genes are (or can be) 
freely exchanged, but between which gene flow does not occur or at least 
is very rare (e.g., Mayr, 1970). According to this view, a species is a group 
of organisms with a common gene pool that is reproductively isolated from 
other such groups.
The evolutionary species concept (Simpson, 1961; Grant, 1971; Wiley, 1978, 
1981) is an important extension of the concept of biological species, an attempt 
to broaden the definition to include all sorts of organisms (not just sexually repro-
ductive ones) and to portray the existence of species through time. According 
to this view, species are separate ancestor-descendant lineages with their own 
evolutionary roles, tendencies, and fates. The ecological species concept of Van 
Valen (1976) is similar (but see Wiley, 1981), however, it emphasizes the “adaptive 
zone” occupied by a lineage.
Ghiselin (1974) and Hull (1976, 1978) have examined the status of species 
from a philosophical standpoint. They contend that if species are to play the 
role required of them in current systematic and evolutionary theory, they must 
be “individuals” (i.e., integrated and cohesive entities with a restricted spatio-
temporal location) rather than “classes” (i.e., spatiotemporally unrestricted sets 
with defining characteristics). Hull (1980), Wiley (1980, 1981), and Ghiselin 
(1981) argue that species are fundamentally different from genera, families, and 
other higher taxa because they are the most inclusive entities that are “actively 
evolving.”
In general, then, species are considered to be the most objectively defined 
taxonomic and evolutionary units. As Mayr (1970:374) put it, they are “the 
real units of evolution, as the temporary incarnation of harmonious, well-
integrated gene complexes.” They differ from taxa at all other levels, which 
are considered to be arbitrarily defined and more subjective categories (e.g., 
Mayr, 1969:91).
For many workers, these views are not only theoretically satisfying but 
also seem sufficiently unproblematical in application. Many biologists (espe-
cially zoologists) seem to be satisfied that, with the exception of some sibling 
species complexes and rassenkreise, the application of biological/evolution-
ary species concepts will yield the same sets of organisms that would be 
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recognized as “species” by a competent taxonomist in a museum, or by a 
person on the street.2
It must be pointed out, however, that the prevailing species concepts are 
based on relatively few well-studied groups such as birds and Drosophila, groups 
in which discontinuities in the ability to interbreed are relatively complete, and 
discontinuities in morphological and ecological variation coincide well with the 
inability to breed in nature. It also must be pointed out that even though rela-
tively few groups have been studied in detail, a correspondence between mor-
phological, ecological, and breeding discontinuities is often simply assumed.
The acceptance of biological/evolutionary species concepts has not been 
universal. In particular, the botanical community has not wholeheartedly taken 
them up, and alternatives have been proliferated.3 It seems clear that the group 
2 Gould (1979) and others have defended the biological species concept on the grounds that the 
same taxa recognized by western taxonomists are recognized by tribespeople in New Guinea, 
etc. There are several problems with this kind of argument. First, it is not clear that this finding 
constitutes an independent test because, after all, New Guinea tribespeople are human too, with 
similar cognitive principles and limitations of language. It should also be borne in mind that the 
observer is by no means neutral. Folk taxonomies have been collected by people with a knowl-
edge of evolution and modern systematic concepts. Second, it is generally not a strong argument 
to show that a pre-scientifìc society has recognized something that modern science currently 
accepts. Surely a modem astronomer would not consider it very strong evidence that a primi-
tive mythology supported one cosmological theory over another. Finally, the taxa recognized 
by western taxonomists (and often by natives at some level of their linguistic hierarchy) in these 
instances are not known to be biological species – for the most part they are morphological units 
that are believed to be reproductively isolated from other such units.
3 Initially, the biological species concept was embraced and promulgated by plant systematists 
interested in evolution (Stebbins, 1950; Grant, 1957). Cronquist (1978) detailed Grant’s efforts 
(from 1956 to 1966) to apply the biological species concept in Gilia  (Polemoniaceae). It very 
soon became apparent that the biological species concept was fraught with difficulties, but Grant 
chose to amend the concept (rather than abandon it altogether), first (1957) with the notion of 
the syngameon (i.e., the unit of interbreeding higher than the species), later (1971) by adopting an 
evolutionary species concept. Finally, in the second edition of his classic book on plant specia-
tion, Grant (1981) treats species in a more flexible and pluralistic manner. Some botanists (e.g., 
Stebbins, 1979:25) continue to feel that the biological species concept, or some modification 
of it, is the only suitable framework for understanding plant diversity. However, many (perhaps 
most) botanical systematists remain rather skeptical about the general applicability of the con-
cept in botany (Davis and Heywood, 1963; Raven, 1976; Cronquist, 1978; Levin, 1979; Stevens, 
1980a).
  The different attitudes of zoologists and botanists towards the concept of species may be of 
interest to historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science. For organismic and evolutionary 
biology, the “modern synthesis” of the 1930’s and 1940’s may have represented a revolution 
in the sense of Kuhn (1970). For systematists, the principal outcome was the biological species 
concept. Zoologists (especially vertebrate systematists) appear to have largely accepted the new 
paradigm and to have entered a period of “normal science/’ applying the concept in particular 
cases (“puzzle-solving”). While problems like sibling species, semispecies, and subspecies have 
become apparent, these have generally not prompted a critical evaluation of the paradigm or 
a proliferation of alternatives. In contrast, in the botanical community the biological species 
concept was soon found to be inapplicable or of difficult application and likely to lead to confu-
sion. This resulted in a groping for alternatives and a defense of older concepts. In this regard, 
the historical development of species concepts in botany seems to fit better. Feyerabend’s (1970) 
characterization of scientific change as the simultaneous practice of normal science and the 
proliferation of alternative theories.
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of organisms on which one specializes strongly influences the view of “species” 
that one develops. It also seems clear that in order to fully appreciate biological 
diversity (for purposes of developing general concepts), it is essential to study a 
variety of different kinds of organisms, or at least take seriously those who have.4
Numerous attacks have been leveled at the biological/evolutionary species 
concepts. Many of these have been concerned primarily with whether they are 
operational (e.g., Sokal and Crovello, 1970). However, as Hull (1968, 1970) has 
pointed out, a concept cannot be completely operational and still be useful 
for the growth of science. The critical question is whether a concept is opera-
tional enough to be useful as a conceptual framework. Considerations of opera-
tionally, while certainly of interest, are not central to the argument developed 
below, which primarily concerns the theoretical adequacy of prevailing species 
concepts.
Empirical Considerations
In our view, a theoretically satisfactory species concept must bear some specifi-
able relationship to observed patterns of variation among organisms. It is not 
acceptable to adopt a definition of species simply because it conveniently fits 
into some more inclusive theory, e.g., a theory of evolutionary process. A species 
concept is, in effect, a low-level hypothesis about the nature of that variation, 
itself subject to empirical tests. Therefore, in this section, we summarize some 
relevant empirical findings, many of which have not been generally recognized.
the Noncorrespondence of Discontinuities
The reason for discontent among botanists and other workers is not that they 
have been unable to perceive discontinuities in nature. Instead, it has become 
apparent that there are many kinds of discontinuities, all of which may be of 
interest (Davis and Heywood, 1963:91). The question is, how well do various 
discontinuities correspond; i.e., are the same sets of organisms delimited by 
discontinuities when we look at morphology, as when we look at ecology, or 
breeding? The answer appears to be that there is no necessary correspondence. 
Stebbins (1950), Grant (1957, 1971, 1981), Stace (1978), and many others have 
discussed hybridization, apomixis, polyploidy, and anomalous breeding systems 
in plants and have clearly documented the frequent noncorrespondence of dif-
ferent kinds of discontinuities. In some groups, there is complete reproductive 
4 The zoologists initially responsible for developing the biological species concept were aware of 
the difficulties in applying the concept in some groups of animals and many groups of plants. 
Dobzhansky (1937, 1972) consistently pointed out the diversity of “species situations” observ-
able in nature. Mayr (1942:122) was careful to point out differences between plants and ani-
mals, and difficulties in the practical application of the biological species concept in some 
cases. Particularly, rigid versions of the biological species concept have been promulgated more 
recently, in attempted generalizations that have shown a startling lack of concern for the biology 
of the majority of organisms on earth. Mayr (1982) has examined the resistance of botanists to 
the biological species concept and concluded that “the concept does not describe an excep-
tional situation” (p. 280). But he grants some justification to the ideas of “certain botanists” who 
question “whether the wide spectrum of breeding systems that can be found in plants can all be 
subsumed under the single concept (and term) ‘species’“ (p. 278).
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isolation between populations that would be recognized as one species on mor-
phological grounds (i.e., “sibling species,” as in some groups of Gilia (Grant, 
1964), and Clarkia (Small, 1971)), and in many other groups of plants the inter-
breeding unit encompasses two to many morphological units (e.g., Quercus 
(Burger, 1975)).
It has also become clear that discontinuities in morphological variation or in 
the ability to interbreed do not necessarily correspond to differences in ecology 
(“niche?”). The early work of Turesson (1922a, 1922b) in Europe, and of Clausen, 
Keck, and Hiesey (1939, 1940) in North America, demonstrated that ecotypes 
“may or may not possess well-marked morphological differences which enable 
them to be recognized in the field” (Stebbins, 1950:49). The great extent to 
which local populations of the same biological or morphological species are 
physiologically differentiated and adapted to their particular environments is 
only now being realized (Mooney and Billings, 1961; Antonovics et al., 1971; 
Antonovics, 1972; Bradshaw, 1972; Kiang, 1982).
If noncorrespondence is prevalent, then strict biological species will not 
necessarily have anything in common but reproductive isolation. It might be 
argued that a species concept that unambiguously reflects one aspect of varia-
tion may be preferable to one that ambiguously reflects several things. But why 
should we necessarily pin species names on sets of organisms delimited by 
reproductive barriers? Why not choose, for example, to name morphological 
units instead?
One argument for pinning species names on reproductively isolated groups 
is that breeding discontinuities are thought to be more clear-cut than mor-
phological ones and therefore less arbitrary. However, Ornduff (1969) has 
summarized the complexity of the reproductive biology of flowering plants 
and pointed out the difficulty of applying rigid species delimitations based on 
interfertility. When variation in the ability to interbreed is examined in detail, 
we find discontinuities of many different degrees and kinds. Groups of organ-
isms range from completely interfertile to completely reproductively isolated. 
Hierarchies or networks of breeding groups vary in complex ways in space 
and time. Therefore, even if we were to decide that breeding discontinuities 
were theoretically the most important kind of discontinuity, and the ones that 
species names should reflect, the choice of what constitutes a significant dis-
continuity remains problematical.
A second argument for the importance of reproductive barriers is that 
gene flow prevents significant divergence while a lack of gene flow allows it. 
However, this now appears not to be the case. If a population is subjected to 
disruptive selection, there can be divergence even in the face of gene flow (Jain 
and Bradshaw, 1966). In these instances, it appears that some means of repro-
ductive isolation will usually evolve, but such isolation follows initial divergence. 
Moreover, allopatric populations can remain morphologically similar for very 
long periods or they can diverge morphologically (see discussion of this point by 
Bremer and Wanntorp, 1979a). This morphological divergence may or may not 
be accompanied by reproductive isolation, though it appears likely that eventu-
ally, a reproductive barrier will result. The point is that morphological divergence 
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and the attainment of means of reproductive isolation can be uncoupled events 
in time and space. Levin (1978:288–289) concluded:
“If we adhere to the biological species concept—the integrated reproductive com-
munities—described by Mayr, then speciation is capricious … Isolating mechanisms 
are not the cause of divergent evolution, nor are they essential for it to occur.”
A related, larger-scale argument for the importance of reproductive barriers is 
that groups that are reproductively isolated for long periods of time are at least 
evolutionarily independent (whether or not they diverge morphologically), mak-
ing them effectively separate entities. Reproductive barriers indeed may often be 
important in this way, but other factors such as ecological role and homeostatic 
“inertia” are important as well. Because of the complex nature of variation in 
each of these factors, and because different factors may be “most important” in 
the evolution of different groups, a universal criterion for delimiting fundamen-
tal, cohesive evolutionary entities does not exist.
Questionable Internal Genetic Cohesion
The notion of integration and internal cohesion is central to biological/evolution-
ary/individualistic species concepts. In this paper, we will follow the common 
assumption that “cohesion” means genetic cohesion maintained via gene flow, 
a notion that has recently been explicitly formulated (Wiley and Brooks, 1982). 
However, Hull (1978) has pointed out that other factors such as internal homeo-
stasis and “external environment in the form of unitary selection pressures” 
(p. 344) may contribute to or confer cohesion. It seems to us likely that “cohesion,” 
and the factors responsible for it, will differ from one group of organisms to 
another and from one level in the hierarchy to another.
Ehrlich and Raven (1969) pointed out that the extent of gene flow seems 
to be very limited in many organisms and may not account for the apparent 
integrity of the morphological units we recognize in nature. Bradshaw (1972:42) 
suggested that “effective population size in plants is to be measured in meters 
and not in kilometers.” Endler (1973) studied clinal variation and concluded that 
“gene flow may be unimportant in the differentiation of populations along envi-
ronmental gradients” (p. 249). Levin and Kerster (1974) thoroughly reviewed and 
analyzed the literature concerning gene flow in seed plants and concluded that 
“the numbers [of individuals] within panmictic units are to be measured in tens 
and not hundreds” (p. 203). These same points were reiterated by Sokal (1973), 
Raven (1976), and Levin (1978,1981). Levin (1979:383) stated:
“The idea that plant species are Mendelian populations wedded by the bonds of 
mating is most difficult to justify given our knowledge about gene flow. Indeed 
a contrary viewpoint is supported. Populations separated by several kilometers 
may rarely, if ever, exchange genes and as such may evolve independently in the 
absence of strong or even weak selective differentials.”
Lande (1980) has stressed that there has been an overemphasis on the genetic 
cohesion of widespread species and argued that “of the major forces conserving 
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phenotypic uniformity in time and space, stabilizing selection is by far the most 
powerful” (p. 467). Grant (1980:167) suggested that “the homogeneity of species 
is due more to descent from a common ancestor than to gene exchange across 
significant parts of the species area.”
Jackson and Pound (1979) critically reviewed much of this literature and 
rightly pointed out that there is little rigorous evidence in animals to support or 
to reject the generality of any statement about gene flow because detailed stud-
ies are rare. They concluded, however, that data “seem sufficient to indicate that 
gene flow in plants can be limited due to local or leptokurtic dispersal of pollen 
and seeds” (p. 78). It is important to keep in mind that population genetic theory 
predicts that a small amount of migration between populations may be sufficient 
to maintain genetic similarity in the absence of differential selection (Lewontin, 
1974:212–216). Clearly, determining the relative importance of factors such as 
gene flow, developmental homeostasis, and selection in nature will require rig-
orous population genetic theory (e.g., Lande, 1980) and careful quantification of 
empirical data, rather than qualitative, anecdotal arguments.
Evolutionary biologists are just beginning to understand gene flow in plants 
and animals, but have hardly begun to address the complicated patterns of gene 
exchange present in the fungi, bacteria, and “protists.” A kind of chauvinism has 
so far restricted discussions of gene flow to comparisons of biparental sexual 
organisms and asexual ones. Complex patterns of sexuality are present in the 
fungi (Clémençon, 1977); intricate incompatibility systems, as well as incom-
pletely understood parasexuality cycles, make the simplistic application of the 
biological species concept impossible in most cases. The existence of discrete, 
integrated genetic lineages is even less likely in the “Monera” (Cowan, 1962). 
There probably are very few absolute barriers to genetic exchange in bacteria, 
because of the phenomena of DNA-mediated transformation, phage-mediated 
transduction, and bacterial conjugation (Bodmer, 1970).
Are Species Taxa Individuals?
In our view, the empirical considerations discussed above indicate that in many 
(perhaps most) major groups of organisms, actual patterns of variation are such 
that the species taxa currently recognized by taxonomists cannot be considered 
discrete, primary, and comparable “individuals,” integrated and cohesive via the 
exchange of genes, fundamentally different from taxa at other levels. Variation 
in morphology, ecology, and breeding is enormous and complex; there are dis-
continuities of varying degree in each of these factors and the discontinuities 
are often not congruent. There may often be roughly continuous reduction in 
the degree of cohesion due to gene flow as more inclusive groups of organisms 
are considered. The acquisition of reproductive isolating mechanisms appears 
in many cases to be fortuitous and such isolation is neither the cause of mor-
phological or ecological divergence nor is it necessary for divergence to occur.
Although many currently recognized species do not meet one important 
criterion of “individuality,” namely cohesion and integration of parts, another 
important criterion often is met, namely restricted spatiotemporal location 
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(i.e., units united by common descent). These units are not strictly “individuals” 
or “classes,” but clearly they can function in evolutionary theory and phylogeny 
construction. Wiley (1980) called such units “historical entities,” but applied this 
term only to taxa above the species level.
We should mention, as a disclaimer, that although many species taxa (as cur-
rently delimited) cannot be considered unique, individualistic units, this does 
not mean that all species taxa are not. In some groups of organisms, biological 
species may conform in all respects to the philosophical concept of individual. 
We simply suggest that this condition is a “special case,” and that unwarranted 
extrapolations have been made from a very few groups of organisms to organ-
isms generally.
Some Options
As discussed above, in many plant and some animal groups, evolutionary pro-
cesses (i.e., replication and interaction in the sense of Hull, 1980) occur primar-
ily on a small scale (even when extrapolated over many generations) relative to 
the traditional species level. In such groups, the units in nature that are more like 
individuals are actually interbreeding local populations, and therefore, the basal 
taxonomic unit (the species) is currently more inclusive than the basal evolution-
ary units (the populations). This means that many presently recognized species 
taxa are, at best, historical entities. If this is the case, and if we want species taxa 
that are more fully individuals, can we bring taxonomic practices in line with our 
theoretical desires, and at what cost? If we cannot, or if the costs are too great, 
are there any theoretically acceptable alternatives, and what would they entail?
We formulate here three options with which we are faced and reject the first 
two. In the next section, we explore some implications of the third alternative.
1. Alter the usage of “species” to equal “evolutionary unit,” i.e., attempt to 
locate all of the effectively isolated and independently evolving popula-
tions and apply species names to them.
2. Alter the usage of “species” to equal the “cenospecies” or “comparium” 
(see Stebbins, 1950; Grant, 1971), i.e., recognize as the basic taxonomic 
units only those taxa that are completely intersterile.
3. Apply species names at about the same level as we have in the past, 
and decouple the basal taxonomic unit from notions of “basic” evolu-
tionary units.
We reject choice (1) for several reasons, some practical and some theoretical. 
In a practical sense, formally naming whatever the truly genetically integrated 
units turned out to be would be disastrous. There are certainly very many such 
units, they are at best very difficult to perceive even with the most sophisticated 
techniques and in the most studied organisms, and these units are continuously 
changing in size and membership from one generation to the next. At any one 
time, we can never know which units will diverge forever.
Rosen (1978, 1979) has discussed and adopted a species concept quite similar 
to choice (1). While we would generally agree with him that populations with 
19The Need for Pluralism Because of Different Biologies in Different Taxa
apomorphous character states are units of evolutionary significance (1978:176), 
we could not agree that species should be “the smallest natural aggregation of 
individuals with a specifiable geographic integrity that can be defined by any 
current set of analytical techniques” (1979:277). Since we could probably distin-
guish each individual organism, or very small groups of organisms, on the basis 
of apomorphies (if we looked hard enough), why shouldn’t each of these units 
be given a Linnaean binomial?
There is a more important, theoretical reason for rejecting alternative (1), one 
that we have alluded to above. A pervasive confusion runs through much dis-
cussion of species: the erroneous notion that a single basal evolutionary unit is 
somewhere to be found among all the possible units that could be recognized. 
There are many evolutionary, genealogical units within a given lineage (Hull, 
1980) – a rough hierarchy or network of units, which may be temporally and 
spatially overlapping. Thus, in the search to find the evolutionary unit, one is 
on a very “slippery slope” indeed. Units all along this slope may be of interest 
to evolutionists, depending on the level of focus of the particular investigator. 
These units do require some sort of designation in order to be studied, but a 
formal, hierarchical Linnaean name is not necessary.
Option (2), in many instances, would represent the opposite extreme (an attempt 
to locate the “top” of the slippery slope). Absolute reproductive isolation would be 
used as the overriding ranking criterion. If two organisms could potentially exchange 
genes, either directly or through intermediates, they would be placed in the same 
species taxon. There are several reasons why we reject this alternative.
First, it is unclear that reproductive criteria necessarily provide species taxa 
that are useful for purposes of phylogeny reconstruction and historical biogeog-
raphy. As Rosen (1978, 1979) and Bremer and Wanntorp (1979a) have pointed 
out, “biological species” may be paraphyletic assemblages of populations united 
only by a plesiomorphy, i.e., all those organisms that have not acquired a means 
of reproductive isolation. If reproductive criteria are to be useful for cladistic 
analysis, it is necessary to determine which modes of isolation arose as evolu-
tionary novelties in a group.
Our second objection to option (2) has to do with the problem of measur-
ing “potentiality.” There have been numerous comments on the inadequacy of 
potential interbreeding as a ranking criterion, and even strong proponents of the 
biological species concept have rejected potential interbreeding as a part of their 
species definitions. Under certain conditions, very disparate organisms can be 
made to cross. If we adopted this option, the family Orchidaceae, with approxi-
mately 20,000 species at present (covering a great range of variation), might be 
lumped into just a few species because horticulturalists have produced so many 
bi-and pluri-generic hybrids. The universal application of any one criterion will 
undoubtedly obscure important patterns of variation in other parameters.
Species Like Genera
If we adopted alternative (3), what would happen to the species category? 
Would species taxa necessarily be theoretically meaningless entities? Are all 
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alternatives to biological/evolutionary/individual species concepts devoid of 
theoretical interest as implied by Eldredge and Cracraft (1980:94)?
We would agree that if species were simply phenetically similar groups 
of populations they might indeed be unsatisfactory for many purposes. The 
application of species concepts like those of Cronquist (1978) and Nelson and 
Platnick (1981) may yield species taxa that are not useful from the standpoint of 
reconstructing phylogenies (see discussion by Beatty, 1982).5
However, we think that one form of option (3) may provide theoretically 
meaningful units. In groups where the actual interbreeding units are small rela-
tive to the morphologically delimited units, species can be considered to be like 
genera or families or higher taxa at all levels. That is, they are assemblages of 
populations united by descent just as genera are assemblages of species united 
by descent, etc. If we required that species be monophyletic assemblages of 
populations (to the extent that this could be hypothesized), then they could play 
a role in evolutionary and phylogenetic theory just as monophyletic taxa at all 
levels can. Theoretical significance does not reside solely in the basal taxonomic 
units or in units that are “fully individuals.”
If we recognize that species are like genera, and insist that they be mono-
phyletic, then we are faced with the problems of assessing monophyly and of 
ranking, problems that plague systematists working at all levels. Several differ-
ent concepts of monophyly have been employed by systematists, but none of 
them explicitly at the species level (see discussion by Holmes, 1980). We favor 
Hennig’s (1966) concept of monophyly (except explicitly applied at the species 
level) but are fully aware of the difficulties in its application at low taxonomic 
levels (Arnold, 1981; Hill and Crane, 1982). In particular, the difficulty posed by 
reticulation (hybridization) (Bremer and Wanntorp, 1979b) may be especially 
acute at lower taxonomic levels. Using synapomorphy as evidence of mono-
phyly requires that the polarity of character states be determined, and again this 
may be an especially difficult problem near the species level. Polarity assess-
ments will be possible to a greater or lesser extent depending on the certainty 
with which out-groups are known (Stevens, 1980b).
As noted previously, in order to use reproductive isolation as evidence of 
monophyly, it would be necessary to determine which means of reproductive 
isolation are apomorphies at a given level, and which are not. An example of 
the difficulty of applying a Hennigian concept of monophyly is the very real 
possibility of “paraphyletic speciation.” If speciation by peripheral isolation hap-
pens frequently, then a population (geographically defined), which has devel-
oped some apomorphic feature (such as a morphological novelty or an isolating 
mechanism) with respect to its “parent” species, may often be cladistically more 
closely related to some part of the parent species than to the remainder (see 
5 The species concepts of Cronquist and of Nelson and Platnick are as follows:
Cronquist (1978:15): “the smallest groups that are consistently and persistently distinct, and dis-
tinguishable by ordinary means.”
Nelson and Platnick (1981:12): “the smallest detected samples of self-perpetuating organisms that 
have unique sets of characters.”
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discussion and example in Bremer and Wanntorp, 1979a). In such a case, we 
would take the (perhaps controversial) position that if the population is to be 
recognized as a formal species taxon, and if the phylogenetic relationships of the 
populations in the parent species can be resolved, then the taxonomist should 
not formally name the parent “species” (which has now been found to be a 
paraphyletic group), but instead name monophyletic groups discerned within it. 
Conversely, however, if cladistic structure within the parent species cannot be 
resolved, then in our view it would be acceptable to provisionally name it as a 
species (even if the populations included within shared no apomorphy).
This example illustrates the fact that even when monophyletic groups are 
delimited, the problem of ranking remains since monophyletic groups can be 
found at many levels within a clade. Species ranking criteria could include 
group size, gap size, geological age, ecological or geographical criteria, degree 
of intersterility, tradition, and possibly others. The general problem of ranking 
is presently unresolved, and we suspect that an absolute and universally appli-
cable criterion may never be found and that, instead, “answers” will have to be 
developed on a group by group basis.
Some Consequences of Pluralism
We have outlined a concept of species (i.e., “species like genera”) that may be 
appropriate for groups of organisms in which certain conditions obtain. However, 
we think that a variety of species concepts are necessary to adequately capture 
the complexity of variation patterns in nature. To subsume this variation under 
the rubric of any one concept leads to confusion and tends to obscure important 
evolutionary questions. As Hull (1970; see epigraph) has argued, we must resist 
the urge to superimpose false simplicity. If “species situations” are diverse, then 
a variety of concepts may be necessary and desirable to reflect this complexity.
Many theories in biology appear to lack the universality of theories in other 
natural sciences. Often the problem is to decide which one of several theories 
(not necessarily mutually exclusive) applies to a particular situation (for a specific 
application of this theoretical pluralism to evolutionary biology, see Gould and 
Lewontin, 1979). A satisfactory general theory is one in which the number of 
sub-theories is kept to a minimum, but not reduced to the point where important 
patterns and processes are obscured. The evaluation of how well a theoretical 
system “accounts for” patterns in the world is problematical, and we cannot 
offer any generally applicable criterion for making such an evaluation. However, 
in the case of species, we think that the search for a universal species concept, 
wherein the basal unit in evolutionary biology and in taxonomy is the same, is 
misguided. In our opinion, it is time for “species” to suffer a fate similar to that of 
the classical concept of “gene.”6
6 Initially, the “gene” was considered to be the unit of heredity, but the classical concept of gene 
has been replaced by several concepts which stand in a complex relation to one another (Hull, 
1965). The use of a disjunctive definition (Hull, 1965) allows a single term to designate a complex 
of concepts. However, this can become so confusing that it may be desirable to replace (at least 
in part) an old terminology with a new set of terms with more precise meanings.
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We should recognize that species taxa have never been, and very probably can-
not be made readily comparable units. This observation has a number of important 
theoretical implications. Ecologists must consider the extent to which “species” can 
be considered equivalent and comparable from one group of organisms to another. 
Population sizes and structures, gene flow, social organization, the nature of selective 
factors, and developmental constraints differ in multifarious ways. This means that it is 
imperative that systematists be explicit about the nature of variation in, and the prop-
erties of, the species that they recognize in the groups they study. In turn, the users of 
species names must at all times be aware that “species are only equivalent by desig-
nation, and not by virtue of the nature or extent of their evolutionary differentiation” 
(Davis and Heywood, 1963:92). As obfuscatory as this may seem, comparative biolo-
gists must not make inferences from a species name without consulting the systematic 
literature to see what patterns of variation the name purports to represent.
These considerations are also important to paleontologists, who make infer-
ences about, and from, “fossil species,” and imply correspondences between 
variation in morphology, ecology, and breeding. It is perplexing that some quite 
innovative paleontologists, such as Eldredge and Gould, have uncritically retained 
the biological species concept in their work. As we have shown, there are many 
reasons why species should not be treated as particles or quanta. Paleontologists 
should consider exactly what macroevolutionary theories require species to be. 
For many purposes, they may not require species that are completely individu-
als, but simply monophyletic lineages. If units that are cohesive via gene flow 
are an absolute requirement, then fossils may not provide appropriate evidence.
Finally, what are the implications for the systematist of a pluralistic outlook 
on species? Systematists working on relatively little known organisms should not 
assume that concepts derived from other groups of organisms are necessarily 
applicable. Instead, in each group, the systematist is obligated to study patterns 
of variation in morphology, ecology, and breeding, and to detail the nature of 
the correspondences among these patterns. It is essential that the ways in which 
names are applied to taxa at all levels be stated explicitly.
If we adopt a case by case approach and urge specialists to unabashedly 
develop concepts for their particular groups, are we saying that “anything goes?” 
Of course, the answer is no. We are only suggesting pluralism within limits. Taxa 
(including species) recognized by systematists must have a specifiable relation-
ship to theoretically important variation, more specifically, we have argued that 
species taxa should be phylogenetically meaningful units. There may not be a 
universal criterion to arbitrate between conflicting species classifications of a 
given genus, but through the complex process that is science, the community of 
involved workers can and will hammer out criteria for making such decisions.
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Abstract
This paper examines the theoretical and practical status of species relative to 
two major issues: the recognition of the importance of epigenetic constraints in 
evolution and the rise of Hennigian phylogenetic systematics (cladistics). Theories 
advanced to explain the origin and maintenance of basic morphological clusters 
of organisms (species) have usually involved two main classes of causal factors: 
selection (ecological constraints) and gene flow (breeding barriers vs. the inte-
grating effect of gene exchange). However, in many plants, non-correspondence 
of patterns of discontinuities among basic morphological, ecological, and breed-
ing groups has been noted. The “biological species concept” is flawed because it 
is biased towards explanations at the genetic level. A third class of causal factors 
(epigenetic constraints) has come into favor as an explanation for the distinctness 
of higher-level morphological clusters, but the relevance of epigenetic factors as 
primary constraints on morphological variation at the species level remains to be 
examined. A phylogenetic species concept is advocated, which views species 
as monophyletic groups of organisms, the smallest such groups recognized in 
a formal classification. Assignment of species rank to a particular group should 
depend on the causal factors acting to maintain that group as an independent lin-
eage. Epigenetic constraints may prove to be the most important factor producing 
and maintaining species lineages. Bryophytes are useful organisms for investigat-
ing this question because they are readily manipulated under experimental con-
ditions, both sexual and asexual species exist, and a diversity of ecological and 
geographic specificities are known.
What are basic kinds in systematic and evolutionary biology? Since the Darwinian 
Revolution, biologists have been struggling to arrive at a concept of species in 
order to explain morphological discontinuities in terms of the dynamic process 
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of evolution. This debate has not been resolved. Botanists and zoologists, phy-
leticists and pheneticists, paleontologists and population geneticists, philoso-
phers and practitioners have yet to reach a consensus.
Simple observation shows that the diversity of the natural world is not con-
tinuous. Organic variation usually falls into clusters or nodes, which are often 
structured hierarchically into progressively more inclusive clusters. The central 
problem of systematic biology is to document these patterns; the central prob-
lem of evolutionary biology is to determine what processes are responsible for 
stasis or change in these nodes. Clearly, the units recognized by systematists 
must be the units involved in processes studied by evolutionists if the work of 
these two fields is to be mutually relevant. Therefore, it is important to examine 
carefully the status of species, a category often held to be unique and fundamen-
tal by both systematists and evolutionists.
A diversity of views on the meaning of species exists (for reviews see Mayr 1957; 
Wiley 1978). Yet it seems that the prevailing species concept among systematists, 
ecologists, and evolutionists (especially zoologists) is some version of the biological/
evolutionary species concept (Simpson 1961; Mayr 1970) or the “species as indi-
vidual” concept as developed by Ghiselin (1974) and Hull (1976, 1980). In this view 
species taxa are seen as fundamentally and universally different from taxa at all other 
levels: real, genetically integrated, cohesive, and comparable units of evolution.
The acceptance of the biological or evolutionary species concept has certainly not 
been universal among botanists (Mishler & Donoghue 1982). Some botanists, espe-
cially cytologists (e.g., Stebbins 1950, 1979) advocate a biological species concept 
based on discontinuities in gene flow. However, many botanists favor a morphologi-
cal (i.e., phenetic) species concept (e.g., Cronquist 1978; Levin 1979). However, neither 
of these concepts is appropriate for recognizing theoretically meaningful taxa.
Mishler and Donoghue (1982) presented empirical and theoretical arguments 
to indicate that current biological or evolutionary species concepts are over-
simplified (see also Donoghue, this symposium). They concluded that no single 
and universal basic evolutionary unit exists and that in most cases species taxa 
have no special reality in nature. Furthermore, criteria for what constitutes an 
“important” discontinuity appear to depend on differences in the biology of 
different groups of organisms. Causal factors responsible for the existence of 
morphologically distinct species seem to be fundamentally different in different 
groups. It was suggested that a more pluralistic concept of species is needed to 
reflect adequately the variety and complexity of “species situations.”
In the present paper, I attempt to weave together two theoretical strands. The 
first relates to the general debate in systematics over what taxonomic names 
should represent. Even among Hennigian phylogenetic systematists a diversity 
of species concepts has been or is being espoused. While this school of thought 
is presenting a strong challenge to traditional “evolutionary systematics,” there 
has been inadequate discussion of the fundamental taxonomic level of species. 
The second strand involves the debate over the relative importance of vari-
ous evolutionary forces acting to constrain morphological variation over time. 
Growing realization of the importance of epigenetic constraints in evolution is 
another element in an increasingly coherent challenge to the neo-Darwinian 
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“modern synthesis.” However, whether epigenetic factors act as constraints on 
morphological variation at the species level remains to be examined.
This discussion will of necessity be generalized because the application and 
meaning of the species category remain problematic in all major groups of organ-
isms. However, in keeping with the theme of the symposium, I will refer primarily 
to bryophytes (especially to the moss Tortula) for examples. What is special about 
the species situation in bryophytes? Conversely, how can bryophytes illustrate 
issues of general biological interest with respect to the species problem?
The Species Category and Hennigian Phylogenetic Systematics:  
Ontology and Phylogeny
The past two decades have seen the rise of Hennigian phylogenetic systemat-
ics or cladistics. This method arose as a reaction to the traditional, subjective 
“evolutionary systematics” and to the more recent indiscriminate grouping by 
overall similarity advocated by the numerical phenetics school. The applica-
tion of Hennigian cladistics to bryology was discussed by Mishler and Churchill 
(1984); see Wiley (1981) for further details.
Two important ideas contributed by Hennig (1966) were the recognition of 
the importance of using shared derived characters for reconstructing phylogeny 
and the restriction of the concept of monophyly to those groups that contain all 
and only descendants of a common ancestor.
Within the Hennigian school a diversity of species concepts are advocated, none 
of which fully deals with the application of Hennigian ideas such as monophyly to 
the species category. Hennig (1966) advocated the biological species concept in his 
work. As expressed by Mayr (1970), biological species “are groups of interbreeding 
natural populations that are reproductively isolated from other such groups.”
Nelson and Platnick (1981) devoted only a few paragraphs to the species 
category. They define species as “simply the smallest detected samples of self-
perpetuating organisms that have unique sets of characters,” then go on to stress 
that a species need not have any single unique trait – only a unique, diagnos-
able combination of characters. They make a distinction between “species” and 
“groups of species.” As Platnick (1985) has elaborated, the latter does need to 
have apomorphies. However, a basic concept (such as “species”) that fills an 
ontological role in a theoretical system cannot be chosen arbitrarily and inde-
pendently of the theoretical system in which it occurs. Since Nelson and Platnick 
are not enthusiastic about current evolutionary theory, it is perhaps understand-
able that they do not frame and justify their species concept in terms of that 
theory. However, their concept seems inadequately justified even in terms of 
the theoretical system in which they work. There is no explicit connection to 
the general concept of taxa as lineages, and there is also nothing to distinguish 
their concept from those proposed by pheneticists. The use of phenetic spe-
cies in cladistic and biogeographic analyses is an important internal conflict. 
A phenetic species concept at best can serve as a first approximation of basal 
cladistic units in a phylogenetic analysis, but the concept of species needed for 
phylogenetic systematics must be richer in content.
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Rosen (1979) has defined species as a “population or group of populations 
defined by one or more apomorphous features … the smallest natural aggrega-
tion of individuals with a specifiable geographic integrity that can be defined by 
any current set of analytical techniques.” This definition, in contrast to that of 
Nelson and Platnick, is consistent with the systematic and biogeographic theo-
ries of the author. However, it is atomistic, tending towards the recognition of 
individual organisms or family groups as Linnaean species (Hill & Crane 1982; 
Mishler & Donoghue 1982). It is important to recognize that concepts of phylo-
genetic taxa (including species) must include two components, a grouping crite-
rion (e.g., monophyly) and a ranking criterion (see Donoghue, this symposium). 
Rosen’s definition has a criterion that can be used to group organisms, but the 
criterion for ranking is vague. I will return later to this distinction and to the ques-
tion of just what these ranking criteria should be in phylogenetic systematics.
Eldredge and Cracraft (1980) defined species as: “a diagnosable cluster of 
individuals within which there is a parental pattern of ancestry and descent, 
beyond which there is not, and which exhibits a pattern of phylogenetic ances-
try and descent among units of like kind.” While this definition out of context 
may not be clear, since all would accept that there is a pattern of ancestry and 
descent beyond the species level, reference to the discussion in Eldredge and 
Cracraft (1980) will show that the concept being advocated is more or less the 
standard biological species concept. However, Cracraft (1982) has more recently 
presented a view of species similar to that of Nelson and Platnick (1981).
As a modification of Simpson’s (1961) evolutionary species concept Wiley 
(1981:25) has presented the following species definition: “a single lineage of 
ancestral descendant populations of organisms which maintains its identity from 
other such lineages and which has its own evolutionary tendencies and histori-
cal fate.” I find this concept to be the most compelling so far advocated by cla-
dists because it provides an explicit statement of species as lineages. However, 
this concept is similar to the biological species concept in its usual emphasis 
on genetic discontinuity and in that it views the species category as unique and 
fundamental (a view that I argue is not generally the case).
Taken as a whole, the various concepts of species held by cladists span almost 
the whole range of diversity of species concepts held by systematists generally. 
However, these cladistic species concepts have features in common. All (except for 
Rosen’s concept) make a clear distinction between species and groups of species 
(i.e., higher taxa) and do not apply an unequivocal, cladistic concept of monophyly 
(i.e., the recognition of monophyly by apomorphies) to the species level. This dis-
tinction is also made by Hill and Crane (1982) who contrast cladistic species (as 
evidenced by apomorphies) with “real” species (as evidenced by genetic isolation) 
and point out that there is no necessary congruence between the two.
There are also substantial differences among the species concepts discussed 
above. What species concept is adopted matters theoretically because of the 
central role of the species concept and of species in biology and practically 
because systematists with differing views of species will often treat the same 
situation in different ways. Terms such as “species” have a necessary relationship 
to theories in which they are embedded (Hull 1981). As Hull (1968, 1981), Beatty 
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(1982), Lewontin (1974), Hennig (1966), and others have pointed out, progress in 
understanding the world comes as we build an elaborate theoretical structure 
by iteratively matching together lower-level theories (such as species concepts 
and classifications) with higher-level theories (such as evolutionary theory). The 
question of definition or meaning of a basic term such as species is thus embed-
ded in both lower-level and higher-level causal theories. Empirical consider-
ations enter in the low-level matching of observation and theoretical concept; 
ontological considerations enter in because of the function of such basic terms 
in higher-level explanatory theories.
Despite the many problems with details, the theory of evolution (descent with 
modification) unquestionably remains the primary overarching theoretical struc-
ture for comparative biology and provides both the justification and motivation 
for the development of phylogenetic systematics. Concepts of species must be 
evaluated in terms of the role these concepts play in evolutionary theory as well 
as by their fit to observed patterns of variation among organisms.
The evolutionary species concept as developed by Wiley and others fails 
to fit observed empirical patterns in many groups of organisms (Mishler & 
Donoghue 1982). There are two main conclusions drawn by Mishler and 
Donoghue which, if true, have important implications for phylogenetic sys-
tematics. The first is the notion that species often have no special reality as 
compared to taxa at other levels within a clade. The second is that the causal 
factors responsible for differentiation at the species level seem to be funda-
mentally different in different groups.
The first conclusion conflicts with the current distinction between “species” 
and “groups of species,” which figures importantly in cladistic concepts of mono-
phyly, ancestor-descendant relationships, and the supposed difference between 
cladograms and trees. Since (contrary to Wiley 1981) species cannot be taken 
as a priori monophyletic, cladistic theory must expand and develop meaningful 
concepts of monophyly at the species level. The task of developing a revised defi-
nition of monophyly that is applicable to the species category (which is necessary 
because Hennigian monophyly is traditionally defined with reference to origin of a 
taxon in a single species) is beyond the scope of the present paper. In short, mono-
phyly should be viewed as involving a single origin of a taxon. In the case of spe-
cies, this means single origin in one population or even one individual organism.
Particularly controversial situations that must be faced by a strict phylo-
genetic species concept are the apparently frequent cases of incongruence 
between cladistically discrete groups and genetically discrete groups (biologi-
cal species) (Bremer & Wanntorp 1979; Hill & Crane 1982). As pointed out by 
Rosen (1979), biological species may often be united only by a plesiomorphy, 
reproductive compatibility. A solution favored in these situations by Wiley 
(1981, and pers. comm.) and Hill and Crane (1982) is to name as species the 
genetically interconnected groups. In my opinion, however, this would obscure 
the important pattern. The fact that cladistic structure can be observed in the 
face of potential or actual gene flow is an indication that other causal factors 
are operating and a good reason to name as species the cladistically distinct 
groups. I favor applying Hennigian principles of classification to the use of 
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Linnaean binomials, reserving the formal taxon, species, for minimally “impor-
tant” phylogenetic units as evidenced by apomorphies. In this context “impor-
tant” refers to ranking criteria.
The generally unrecognized distinction between the grouping and ranking 
components of a species concept is critical (see also discussion by Donoghue, 
this symposium). All species concepts have both components. For example, in 
the biological species concept, the grouping criterion is having the ability to 
interbreed; the ranking criterion is being the most inclusive group having that 
ability. Even when monophyletic groups (sensu Hennig) are delimited the prob-
lem of ranking remains because monophyletic groups can be found at many lev-
els within a clade. Species ranking criteria could include morphological gap size 
(i.e., morphological distinctiveness), ecological or geographical criteria, degree 
of intersterility, and possibly others. The general problem of ranking is presently 
unresolved. I contend that an absolute and universally applicable criterion is not 
possible and that criteria will have to be developed on a group by group basis 
with reference to causal factors that are important in maintaining lineages in 
particular groups. The grouping concept, monophyly, should be retained as a 
universal component of the species concept until it can be shown empirically 
that other concepts of grouping are needed (which may indeed be the case in 
groups such as bacteria).
An Epigenetic View of the Species Category: Ontogeny and Plurality
A renewal of interest in the relationship between development and evolution 
has taken place in evolutionary biology. Darwin’s mysterious “laws of correla-
tion of characters” did not figure prominently in the modern synthesis of evo-
lutionary theory fashioned in the 1930s and 40s despite Waddington’s (1957) 
striking analogy of a developmental landscape. [See Gould (1980) for a general 
discussion of current challenges to the “modern synthesis,” which hardened in 
the late 1940s and 50s into a strongly reductionistic, genetically based theory.]
Of particular relevance here are recent attempts to discover and define 
developmental or epigenetic constraints on patterns of morphological form (Ho 
& Saunders 1979; Alberch 1980, 1982; Rachootin & Thomson 1981; Oster & 
Alberch 1982). The general theme of these investigations is the existence of 
complex epigenetic programs that translate the genotype into the phenotype. 
These epigenetic rules ensure that a one-to-one matching between a particular 
sequence of DNA and a particular phenotypic feature is unusual. Thus, certain 
phenotypes are prohibited or are unlikely, and continuous genetic change can 
result in discontinuous epigenetic changes.
The possible role of epigenetic factors as primary constraints on morphologi-
cal variation at the species level has only been mentioned in passing (Eldredge & 
Gould 1972). In my opinion, an important internal conflict is created when work-
ers such as Gould (1979) and Eldredge and Cracraft (1980) defend the strongly 
reductionistic, genetically based biological species concept at the same time 
they are advocating a critical reexamination of the modem synthesis. The newly 
developing macroevolutionary theory relies strongly on a hierarchical view of 
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evolution (Gould 1980; Eldredge & Cracraft 1980), but the biological species 
concept is not necessary (in fact, it may even be harmful) for this view.
The debate about the differentiation or stasis of populations and species has 
so far primarily been a comparison of two classes of causal factors, gene flow 
and selection (Ehrlich & Raven 1969; Jackson & Pounds 1979; Ehrlich & White 
1980; Pounds & Jackson 1982). Neither position seems to provide a satisfactory 
explanation for many situations in plants. As pointed out by Grant (1980:167), 
“the homogeneity of species is due more to descent from a common ancestor 
than to gene exchange across significant parts of the species-area.” Of course, 
this well-justified conclusion by itself does not provide an explanation for the 
homogeneity of species; the addition of a third class of causal factors, epigenetic 
constraints, is necessary.
It is well known that morphological variation is often poorly connected to 
genetic variation in plants. In some cases small genetic changes can lead to 
major morphological changes (Gottlieb 1984); in other cases, large genetic 
changes result in little or no morphological difference. Examples of the latter are 
provided by single morphological species with a variable chromosome number 
(e.g., Sedum moranense, Uhl 1983; and Tortula princeps, Steere, Anderson & 
Bryan 1954) or the widely recognized existence of high levels of genetic poly-
morphism (as revealed by electrophoresis) within and between single popula-
tions (Lewontin 1974; reviewed for bryophytes by Wyatt 1982).
Examples of noncorrespondence between morphological, breeding, and 
ecological discontinuities in plants are numerous (see literature cited in Mishler 
& Donoghue 1982), but one example from bryophytes is instructive. My studies 
of the moss Tortula (Mishler 1984) illustrated the sorts of noncorrespondence 
that have caused dissatisfaction with the prevailing view of gene flow and selec-
tion as the only major causal factors in the homogeneity or divergence of spe-
cies and have prompted a search for another explanation.
Tortula contains both sexual and asexual species, a spectrum of sexual condi-
tions from dioicy to synoicy in the sexual species, and several types of special-
ized asexual propagules. Tortula includes species that are narrowly endemic, 
others that are cosmopolitan, and some that are intermediate. Ecologically, both 
specialized and generalized species are represented. This diversity can allow 
comparative study of topics of current interest, such as punctuated morphologi-
cal change and the relative importance of gene flow, selection, developmental 
constraints, and historical factors in producing and maintaining discontinuities 
in morphological variation.
The 21 species of Tortula recognized for Mexico (Mishler 1994) do not form 
a monophyletic group, but they represent a cross-section of the diversity of spe-
cies within the genus. These species can be divided into four discrete categories: 
sporophytes always present (7 species); sporophytes infrequent but produced in 
a roughly equal frequency throughout the range of the species (6 species); spo-
rophytes infrequent but produced only in a small part of the total range, the spe-
cies thus asexual throughout most of their ranges (5 species); and sporophytes 
absent and the species thus apparently wholly asexual (3 species). The lack 
of certain expected correlations with the frequency of sporophyte production 
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(and hence the opportunity for reproducing via sexually produced propagules) 
is striking. The size of a species’ geographic range or its frequency of occur-
rence within it (as judged from herbarium specimens and my extensive field 
studies in Mexico) is not correlated with the frequency of sporophyte formation. 
Furthermore, the distinctiveness of a particular species (i.e., the possession of a 
set of unique characters) is not correlated with either sporophyte frequency or 
the occurrence of specialized asexual propagules.
The evident importance of asexual reproduction in many species of Tortula 
and the occurrence of widespread species that are nonetheless constant mor-
phologically seem to eliminate gene flow as a likely integrating factor. Stabilizing 
selection may be acting to maintain the morphologically distinctive features of 
each species of Tortula in Mexico. But this explanation seems unlikely because 
while each species has a rather restricted set of preferred habitats, the various 
species overlap in their preferences, and a single species may have a consid-
erable ecological amplitude without concomitant morphological variation. For 
example, T. quitoensis Taylor occurs disjunctively from the northern Andes to 
the subalpine and alpine zones of the high volcanoes of Mexico. Plants of this 
species produce sporophytes infrequently but asexual reproduction is possible 
via the easily detachable leaves. The species maintains its distinctive morphol-
ogy while occurring on soil of disturbed trail banks, on the bark of trees in 
shaded situations, and on moist rocks near streams – a broad habitat preference 
for any moss, let alone a species with a restricted disjunct distribution. The ques-
tion remains: if neither patterns of gene flow nor a specifiable ecological “niche” 
appear to cause the morphological coherence of species, what does?
While not yet well-known in a mechanistic sense, a compelling answer to 
this question is the notion of epigenetic constraints on species. A species in this 
sense is a monophyletic lineage (recognized as such by the possession of a set 
of unique characters), buffered against small amounts of gene exchange because 
of the action of homeostatic epigenetic programs. Such a lineage might be fuzzy 
at the edges, but still be recognizable as a lineage, just as the Gulf Stream is 
recognizably a current (and has causal efficacy for the climate of Britain) despite 
the loss and gain of some water molecules along the way. Biological examples 
are many North American oak species, which seem to maintain their integrity 
despite some inter-crossing and apparent ecological overlap.
Just how much genetic intermixing causes a blending of two lineages (as 
defined above) appears to depend on what other processes are operating in 
a particular case. This returns the discussion to pluralism and the distinction 
between grouping and ranking criteria. The grouping criterion in the species 
concept advocated here remains monophyly. Various causal factors (epigen-
etic constraints, discontinuities in gene flow, or stabilizing selection) may 
figure in the ranking criterion needed in particular cases. This distinction 
is important because, as noted by several authors, the action of epigenetic 
constraints can lead to a strong bias towards parallelism. In other words, 
organisms with similar developmental programs may independently undergo 
channelized morphological changes, thus independently gaining similar phe-
notypes. However, using the grouping criterion of monophyly requires one 
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to make every attempt to distinguish polyphyletic from monophyletic groups 
and formally name only the latter.
The concept of epigenetic constraints remains suggestive and is imperfectly 
known, but it is an exciting field for future research. The full importance of such 
constraints will only become clear with a greater understanding of development 
than is currently present. Further study is needed to discover patterns of continu-
ity and discontinuity in the transition from genes through epigenetic programs 
to phenotypes.
Bryophytes appear to be an advantageous group of organisms for experi-
mentally examining these questions because of the ease with which clones can 
be replicated and because a large number of plants can be cultured in a small 
space. Their development is rather simple and yet a considerable morphological, 
reproductive, and ecological diversity is present. The work of Basile and Basile 
(1983, 1984) has demonstrated the feasibility of documenting and experimentally 
manipulating morphogenetic processes in liverworts. Wettstein’s early experimen-
tal work with mosses (reviewed by Anderson 1963) likewise shows great promise.
Implications of a Phylogenetic Concept of Species
The phylogenetic concept of species developed in this paper and in Donoghue 
(this symposium) has both theoretical and practical implications. Usefulness is 
often taken to be an important virtue of a classification. As discussed above, 
an important part of the usefulness of taxa (including species) resides in their 
ontological role in causal theories meant to explain them. Taxa that are mono-
phyletic in the Hennigian sense are necessary for more than purposes of phylo-
genetic reconstruction. Species that are historical (i.e., monophyletic) entities are 
necessary if meaningful studies of biogeography, speciation, historical ecology, 
or comparative morphology are to be carried out. Phenetic species are unsuit-
able for these purposes because grouping by overall similarity will only some-
times recognize monophyletic lineages.
The phylogenetic species concept seems to fit the theoretical uses to which 
botanists have always applied their species. Traditional studies of phytogeography, 
speciation, and evolution have treated species as “things” (i.e., historical entities 
with many of the attributes of individuals in the philosophical sense; Ghiselin 
1974; Hull 1976, 1980). The concept of species advocated here merely provides 
an explicit connection between the concept and the uses to which it is put.
In a practical sense, usefulness has been claimed for phenetic taxa (includ-
ing species, e.g., Levin 1979) without challenge until recently. As discussed by 
Farris (1983), many measures of information content are satisfied better by cla-
distic classifications than by phenetic ones. Therefore, not only do cladistically 
defined taxa have the primary benefit of theoretical meaningfulness, they are 
also more informative about known and predicted biological information than 
phenetically defined taxa. Thus phylogenetic species are more practical in the 
sense botanists have used the term when advocating phenetic concepts.
What are the taxonomic implications of the phylogenetic species concept 
advocated here? How does a practicing systematist proceed in a group such as 
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the bryophytes that is little known biologically? One proceeds using the method 
of reciprocal illumination (Hennig 1966) to study morphology and produce a 
hypothesis of basic monophyletic groups (i.e., species) evidenced as groups by 
apparent apomorphies and perhaps initially ranked as species only because of 
the size of morphological gaps. One then progressively adjusts the circumscrip-
tion of species as more becomes known about gene flow, ecological relation-
ships, and the genetic and epigenetic basis of characters.
The astute bryological taxonomist will realize by this point that many spe-
cies especially in taxonomically difficult groups such as the Tortula ruralis com-
plex, Bryum, or Brachythecium cannot currently be defined by the possession of 
autapomorphies. However, considerable lumping may be required to recognize 
species in these groups that are characterized by autapomorphies. This may be 
precisely why these groups are taxonomically difficult; current taxonomic work 
is below the level at which clearly monophyletic lineages can be recognized. An 
analogy may be in order: the situation in such difficult groups is rather like trying 
to read a book with a microscope – the very quality of “letterness” disappears 
into blobs of ink and fibers of paper. Meaningful letters come into focus only 
when examined with less magnification.
If it is accepted that a species should be named formally only when a hypoth-
esis is made that it is a historically discrete, monophyletic entity, then specific 
and infraspecific taxa characterized only by shared primitive characters (plesio-
morphies) are not satisfactory. In such cases, attempts should be made to find 
characters that either demonstrate the monophyly of the taxon or conversely 
demonstrate how the taxon could be broken up into monophyletic groups. Such 
attempts may fail, since “paraphyletic” speciation is a real possibility, as in the 
case of a widespread species that gives rise to other species through peripheral 
isolation (Bremer & Wanntorp 1979; Mishler & Donoghue 1982; Donoghue this 
symposium). Ackery and Vane-Wright (1984) and Donoghue (this symposium) 
discussed this important problem in the application of monophyly to species. 
Donoghue noted that some species have an intermediate status between mono-
phyly and paraphyly, in having no autapomorphies and yet with no characters 
that demonstrate paraphyly. Such a group of uncertain monophyly can be rec-
ognized formally under the phylogenetic species concept advocated here 
(as long as the group is not demonstrably paraphyletic), but should be distin-
guished in some way from demonstrably monophyletic species. [See further 
discussion of this topic by Donoghue, this symposium.]
Clearly, the recognition of polyphyletic taxa at or below the level of species, 
as for example in the naming of taxa on the basis of a few, environmentally labile 
characters or a simple genetic polymorphism, is unsatisfactory. Such ecological 
modifications (or even minor genetical variants) are likely to appear indepen-
dently many times within a single, monophyletic species and should be given at 
most only informal recognition.
Examples of these considerations are provided by biosystematic studies of 
the Tortula ruralis complex (Mishler 1984, 1985). Tortula ruralis itself as currently 
circumscribed is problematical because it appears to have no unique characters 
to define it as a species, there are elements within it that appear to be defined 
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by unique characters, and some elements of it share possibly unique characters 
with other species. This “species” is thus likely to be paraphyletic. Examples of 
currently recognized species in the complex that are likely to be polyphyletic are 
T. ruraliformis and T. intermedia. Preliminary culture studies of these “species” 
indicate that characters held to distinguish them are quite plastic phenotypically 
and thus not reliable indicators of monophyly.
I contend that formal infraspecific names should be subject to the same cri-
teria as species names in order to have a taxonomic system that is completely 
consistent and theoretically meaningful. The former should be used only if a 
hypothesis of monophyly is made and if there is some reason why the taxa rec-
ognized are not ranked at the species level.
If formal taxonomic names are used exclusively for phylogenetically discrete 
units at all taxonomic levels, then of course, many other biologically important 
units (such as physiognomic types, ecological guilds, ecophenotypes, cytotypes) 
will not be formally named. Nothing needs to be lost, however, and much may 
be gained. These units can be described informally and placed in overlapping, 
non-hierarchical arrangements as required. As such they will be clearly distin-
guished from monophyletic groups that bear formal names.
To summarize, I have advocated the proposition that species should be 
viewed as monophyletic groups of organisms, recognized as lineages on the 
morphological basis of the possession of shared, derived characters, and ranked 
as species because of causal factors (perhaps especially epigenetic constraints) 
that maintain the lineage as the smallest important monophyletic group recog-
nized in a formal classification. Such a view of species, while “morphological” in 
an important sense, is different than previous morphological or phenetic species 
concepts. It can provide species that are theoretically meaningful for biogeo-
graphic, ecological, and evolutionary studies and that have the practical virtues 
of consistency and predictiveness.
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Species and Evolution in 
Clonal Organisms –  
Introduction8
8 B.D. Mishler and A.F. Budd. 1990. Species and evolution in clonal organisms – introduction. 
Systematic Botany 15: 79–85.  [reprinted by permission]
The species question in biology has a long and tortured past. Despite increasing 
amounts and types of morphological and genetic data, we seem to be no closer 
to an answer to “what is a species?” than we were 100 years ago. Yet, although 
disagreement continues over what species are, many biologists do seem to agree 
that species do not exist in asexual organisms, at least in an evolutionary or 
process sense (Eldredge 1985; Ghiselin 1987; Grant 1981; Hull 1987). Despite 
this widespread consensus, a handful of researchers continue to argue on both 
empirical and theoretical grounds that species (or units very much like species) 
do exist in many groups of asexual organisms (Frost and Wright 1988; Holman 
1987; Mishler and Brandon 1987; Shaposhnikov 1984; Templeton 1989).
This symposium, entitled “Species and Evolution in Clonal Organisms,” was 
held at the 1988 meeting of the American Society of Zoologists in San Francisco, 
sponsored by the Division of Systematic Zoology, ASZ, the Society of Systematic 
Zoology, and the California Academy of Sciences. The overall goal was to take 
a fresh, empirical look at the nature of species in asexual groups. As organizers, 
we devised several questions that were circulated beforehand to invited speak-
ers. These included: How often do clonal organisms form discrete species? In 
cases where they do, what provides the cohesive force for maintaining their 
discreteness? How is speciation accomplished in clonal organisms? Can study of 
clonal organisms provide evidence that a process other than gene flow is funda-
mental in maintaining species even in sexual organisms?
We selected speakers representing a range of different organisms with differ-
ent reproductive biologies and frequencies of asexual reproduction, including both 
plants and animals. The speakers at the symposium included: B. D. Mishler (Duke 
University) on mosses, D. R. Farrar (Iowa State University) on ferns, E. Fenster and 
U. Sorhannus (Queens College, SUNY) on diatoms, E. Kellogg (Harvard University) 
on grasses, C. S. Campbell (University of Maine) and T. A. Dickinson (Royal Ontario 
Museum) on trees and shrubs in the rose family, J. Moore (Colorado State University) 
on parasitic helminths, B. Willis (James Cook University, Australia) on corals, A. 
F. Budd (University of Iowa) on corals, and A. H. Cheetham and J. B. C. Jackson 
(Smithsonian Institution) on bryozoans. The conclusion of the symposium featured 
a lively and prolonged roundtable discussion (see Summary and Discussion for a 
synopsis of the roundtable discussion and a list of titles).
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Six papers presented in the symposium follow in this issue, bolstered by the 
addition of material derived from peer reviews plus discussion at the symposium 
itself. With four of the six papers dealing with plants, we feel that Systematic 
Botany is an appropriate outlet for this topic of general biological interest. The 
goal of this introduction is to set the stage by introducing three major issues 
that are common to all papers. We will first briefly review competing species 
concepts, and the expected patterns of species distinctness. We will then con-
sider mechanisms possibly responsible for causing integration and cohesion of 
species. Finally, we will discuss what “speciation” might be under these different 
concepts of species and under various possible integrating mechanisms.
Species Concepts
Many different concepts of species have been and are held by biologists. This 
conceptual diversity can be reduced for purposes of discussion by placing these 
concepts under four headings, based on the way in which the nature of group-
ings of organisms is viewed under a particular concept (for another recent tax-
onomy of species concepts see Lidén and Oxelman 1989).
Species as Breeding Groups
The prevailing view of species among biologists at large (if perhaps not among 
systematists per se) is some version of the biological species concept: “species are 
groups of interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively isolated from 
other such groups” (Mayr 1970). Under this view, particular species are seen first 
and foremost as gene pools. Other important unifying factors such as genealogy, 
unitary ecological roles, and morphological distinctness are often just assumed to 
be congruent with groupings defined by some measure of potential interbreeding.
A number of variations on the basic biological species theme exist, which we 
would argue represent only minor wrinkles. For example, Paterson (1985) placed 
emphasis on shared mate recognition systems for defining species rather than on 
isolating mechanisms as in the classic biological species concept. Furthermore, 
the biological species concept underlies the treatment of species by Ghiselin 
and Hull (e.g., Ghiselin 1987; Hull 1987), who have argued that species should 
be treated metaphysically as individuals, rather than as classes, in large part 
because of the integrative effects of gene flow.
It is because of the hegemony of this view of species that asexual organisms 
have been seen as a particular problem. Most of the above authors pointed out 
that the biological species concept is not applicable to strictly asexual groups. 
Ghiselin (1987) has argued further that species do not exist in such asexual 
groups, by definition.
Species as Phenetic Groups
An opposing view of species, with a history pre-dating the breeding groups 
view, is that of species as basic phenetic clusters. That is, species are groups 
of similar organisms, separated from other such groups by discontinuities. This 
viewpoint, while ancient, still has many champions today, perhaps especially 
41The Need for Pluralism Because of Different Biologies in Different Taxa
among botanists (e.g., Cronquist 1978; Levin 1979). A similar viewpoint is some-
times referred to as the “morphospecies” concept, when only morphological 
characters are used. However, in the broadest sense, phenetic species can be 
recognized using behavioral and ecological characters as well, or even genetic 
ones. It is important to recognize that “phenetic” does not mean “phenotypic.” 
It means grouping by overall similarity which can be, and often is, done with 
genotypic data.
The phenetic approach is equally applicable to sexual and asexual organisms. 
However, it would seem that for most purposes in evolutionary biology (as distinct 
from purely identification purposes), such as for studies in biogeography, ecologi-
cal partitioning, or speciation, it is necessary to have species that have historical 
integrity. Ecological and evolutionary theory concerns lineages of organisms, not 
ahistorical groups of similar organisms. Phenetic methods will only result in the 
naming of lineages as species to the extent that phenetic methods, in general, are 
successful in delimiting lineages. All the well-known problems with using phe-
netic methods for phylogenetic reconstruction apply (Farris 1983).
Species as Evolutionary or Ecological Groups
One concept recognizing species as lineages was originally proposed by 
Simpson (1961), who extended the notion of unitary evolutionary role over geo-
logic time to define the evolutionary species concept. Wiley (1978) modified this 
definition to include evolutionary stasis of lineages and to exclude anagenetic 
speciation. Van Valen (1976) emphasized the ecological role of species in his 
ecological species concept. Still implicit in both evolutionary and ecological 
species concepts, however, is the view of species as breeding groups and the 
role of gene flow in providing the major underlying cohesive mechanism. In 
applying evolutionary or ecological concepts to asexual species (and perhaps in 
most applications to sexual species), recognition of evolutionary or ecological 
units is based on overall similarity, following the same procedures used in defin-
ing species as phenetic groups.
The more recent “cohesion” species concept of Templeton (1989) was an 
important step forward in the sense that many potential cohesive mechanisms 
(e.g., gene flow, ecological or developmental constraints) are considered. 
Templeton’s concept is explicitly applied to asexual organisms. One drawback, 
however, is that Templeton did not explicitly address the issue of how to ensure 
that species recognized under his concept will be phylogenetic lineages.
Species as Phylogenetic Groups
In contrast to the viewpoints previously discussed, an explicitly phylogenetic view 
of species is a relatively recent development, dating back to the late 1970s (critical 
papers include Bremer and Wanntorp 1979; Rosen 1978, 1979). The central issue, 
i.e., the lack of necessary correspondence between the biological species concept 
or the phenetic species concept and monophyletic lineages, has only become 
clear since the rise of phylogenetic systematics (cladistics), and the clear distinc-
tion between symplesiomorphy and synapomorphy. Indeed, many still apparently 
equate biological species with genealogical entities (e.g., Hull 1987).
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A phylogenetic species concept has been proposed and elaborated in two 
different versions, united by the goal of separating phylogenetic and taxonomic 
patterns from specific evolutionary processes to the extent that this is possible. 
The two versions differ in detail on how such a separation can be made. Cracraft 
(1983, 1989), building on the species concepts of Eldredge and Cracraft (1980) 
and Nelson and Platnick (1981), defined species as: “the smallest diagnosable 
cluster of individual organisms within which there is a parental pattern of ances-
try and descent.” By this he meant that the species category should be used to 
name the smallest lineages recognizable in a given group. He did, however, 
retain the qualification that a species must also be “a reproductive community,” 
having some degree of reproductive cohesion (Cracraft 1983).
Mishler and Donoghue (1982; Donoghue 1985; Mishler 1985) and Mishler 
and Brandon (1987) developed a similar, but more elaborate phylogenetic spe-
cies concept: “a species is the least inclusive taxon recognized in a classifi-
cation, into which organisms are grouped because of evidence of monophyly 
(usually, but not restricted to, the presence of synapomorphies), that is ranked 
as a species because it is the smallest ‘important’ lineage deemed worthy of 
formal recognition, where ‘important’ refers to the action of those processes 
that are dominant in producing and maintaining lineages in a particular case” 
(Mishler and Brandon 1987). The most significant difference between this con-
cept and that of Cracraft (and the related “cladistic species concept” of Ridley 
1989), is the explicit recognition that two components are needed for a logically 
complete species concept. The grouping component (monophyly, or the special 
case of metaphyly as defined and discussed in Mishler and Brandon 1987) is 
monistic and, therefore, provides a measure of comparability among species 
from different groups. The ranking component is necessary because lineages 
exist at all levels of inclusiveness, particularly in groups with limited gene flow 
(with asexual groups being the extreme), such that the “smallest” diagnosable 
monophyletic groups may be far smaller than anyone would want to recognize 
formally (cell lineages within long-lived clones, for example). It is argued that 
the ranking component must be pluralistic, in that its application in particular 
cases should depend on the biology of the group of organisms involved, i.e., the 
particular mix of reproductive, developmental, or ecological processes causing 
cohesion of species (e.g., see Templeton’s cohesion criteria, cited above).
The latter version of the phylogenetic species concept, unlike the former, is 
more clearly designed to include asexual as well as sexual organisms. Both types 
of organisms form lineages (in fact, asexual reproduction leads to much cleaner, 
strictly diverging lineages). The grouping component is the same; the ranking 
component applied in different cases may well be different, but is free to follow 
what becomes known about processes acting to maintain distinctive lineages. 
The important point relevant to the present symposium is that it is quite possible 
that these processes are actually quite similar across sexual and asexual groups. 
Prevailing expectations about the species situation in sexual vs. asexual groups 
may have been based on a false dichotomy.
Debates about proper species concepts are not merely semantic arguments; 
they are critical for progress in understanding evolutionary biology. The use to 
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which we can rightly put our species depends on what they represent in the real 
world. We can be sure that a multiplicity of processes is involved in the origin 
and maintenance of groupings of organisms. Therefore basing a definition of 
species on some particular process is dangerous; basing a definition on non-
genealogical criteria is misleading, at best.
Expected Patterns of Species Distinctness
Throughout this symposium, we use “clonal” and “asexual” broadly to refer 
to species with predominantly uniparental reproduction (including vegetative 
reproduction, parthenogenesis, apomixis, or self-fertilization) with obligate asex-
uality as the extreme. Despite the common argument that any amount of sexual 
reproduction makes integration of a species by gene flow likely, we see no hard 
and fast line in expected variation patterns between asexual and sexual organ-
isms. Infrequent sexual reproduction, especially if localized geographically, can 
produce situations indistinguishable from obligate asexuality (see discussion by 
Templeton 1989).
Theoretically, asexual species are predicted to exhibit less variability within 
populations and greater differentiation among populations than predominantly 
sexual species. Divergence during speciation should be greater in sexual repro-
ducers (e.g., Grant 1981). These predictions arise as a result of the clonal struc-
ture of asexual populations, the internal variability of which is limited due to lack 
of genetic recombination. Somatic mutations would be expected to accumu-
late within clones, causing greater differentiation among populations. Reduced 
overall amounts of recombination among populations should result in reduced 
distinctness of species.
Use of different species concepts will result in different measures of spe-
cies distinctness and thereby have serious consequences for recognition of the 
predicted patterns. If a biological concept is assumed, distances between spe-
cies can be measured using some measure of reproductive compatibility. If a 
phenetic concept is applied, various statistical measures of phenotypic distance 
(e.g., Mahalanobis’ Distance) can be used, or several different measures of geno-
typic distance, including electrophoretic patterns or DNA hybridization. Under 
a phylogenetic concept, distinctness is defined on the basis of the number of 
autapomorphies.
Processes of Cohesion and Integration of Species
The notion of cohesion or integration of species has had many meanings, 
depending in part on differing views of evolutionary processes (see exhaustive 
review by Van Valen 1982; also Templeton 1989). There are three large classes 
of causal factors that have been advanced to explain cohesion or integration 
of species. The first and foremost is gene flow. Starting in the 1960s, a second 
class of causal factors was increasingly recognized, involving stabilizing natural 
selection (e.g., Ehrlich and Raven 1969). Then more recently, beginning in ear-
nest in the 1970s, a third class of causal factors was recognized as potentially 
important in explaining coherence of lineages in general, involving epigenetic or 
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developmental constraints (Alberch 1982; Oster and Alberch 1982; Rachootin 
and Thomson 1981; Raff and Kaufman 1983; Smith et al. 1985). An explicit appli-
cation of this third class of factors to the species level was made by Eldredge and 
Gould (1972), Mishler (1985), Templeton (1989), and Van Valen (1982).
One way to simplify the situation is via the distinction made by Mishler and 
Brandon (1987), who restricted “integration” to refer to those processes causing 
active interaction among parts of an entity, such as gene flow or density-depen-
dent natural selection. They restricted “cohesion” to refer to those processes 
causing an entity to behave as a whole with respect to some process, such 
as developmental canalization or density-independent natural selection. They 
pointed out that species recognized under their phylogenetic concept may be 
integrated, cohesive, both, or neither. Furthermore, the integrative or cohesive 
processes responsible for particular phylogenetic patterns observed will vary 
from case to case.
As a fourth alternative, it is important to keep in mind that the mere observa-
tion of “clustering” in taxonomic space (i.e., the presence of groups of similar 
organisms, with discontinuities among such groups; Hutchinson 1968) does not 
necessarily require a causal “external” explanation such as selective constraints. 
As discussed by Bookstein (1988), simple random walk processes can produce 
such discontinuous patterns. Therefore, accidents of history may well explain 
patterns of discontinuities in morphological variation in some cases, without 
invoking any integrative or cohesive processes.
Devising empirical tests to determine which of these major classes of pro-
cesses, if any, are operating in any particular case is difficult (more below). 
However, obligately asexual organisms may be particularly good cases for 
study, because one important class of processes (gene flow) can be factored out 
immediately.
Speciation
The prevailing definition of “speciation” in the literature of evolutionary biol-
ogy involves the origin of reproductive isolation. Controversies in the speciation 
literature seem merely to involve different possible geographic, ecological, or 
genetic modes of acquisition of reproductive isolation (e.g., Coyne and Barton 
1988; Templeton 1981), rather than questions about the relevance of isolation 
per se. Based on the considerations raised above, however, it might be argued 
that focusing on a single process risks missing what is actually going on.
Under the phylogenetic species concept, reproductive isolating mechanisms 
are recognized as potentially important factors, but as neither necessary nor suf-
ficient for speciation. Speciation is instead the origin of distinctive new lineages, 
by a breakdown in any of a number of integrative and/or cohesive mechanisms 
in “parent” lineages. It might involve a key regulatory mutation producing a new 
morphology or ecology, or the release of selective constraints in some geo-
graphically or ecologically marginal population.
This view of speciation allows the process to be equally well defined for 
both sexual and asexual organisms (see also White 1978). Study of processes of 
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speciation in asexual organisms again may be of special interest; breeding biol-
ogy can be factored out, allowing the discovery of perhaps more fundamental 
mechanisms. Paradoxically, the study of asexual speciation might thus demon-
strate mechanisms that are also important in sexual groups, mechanisms that 
have been neglected under the hegemony of the biological species concept.
Suggestions for Future Work
The question of the nature of species in asexual groups has unfortunately been 
confused with a different question: the adaptive significance of sexual vs. asexual 
reproduction. Thus, it is often suggested that because asexual reproduction is a 
poor adaptive strategy for organisms to take, the question of species in asexual 
organisms is of little importance (e.g., Häuser 1987). There are two things wrong 
with such an argument. First, it is not at all a settled question whether, or in what 
cases, sexual reproduction is selectively advantageous (Bell 1982; Bernstein et 
al. 1981; Glesener and Tilman 1978; Grassle and Shick 1979; Halvorson and 
Monroy 1985; Smith 1978; Stearns 1987; Thompson 1976). Second, even if it 
is generally established that sexual reproduction has distinct advantages for 
organism fitness, it does not follow that species formation in asexual groups 
is impossible or unimportant. Even a relatively rare case of a wholly asexual, 
distinct species, even a species that is geologically short-lived because of poor 
adaptability, provides a phylogenetic pattern that demands explanation. As dis-
cussed above, the search for such an explanation might still shed light on general 
species-level processes, applying even to sexual groups.
What recommendations could be made for empirical studies designed to 
separate selective from developmental explanations of cohesion in an asexual 
species? The nature of developmental constraints should be measured through 
combined morphometric and quantitative genetic studies of organisms grown in 
constant environments (e.g., Atchley 1987). Constrained morphologic variation 
in taxonomically important characters in the presence of high genetic variabil-
ity would suggest that phenotypic variation is decoupled from overall patterns 
of variation at the genotypic level, and that as a consequence, developmental 
constraints play a major role in species distinctness. On the other hand, high 
morphologic variability in taxonomic characters would suggest that develop-
mental constraints were not important. Furthermore, standard experiments esti-
mating fitnesses of given phenotypes in different relevant environments should 
be designed to quantify selective constraints. Field studies should supplement 
such controlled experiments, and include descriptions of morphometric varia-
tion and genetic population structure as well as habitat preferences and demo-
graphic censuses of fecundity and mortality. Such experiments and descriptive 
field studies would need to focus on populations throughout the geographic 
range of a species, to assess uniformity of possible cohesive forces.
What properties would make a particular group of organisms an ideal sub-
ject for study? Ideally, such studies should be carried out on a monophyletic 
group of species that is well understood phylogenetically, so that precise state-
ments could be made about sister group relationships and relative ordering of 
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speciation events within the group. The group should be diverse, so that sister 
group comparisons could be made among species with different combinations 
of breeding systems, niche widths, and developmental canalization. The discov-
ery of a clade composed of strictly asexual species would facilitate factoring out 
the role of gene flow. It would be necessary to have a detailed understanding of 
reproductive biology in nature, to be sure that interbreeding could be eliminated 
as an integrative factor in particular species. The group should be experimentally 
tractable: easy to grow under defined conditions, with short generation time, 
and readily observable in the field.
As difficult as such studies would be to design, they are necessary for a true 
understanding of species-level biology. Despite the apparent emphasis of evolu-
tionary biologists since Darwin, rather little hard information is available on the 
origin of species, per se, as distinct from population processes. We have sug-
gested that this is at least partly due to a lack of conceptual clarity about what 
species are. Asexual groups may be the key to understanding this critical, but 
neglected part of evolutionary biology.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Joel Cracraft for his help in organizing the symposium. J. Cracraft and 
S. D. Cairns read the manuscript and provided helpful comments. We are grate-
ful to the Society of Systematic Zoology and the American Society of Zoologists 
for providing travel funds to symposium participants.
LITERATURE CITED
ALBERCH, P. 1982. Ontogenesis and morphological diversification. Amer. Zool. 
20:653–667.
ATCHLEY, W. R. 1987. Developmental quantitative genetics and the evolution of ontog-
enies. Evolution 41:316–330.
BELL, G. 1982. The masterpiece of nature: The evolution and genetics of sexuality. 
Berkeley: Univ. California Press.
BERNSTEIN, H., G. S. BYERS, and R. E. MICHOD. 1981. Evolution of sexual repro-
duction: Importance of DNA repair, complementation, and variation. Amer. Nat. 
117:537–549.
BOOKSTEIN, F. L. 1988. Random walk and the biometrics of morphological characters. 
Evol. Biol. 23:369–398.
BREMER, K. and H. E. WANNTORP. 1979. Geographic populations or biological species 
in phylogeny reconstruction? Syst. Zool. 28:220–224.
COYNE, J. A. and N. H. BARTON. 1988. What do we know about speciation? Nature 
331:485–486.
CRACRAFT, J. 1983. Species concepts and speciation analysis. Curr. Ornith. 1:159–187.
. 1989. Speciation and its ontology: The empirical consequences of alternative 
species concepts for understanding patterns and processes of differentiation. 
Pp. 28–59 in Speciation and its consequences, eds. D. Otte and J. A. Endler. 
Sunderland, Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates.
CRONQUIST, A. 1978. Once again, what is a species? Pp. 3–20 in Biosystematics in 
agriculture, ed. J. A. Romberger. Montclair, New Jersey: Allanheld & Osmun.
47The Need for Pluralism Because of Different Biologies in Different Taxa
DONOGHUE, M. J. 1985. A critique of the biological species concept and recommen-
dations for a phylogenetic alternative. Bryologist 88:172–181.
EHRLICH, P. R. and P. H. RAVEN. 1969. Differentiation of populations. Science 
165:1228–1232.
ELDREDGE, N. 1985. Unfinished synthesis. Biological hierarchies and modern evolu-
tionary thought. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
         and J. CRACRAFT. 1980. Phylogenetic patterns and the evolutionary process. New 
York: Columbia Univ. Press.
        and S. J. GOULD. 1972. Punctuated equilibria: An alternative to phyletic gradual-
ism. Pp. 82–115 in Models in paleobiology, ed. T. J. M. Schopf. San Francisco: W. 
H. Freeman and Co.
FARRIS, J. S. 1983. The logical basis of phylogenetic analysis. Pp. 7–36 in Advances in 
cladistics, vol. 2, eds. N. I. Platnick and V. A. Funk. New York: Columbia Univ. 
Press.
FROST, D. R. and J. W. WRIGHT. 1988. The taxonomy of uniparental species, with 
special reference to parthenogenetic Cnemidophorus (Squamata: Teiidae). Syst. 
Zool. 37:200–209.
GHISELIN, M. T. 1987. Species concepts, individuality, and objectivity. Biol. Phil. 
2:127–143.
GLESENER, R. R. and D. TILMAN. 1978. Sexuality and the components of environ-
mental uncertainty: Clues from geographic parthenogenesis in terrestrial animals. 
Amer. Nat. 112:659–673.
GRANT, V. 1981. Plant speciation. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
GRASSLE, J. F. and J. M. SHICK. 1979. Introduction to the symposium: Ecology of asex-
ual reproduction in animals. Amer. Zool. 19:667–668.
HALVORSON, H. O. and A. MONROY, eds. 1985. The origin and evolution of sex. New 
York: Alan R. Liss.
HÄUSER, C. L. 1987. The debate about the biological species concept – A review. Z. 
Zool. Syst. Evolut.-forsch. 25:241–257.
HOLMAN, E. W. 1987. Recognizability of sexual and asexual species of rotifers. Syst. 
Zool. 36:381–386.
HULL, D. L. 1987. Genealogical actors in ecological roles. Biol. Phil. 2:168–184.
HUTCHINSON, G. E. 1968. When are species necessary? Pp. 177–186 in Population 
biology and evolution, ed. R. C. Lewontin. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse 
Univ. Press.
LEVIN, D. A. 1979. The nature of plant species. Science 204:381–384.
LIDÉN, M. and B. OXELMAN. 1989. Species – Pattern or process? Taxon 
38:228–232.
MAYR, E. 1970. Populations, species, and evolution. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
Univ. Press.
MISHLER, B. D. 1985. The morphological, developmental, and phylogenetic basis of 
species concepts in bryophytes. Bryologist 88:207–214.
        and R. N. BRANDON. 1987. Individuality, pluralism, and the phylogenetic species 
concept. Biol. Phil. 2:397–414.
        and M. J. DONOGHUE. 1982. Species concepts: A case for pluralism. Syst. Zool. 
31:491–503.
NELSON, G. J. and N. I. PLATNICK. 1981. Systematics and biogeography: Cladistics and 
vicanance. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
OSTER, G. and P. ALBERCH. 1982. Evolution and bifurcation of developmental pro-
grams. Evolution 36:444–459.
PATERSON, H. E. H. 1985. The recognition concept of species. Pp. 21–29 in Species and 
speciation, ed. E. S. Vrba. Pretoria: Transvaal Museum.
48 What, if Anything, Are Species?
RACHOOTIN, S. P. and K. S. THOMSON. 1981. Epigenetics, paleontology, and evo-
lution. Pp. 181–193 in Evolution today, eds. G. G. E. Scudder and J. L. Reveal. 
Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon Univ. Press.
RAFF, R. A. and T. C. KAUFMAN. 1983. Embryos, genes, and evolution: The develop-
mental-genetic basis of evolutionary change. New York: MacMillan.
RIDLEY, M. 1989. The cladistic solution to the species problem. Biol. Phil. 4:1–16.
ROSEN, D. E. 1978. Vicariant patterns and historical explanation in biogeography. Syst. 
Zool. 27:159–188.
       . 1979. Fishes from the upland and intermontane basins of Guatemala: Revisionary 
studies and comparative geography. Bull. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist. 162:267–376.
SHAPOSHNIKOV, G. C. 1984. Aphids and a step toward the universal species concept. 
Evol. Theory 7:1–39.
SIMPSON, G. G. 1961. Principles of animal taxonomy. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
SMITH, J. M. 1978. The evolution of sex. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
            , R. BURIAN, S. KAUFFMAN, P. ALBERCH, J. CAMPBELL, B. GOODWIN, R. LANDE, 
D. RAUP, and L. WOLPERT. 1985. Developmental constraints and evolution. Quart. 
Rev. Biol. 60:265–287.
STEARNS, S. C., ed. 1987. The evolution of sex and its consequences. Basel: Birkhäuser 
Verlag.
TEMPLETON, A. R. 1981. Mechanisms of speciation – A population genetic approach. 
Annual Rev. Ecol. Syst. 12:33–48.
       . 1989. The meaning of species and speciation: A genetic perspective. Pp. 3–27 
in Speciation and its consequences, eds. D. Otte and J. A. Endler. Sunderland, 
Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates.
THOMPSON, V. 1976. Does sex accelerate evolution? Evol. Theory 1:131–156.
VAN VALEN, L. M. 1976. Ecological species, multispecies, and oaks. Taxon 25:233–239.
         . 1982. Integration of species: Stasis and biogeography. Evol. Theory 6:99–112.
WHITE, M. J. D. 1978. Modes of speciation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co.




It is important to recognize that the species problem is not a unique one in systemat-
ics. More inclusively, there is a taxon problem. One first has to decide what taxon 
names should represent in general, then species-level taxa should be the same kind of 
things – just the least inclusive. For me, the arguments made for the Hennigian phy-
logenetic approach to systematics (Nelson 1973, Farris 1983) have always been com-
pelling. Our classification systems are obviously human constructs, meant to serve 
certain purposes of our own: communication, data storage and retrieval, predictivity, 
and most importantly capturing units functioning in processes (Mishler 2009). The 
most important process in biology is evolution, therefore these purposes are best 
served by a classification system that reflects our best understanding of descent with 
modification. Thus the field of systematics, in general, has settled on restricting the 
use of formal taxonomic names to represent phylogenetically natural, monophyletic 
groups. Following this general spirit in the 1980’s and 1990’s, my concern was in 
developing an approach to species that fits into the Hennigian phylogenetic system.
GROUPING VS. RANKING
There are two necessary parts of any species definition. The criteria by which organ-
isms are grouped into taxa must be specified, as well as the criteria by which a taxon 
is ranked as a species rather than some other taxonomic level. Mishler & Donoghue 
(1982), Mishler & Brandon (1987), and Mishler & Theriot (2000) argued that the 
grouping criterion that should be used for species is monophyly (there can be special 
difficulties applying the concept of monophyly at this level, of course; see discussion 
below). Under this view, synapomorphies are considered to be the necessary empiri-
cal evidence for grouping phylogenetic species, as for phylogenetic taxa at all levels.
We argued that the ranking decision should include consideration of processes 
acting in the particular group in question. The question of what causes integration/
cohesion of lineages has many possible answers: breeding relationships and patterns 
of gene flow are relevant here, but so are ecological niches, stabilizing selection, and 
developmental constraints. The decision about applying a species rank could also 
involve practical criteria such as the amount of character support for a group, the 
origin of a distinctive mating system at a particular node, or the acquisition of exclu-
sivity (a condition in which each allele in a lineage is more closely related to another 
allele in the lineage than it is to an allele outside the lineage; Graybeal 1995). We 
argued that the ranking decision was pluralistic in that different sets of criteria would 
be necessary for use in different cases.
3
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MONOPHYLY
Over the history of Hennigian phylogenetic systematics, there have been two dis-
tinctly different (yet often confused) perspectives when defining monophyly. 
Monophyly has often been defined in a diachronic sense (i.e., “an ancestor and all of 
its descendants”). Or, it has almost equally often been defined in a synchronic sense 
(i.e., “all and only descendants of a common ancestor”). The salient distinction is 
that in the latter the ancestor is not included in the group (it is only used as a refer-
ent), while in the former the ancestor is included in the group. The latter approach is 
better in several ways (Mishler 2010, reprinted below) and is especially necessary for 
my purposes in discussing species, in order to distinguish the extant group of rela-
tives from their ancestor. Thus the concept of monophyly used here is synchronic: a 
group containing all and only descendants of a common ancestor, existing in any 
one instantaneous slice in time.
The concept of monophyly is in need of further refinement in light of modern 
genomic data. Horizontal transfer (reticulation) is much more common in nature 
than realized 20 years ago. Despite being frequently presented as such, reticulation 
is not just a problem for the species level; clades at all levels can be subject to hori-
zontal transfer. In the modern genomic world, because of the mounting evidence of 
horizontal gene transfer at all levels (e.g., Beltrán et al. 2002, Degnan & Rosenberg 
2009, Mallet et al. 2016), monophyly of a group of organisms can no longer mean 
monophyly on every gene tree in its genome (as assumed by earlier generations of 
cladists including me, before there were data to the contrary). We would have few to 
no monophyletic groups, at any level, in that strict sense.
Rather, we need a revised concept that I’ll call “modern monophyly,” which refers 
to an emergent, ensemble characteristic of organismal descent as discussed by Baum 
(2007, 2009). Just like a person can get a skin graft or liver transplant from someone 
else and still be the same person, a biological lineage can pick up genes horizontally 
and still be the same lineage.  The key issue is how much and how often this can 
happen and still be reasonable to call it the same lineage.   Consider two leaky hoses 
laying next to each other in the yard.  Some water from one may end up getting into 
the other but there are still clearly two hoses.  But if there is a lot of leakages (i.e., 
both are completely broken at some point) it becomes just one combined stream of 
water. We botanists have long been happy thinking that hybridization can lead to 
either situation, the first we have called “introgression,” the second we have called 
“hybrid speciation.”
The ontology of monophyly can remain as stated given in Mishler and Brandon 
(1987): “A monophyletic taxon is a group that contains all and only descendants of 
a common ancestor, originating in a single event.” “Event” here refers to processes 
of integration and cohesion uniting the ancestor, and connecting it via lineages to 
its descendants, as discussed in our paper, reprinted below. The change needed is in 
the epistemology of monophyly: modern monophyly requires congruence among a 
plurality of gene trees to call something at a more inclusive level monophyletic. So 
congruence, e.g., as measured by concordance (see Steel & Velasco 2014) is not defi-
nitional; it is simply an epistemological tool.  Congruence is evidence used to point 
back only to a putative common ancestor of the clade in question, not further back in 
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time, i.e., it is fine to call a clade resulting from a hybridization event a monophyletic 
group as long as it was one event.  So while there can’t be multiple origins of a hybrid 
“species” as widely assumed (e.g., Ptacek et al. 1994, Sampson & Byrne 2012), just 
like there can’t be multiple origins of a non-hybrid taxon, there can certainly be a 
monophyletic origin of a hybrid clade.
Note also that many of the discordant gene trees observed among related clades 
are not due to horizontal transfer at all, but rather to incomplete lineage sorting. Plus, 
there are two other major sources of discordant gene trees among related lineages: 
convergence due to selection, and erroneous reconstruction of gene trees due to rate 
heterogeneity, etc.  In the first two cases (horizontal transfer and lineage sorting) we 
are talking about “true” incongruence, i.e., genes with truly different histories than 
their containing lineages.  Whereas the second two cases are due to inaccurate gene 
trees. These cases are conceptually easy to distinguish but very difficult to tell apart 
in practice.  One usually sees many incongruent gene trees in any given analysis, 
but probably a small minority of those are due to horizontal transfer.  The bacteriolo-
gists like Doolittle (1999) who see horizontal transfer everywhere don’t take these 
other possibilities into account and are thus likely overemphasizing reticulation.  It 
is likely that erroneous reconstruction of gene trees is the basis for most of the incon-
gruence, given problems with orthology assessment, alignment issues, saturation in 
fast-evolving genes, etc.
Thus monophyly, in this modern sense, refers to the preponderance of gene lin-
eages making up a clade (using the clade-lineage distinction given below). Gene lin-
eages that don’t match the pattern of descent shown by the majority of lineages need 
a different explanation (e.g., horizontal transfer, incomplete lineage sorting, mis-
taken reconstruction, or convergence) than the majority. Note that this is analogous 
to the distinction people have long made between homology and homoplasy. In fact, 
all these sources of incongruence, including horizontal gene transfer, are best viewed 
as types of homoplasy. It has become clear that even a large amount of incongruence 
does not preclude cladistic reconstructions of phylogeny.
CLADE VS. LINEAGE
Both of the previous perspectives on defining monophyly have useful applications, if 
we recognize that the things being defined under the two concepts are fundamentally 
different things. The diachronic sense defines a lineage, while the synchronic sense 
defines a clade (see fig. 4.2). These are not at all the same thing, although their mean-
ings intertwine. A “lineage” is a diachronic concept, a relationship through time 
among a series of ancestor-descendant replicators. On the other hand, a “clade” is a 
synchronic concept, an instantaneous snapshot of a lineage cross-section. Monophyly 
as discussed above only applies to clades.
These two conflicting ways of viewing taxa have translated to considerable con-
troversy in the debates over defining species in a phylogenetic sense. Some concepts 
view species as synchronic things (clades; Mishler & Donoghue 1982, Mishler & 
Brandon 1987, Mishler & Theriot 2000) and some view species as diachronic things 
(lineages; Wiley 1978, de Queiroz 1999). Viewing species as clades avoids several 
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problems faced by the alternative where they are viewed as lineages. Operational 
criteria have been worked out over the last several decades to test hypotheses about 
clades using apomorphic characters, whereas no empirical criteria have been pro-
posed to test hypotheses about lineages. In addition, conceptually defining species as 
clades allows them to fit logically in a hierarchical phylogenetic system where taxa at 
all more inclusive levels are definitely considered clades.
To summarize, the two papers reprinted below (Mishler & Brandon 1987, Mishler 
& Theriot 2000), assumed that the current codes of nomenclature employing ranks 
were to continue, and defined a phylogenetic species concept. First, organisms should 
be grouped into species on the basis of evidence for monophyly (defined synchronic-
ally), as at all taxonomic levels. Second, ranking criteria used to assign species rank 
to certain monophyletic groups must vary among different organisms, but might well 
include ecological criteria or presence of breeding barriers in particular cases.
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Abstract
The concept of individuality as applied to species, an important advance in 
the philosophy of evolutionary biology, is nevertheless in need of refinement. 
Four important subparts of this concept must be recognized: spatial boundar-
ies, temporal boundaries, integration, and cohesion. Not all species necessarily 
meet all of these. Two very different types of “pluralism” have been advocated 
with respect to species, only one of which is satisfactory. An often unrecog-
nized distinction between “grouping” and “ranking” components of any spe-
cies concept is necessary. A phylogenetic species concept is advocated that 
uses a (monistic) grouping criterion of monophyly in a cladistic sense, and a 
(pluralistic) ranking criterion based on those causal processes that are most 
important in producing and maintaining lineages in a particular case. Such 
causal processes can include actual interbreeding, selective constraints, and 
developmental canalization. The widespread use of the “biological species 
concept” is flawed for two reasons: because of a failure to distinguish grouping 
from ranking criteria and because of an unwarranted emphasis on the impor-
tance of interbreeding as a universal causal factor controlling evolutionary 
diversification. The potential to interbreed is not in itself a process; it is instead 
a result of a diversity of processes which result in shared selective environ-
ments and common developmental programs. These types of processes act in 
both sexual and asexual organisms, thus the phylogenetic species concept can 
reflect an underlying unity that the biological species concept can not.
Keywords
Species concepts, individuality, pluralism, monophyly, cladistics, phylogeny.
Introduction
The species question continues to be of central interest to biologists and phi-
losophers. Perhaps surprisingly for a topic that has been discussed so frequently 
for so long, new insights and original interpretations continue to emerge. In our 
opinion, however, widespread confusion remains on several important points. 
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Our purpose here cannot be to provide a general review of the subject (for 
which see Mayr, 1982, 1987). We wish instead to concentrate on the flurry 
of recent philosophically-oriented papers on species (Bernier, 1984; Ghiselin, 
1987; Haffer, 1986; Holsinger, 1984, in press; Hull, 1984, 1987; Kitcher, 1984a, 
1984b; Kitts, 1983, 1984; Mayr, 1987; Rieppel, 1986; Ruse, 1987; Sober, 1984; 
Williams, 1985), and to make several points. First, the distinction between indi-
viduals and classes is an oversimplification; at least four important subparts of 
the concept of individuality can be recognized. Second, a phylogenetic species 
concept has recently been elaborated that can simultaneously and rigorously 
meet the needs of systematists and evolutionary biologists. Species delimited 
in this way will never be classes, yet they will often not be fully individuals 
either. Third, in order to apply this concept, the usually unrecognized distinc-
tion between “grouping” and “ranking” components of a species concept must 
be realized and the appropriate meanings of “pluralism” and “monophyly” with 
respect to species must be appreciated.
Individuality
The “radical solution to the species problem” advocated by Ghiselin (1974) and 
Hull (1976) was to consider species as individuals rather than as classes. By “indi-
viduals” they meant entities that are “spatiotemporally localized, well-organized, 
cohesive at any one time, and continuous through time” (Hull, 1987). This idea 
has been enormously productive as a source of new insights into the species 
problem. Nevertheless, it is time to move beyond the simple class-individual 
distinction to a more detailed consideration of properties held by biological 
entities.10
A number of authors have suggested that the class-individual distinction 
advocated by Ghiselin and Hull is oversimplified and have suggested other 
ontological categories (Wiley, 1980; Mayr, 1987). Indeed, Hull (1976) himself 
suggested that a species may fall into some hybrid category that is neither an 
individual nor a class; but, he claimed, it is at least clear that species are not 
classes. The last conclusion we find ourselves in complete agreement with. It 
has been established beyond a doubt, in our opinion, that neither species nor 
other biological taxa can productively be viewed as sets or classes defined by 
possession of certain features. We believe that it is possible to define classes 
that are coextensive with particular biological species (see attempts by Kitcher, 
1984a). But such definitions do not add anything to the theoretical insights that 
have been gained by the “species as individual” concept.
A refinement that  can  lead to further theoretical insights is to unpack the 
concept of individuality into important subparts. With regard to evolutionary 
10 We should note at the outset that, contrary to the impression one is likely to get from the literature 
on species-as-individuals, the class-individual distinction is not a distinction taken directly from 
logic. First, Hull and Ghiselin are using a restricted notion of classes. Something counts as a class 
for them only if its membership can be specified in a spatiotemporally unrestricted way. Logic 
places no such restriction on classes. Although Hull (1978) is reasonably clear on this point, not 
everyone else has been and this has lead to some confusion. Second, the operative notion of 
“individual” comes more from common sense zoology than from logic.
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biology, at least four major sub-concepts of individuality can be recognized. 
We are not concerned with what sub-concept (or combination thereof) should 
be called true individuality. Rather we will argue that various kinds of biological 
entities (including those called species by systematists) will meet various com-
binations of these criteria of individuality and that it is necessary to distinguish 
among them. Our concern is to argue against the largely tacit assumption that 
entities meeting some of these criteria will meet them all.
We have suggested names for these sub-concepts, based on terms that have 
been used in the literature; other terminologies are clearly possible. It is impor-
tant to note that the first two of these sub-concepts are different in kind from the 
second two. The former refers to “patterns,” i.e., effects of biological processes, 
and the latter refers directly to the action of processes. We particularly use spe-
cies taxa as currently defined for examples here, but will defer our recommen-
dations for proper application of these ideas to species until a later section.
Spatial Boundaries
One important aspect of individuality is the spatial localization of a particular 
entity. The traditional view of a class is that its members may be present any-
where in the universe, if the proper defining features are present. All known 
evolutionary processes, however, certainly produce entities at all taxonomic lev-
els that are spatially restricted. Thus it would seem that species taxa, properly 
named, would always meet this criterion.
temporal Boundaries
A second important aspect of individuality involves temporal restriction of an entity. 
A taxon must have a single beginning and potentially have a single end in order to 
count as an individual under this criterion. Thus, such taxa may not re-originate, even 
if the second-arising entity is indistinguishable from the first. It should be clear that 
this criterion can be decoupled from the first. Depending on one’s definition of spe-
cies, taxa could easily be recognized that are spatially, but not temporally, restricted. 
One example would be repeated polyploid speciation in plants via hybridization 
(Holsinger,1987). The currently controversial systematic concept of monophyly is 
relevant here, but we defer discussion until a later section.
Integration
Two very different types of causal interaction between processes and biological 
entities have been lumped under the concept of individuality, thereby causing 
confusion. We will argue that these types of causal interactions can and often 
are disconnected from each other and/or from the resulting patterns discussed 
above, thus careful distinctions must be made.
We have designated “integration” to refer to active interaction among parts 
of an entity. In other words, does the presence or activity of one part of an 
entity matter to another part? Examples of this type of causal interaction include 
the effect of the heartbeat on the circulatory system of an animal, mating rela-
tionships and gene flow within populations and species, and processes of fre-
quency-dependent and density-dependent natural selection. It has been argued 
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by a number of authors (summarized by Mishler and Donoghue, 1982) that spe-
cies taxa as currently delimited often do not meet this criterion of individuality 
(even though they may meet one or both of the two criteria listed above).
Cohesion
We have designated “cohesion” to refer to situations where an entity behaves as 
a whole with respect to some process. In such a situation, the presence or activ-
ity of one part of an entity need not directly affect another, yet all parts of the 
entity respond uniformly to some specific process (although details of the actual 
response in different parts of the entity may be different because of the opera-
tion of other processes). Examples of this type of causal interaction include the 
failure of a corporation due to a stock market crash, developmental canalization 
in biological systems, and processes of density-independent natural selection. 
Clearly, species taxa as currently delimited may show cohesion as defined in this 
way, or integration, or both, or neither.
Problems with application of Individuality to Species
It should be clear from the above examples that despite its philosophical appeal, 
the “species as individual” concept developed by Ghiselin and Hull cannot be 
applied in its simplistic form to most species taxa as currently delimited, nor, we 
would argue, could taxonomic practice be revamped so as to make it generally 
applicable (see Mishler and Donoghue, 1982, for further arguments and exam-
ples). The major reasons for this inapplicability are two: the plethora of causal 
processes acting on biological entities and the lack of correspondence between 
either these processes or patterns resulting from them.
As pointed out by Van Valen (1982) and Holsinger (1984) among others, a 
great number of processes impinge on organisms and groups of organisms. A 
non-exhaustive list would include breeding relationships, competition, geologi-
cal change, developmental canalization, symbioses, and predation. Entities can 
simultaneously behave as individuals with respect to different processes, at dif-
ferent levels of inclusiveness (Holsinger, 1984). Furthermore, groups of organ-
isms defined by aspects of individuality with respect to one process are often 
not congruent with groups defined with respect to a second process (Mishler 
and Donoghue, 1982).
Mary Williams’ recent attempt (1985) to link her concept of “Darwinian sub-
clan” with Ghiselin and Hull’s formulation of species as individuals fails for both 
of these reasons. Her whole argument rests on the assumption that all biological 
species are in the domain of a legitimate interpretation of “Darwinian subclan,” 
or in other words, that species are Darwinian subclans. However, this amounts 
to the assumption that species are cohesive units with respect to (at least some) 
selective forces, i.e., that organisms within a species are all acted upon by those 
same forces. This flies in the face of much of what is known about selection. 
For example, a species ranging over a geographical cline would hardly qualify as 
a Darwinian subclan. For a more theoretical example, consider the intrademic 
models of kin and group selection (Wilson, 1980). Here the population units that 
are cohesive with respect to selection are generally much smaller than the local 
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population, much less the entire species. It is possible, even likely, that species will 
be Darwinian subclans for some period of their existence (especially at their origin), 
but this does not help Williams’ argument. She needs this to be generally true. 
However, current knowledge of evolutionary processes does not back her up.
The upshot is that species taxa often are not integrated or cohesive because 
of particular selective regimes. Other processes causing integration and/or 
cohesion of species taxa include gene flow and developmental canalization 
(Van Valen, 1982; Mishler, 1985). As mentioned above, species taxa as cur-
rently recognized may not be integrated or cohesive in any sense (although as 
will be discussed below, this situation might be changed by revision of taxo-
nomic practice). Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that reproductive 
processes and selective processes pick out the same units in nature (Mishler 
and Donoghue, 1982; Holsinger, 1984) – a correspondence necessary to relate 
Williams’ Darwinian subclans to Mayr’s biological species concept.
To summarize this section, it is useful to consider the nature of various exam-
ples of biological entities with differing degrees and aspects of individuality, to 
drive home the point that application of the simple dichotomy between indi-
viduals and classes has obscured important distinctions. Are there important 
biological groupings that are spatiotemporally localized but neither integrated 
nor cohesive? Yes, monophyletic higher taxa, called historical entities by Wiley 
(1980), and Darwinian clans as formalized by Williams (1970), would usually fit 
such a description. Mayr (1987) suggests that species often represent an inter-
mediate kind of entity (which he terms a “population”) that have spatiotempo-
ral localization but weak integration and cohesion. Thus the distinction made 
above can admit to differing degrees of integration or cohesion, ranging from 
strong (in a paradigmatic individual organism) to weak or absent.
Are there important biological groupings that are integrated and/or cohe-
sive but not spatiotemporally localized? Yes, groups defined by their participa-
tion in processes, such as plant communities, pollinator guilds, trophic levels, 
mixed-species feeding flocks, or C4 photosynthesizers, may be highly integrated, 
cohesive, or both, and yet lack any temporal boundaries. Further examples are 
given by polyphyletic or paraphyletic taxonomic groupings. Such groups may 
be cohesive because of ecological factors or shared developmental programs, 
but lack a unique beginning (in the case of polyphyletic groups) or a unique 
end (in the case of both kinds of groups). Integration and cohesion do seem 
to require some form of spatiotemporal connectedness, but, as our examples 
illustrate, this does not imply temporal boundaries. Does it strictly imply spatial 
boundaries? We think it does; in any case, we cannot think of any plausible 
examples of integrated and/or cohesive entities lacking spatial boundaries.
The Phylogenetic Species Concept
The search for a satisfactory concept of species is complicated by the need to 
simultaneously reconcile recent advances in evolutionary theory, with recent 
advances in systematic theory, with empirical requirements of objectivity and 
testability, and with constraints imposed by the formal Linnaean nomenclatorial 
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system. Before discussing one recently proposed solution, there is a need to 
introduce and clarify two important subjects: pluralism and the distinction 
between grouping and ranking.
Pluralism
As a number of authors have pointed out, controversies in evolutionary biol-
ogy over causal agents generally do not involve claims that all but one favored 
agent are impossible. Rather, a number of causal agents are acknowledged to be 
possible and controversy centers around which agent is the “most important” 
(Gould and Lewontin, 1979; Beatty, 1985).
The result of this situation in evolutionary biology has been a number of calls 
for “pluralism,” meaning generally to keep an open mind about which particular 
causal agent is to be invoked as an organizing principle in any particular case. 
The case of species concepts has heard similar calls (Mishler and Donoghue, 
1982; Kitcher, 1984a, b).
However, in the case of species, two very different sorts of “pluralism” have 
been advocated, thus confusion has resulted. Both sorts of pluralism are based 
on the fact that many different (and non-overlapping) groups of organisms are 
functioning in important biological processes (see discussion by Holsinger, 
1984,1987). Both sorts of pluralism deny that a universal species concept exists. 
However, they differ in their application to particular biological cases. Kitcher’s 
(1984a, b) brand of pluralism implies that there are many possible and permissible 
species classifications for a given situation (say the Drosophila melanogaster 
complex), depending on the needs and interest of particular systematists. In 
contrast, Mishler and Donoghue’s (1982) brand of pluralism implies that a single, 
optimal general-purpose classification exists for each particular situation, but 
that the criteria applied in each situation may well be different. This latter mean-
ing of pluralism, we would argue, is close to the use of the term by Gould and 
Lewontin (1979). Furthermore, we would also argue that its use results in per-
fectly reasonable and rigorous scientific solutions to particular problems. The 
only caveat is that problems (such as difficult species complexes) that seem at 
least superficially similar may require different criteria for solution.
Ghiselin (1987) has unfortunately confused these two uses of “pluralism” and 
tarred them both with a broad brush. Also, unfortunately, he has engaged in ad 
hominem attacks (by suggesting that pluralists are lazy, incompetent, dishonest, 
and generally not engaged in science at all) and fallacious arguments. Despite 
his unsupported assertion that the biological species definition is “fully applica-
ble to plants,” numerous botanists (and others) have published careful empirical 
and theoretical analyses of the difficulties with applying the biological species 
concept (see Mishler and Donoghue, 1982 for references). Problems having to 
do with lack of correspondence between patterns resulting from different causal 
processes, and the gradual nature of breeding discontinuities in plants, cannot 
be waved aside casually.
To further distinguish between the two meanings of “pluralism” and to clarify 
the proper usage of the term with respect to biological theories, it is necessary 
to examine connections with the concept of parsimony. It is natural and correct 
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for scientists to have a bias towards monism, because of the fundamental sci-
entific tenet of economy in hypotheses. Hull’s (1987) arguments for consistency 
in using cessation of gene flow as a uniform definition of the species category 
carry a lot of weight (see also arguments by Sober, 1984). The burden of proof 
rests squarely on someone who argues that the current domain of explanation 
of a monistic theoretical concept must be broken into smaller domains, each 
with its own explanatory concept. Note that this sort of pluralism (which is the 
sort advocated by Gould and Lewontin, 1979; Mishler and Donoghue, 1982) is 
“pluralistic” only during the transition as a prevailing monistic concept is broken 
up. Once controversy settles and the transition is complete, you are left with a 
greater number of explanatory concepts, each quite monistic within its proper 
domain. Parsimony considerations weigh in balance against the need to provide 
proper explanations for biological diversity. As scientists, we strongly attempt 
to minimize the number of theoretical concepts (to one if possible) allowed 
to delimit (for example) basic taxonomic units. Yet we should grudgingly grant 
status to additional concepts if the need for them is proven in particular cases.
This use of pluralism is clearly not the use advocated by Kitcher (1984a, b). 
He implies a sort of “permanent pluralism,” where an indefinitely large number 
of theoretical concepts (limited only by interests of particular biologists) remain 
acceptable within a single domain. We share the skepticism of Sober (1984), 
Hull (1987), and Ghiselin (1987) towards this meaning of pluralism. Its use with 
respect to species concepts would seem to rob systematics of any objective way 
of choosing between conflicting classifications or of any use of species as units 
of comparison. Therefore, in what follows we use “pluralism” in the sense of 
Mishler and Donoghue (1982).
Grouping Versus ranking
All species concepts must have two components: one to provide criteria for plac-
ing organisms together into a taxon (“grouping”) and another to decide the cut-off 
point at which the taxon is designated a species (“ranking”). This distinction (as 
detailed by Mishler and Donoghue, 1982; Donoghue, 1985; Mishler, 1985), has 
often not been recognized (but see a similar distinction made by Mayr, 1982:254). 
Taking the biological species concept as an example, its grouping component is 
“organisms that interbreed.” But since such groups are found at many levels of 
inclusiveness, especially if “potentially interbreeding” is added to the grouping cri-
terion, a ranking component is needed which usually is something like “the largest 
grouping in which effective interbreeding occurs in nature.”11
Since both components are implicit in any adequate species concept, con-
fusion is likely to result if the distinction between them is ignored. Thus Hull’s 
(1987) argument that using patterns of gene flow to define species will result in 
“a consistently genealogical perspective” is unsound. It depends on whether 
11 As pointed out by Hull (pers. comm.), when the distinction between grouping and ranking has 
previously been made, it was often blurred. This may often be because researchers use variations 
on the same theme for both grouping and ranking; e.g., patterns of morphological similarity or of 
gene exchange. As will be apparent below, we advocate distinctly different criteria for grouping 
than for ranking.
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reproductive criteria are used for grouping or for ranking. Both Rosen (1979) and 
Donoghue (1985), among others, have nicely shown that the use of reproductive 
criteria in grouping can easily result in non-monophyletic taxa, in contrast to 
the genealogical units Hull (along with us) hopes for. The “recognition concept 
of species” (Paterson, 1985), wherein species are defined by the possession of a 
common fertilization system, suffers from a similar problem in that non-mono-
phyletic taxa often result (see Fig. 3.1, where Species 1 may well be definable by 
reproductive criteria but is not monophyletic).
Further objections to various prevailing species concepts have been given 
by Mishler and Donoghue (1982), Donoghue (1985), and Mishler (1985). These 
authors made the following points: (1) None of the dozens of species concepts 
held currently by various authors can provide grouping criteria able to produce 
truly genealogical species classifications (including, curiously enough, species 
concepts advocated by cladists, a group dedicated to genealogical classifica-
tion). (2) In order to reflect the diversity of causal agents directing evolutionary 
differentiation in different lineages, no universal ranking criterion can be found.
an alternative Concept of Species
An alternative perspective on species as genealogical, theoretically significant 
taxa has been developed by Mishler and Donoghue (1982), Donoghue (1985), 
and Mishler (1985) and called the “phylogenetic species concept” (not to be 
confused with the concept proposed by Cracraft, 1983, with the same name). 
This concept explicitly recognizes a grouping and a ranking component, is 
FIGURE 3.1 A hypothetical cladogram showing three named species. Synapomorphies 
are shown as cross-bars; autapomorphies are not shown. Species 1 is paraphyletic.
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monistic with respect to grouping yet pluralistic (in the sense advocated above) 
with respect to ranking, and produces species taxa with at least some aspects 
of individuality.
The grouping criterion advocated by Mishler and Donoghue is monophyly in 
the cladistic sense. Further discussion of the meaning of “monophyly” is needed 
(see below), because the term is not normally applied to species in a substantive 
way by cladists. For now, it suffices to say that “monophyly” here is taken to 
refer to a grouping that had a single origin and contains (as far as can be empiri-
cally determined) all descendants of that origin.
Monophyletic groupings as roughly defined above exist at all levels of inclu-
siveness, thus a ranking criterion for species is needed as the basal systematic 
taxon (i.e., the least inclusive monophyletic group recognized in a particular 
classification). It is here that Mishler and Donoghue have advocated a pluralistic 
adjustment in the number of ranking criteria allowable for consideration in par-
ticular cases. They argued that the currently favored monistic ranking concept 
of absolute reproductive isolation is not the most appropriate for all groups of 
organisms. The ranking concept to be used in each case should be based on the 
causal agent judged to be most important in producing and maintaining distinct 
lineages in the group in question. The presence of breeding barriers might be 
used, but so might selective constraints or the action of strong developmental 
canalization (Mishler, 1985). In the great majority of cases, little to nothing is 
actually known about any of these biological aspects. In such cases grouping 
(estimation of monophyletic groups) will proceed solely by study of patterns of 
synapomorphy (i.e., shared, derived characters), and a practical ranking concept 
must be used until something becomes known about biology. This preliminary 
and pragmatic ranking concept will usually be the size of morphological gaps 
(i.e., number of synapomorphies along any particular internode of a cladogram) 
in most cases, a concept in accord with current taxonomic practice.
The phylogenetic species concept (PSC) of Mishler and Donoghue can be 
summarized as follows:
A species is the least inclusive taxon recognized in a classification, into which 
organisms are grouped because of evidence of monophyly (usually, but not 
restricted to, the presence of synapomorphies), that is ranked as a species because 
it is the smallest “important” lineage deemed worthy of formal recognition, where 
“important” refers to the action of those processes that are dominant in producing 
and maintaining lineages in a particular case.
Relating the PSC back to the earlier discussion of individuality, it is clear that spe-
cies so defined (as with monophyletic taxa at all levels) will at least meet the 
restricted spatiotemporal criterion of individuality. They may or may not be inte-
grated or cohesive. However, these criteria may often prove useful in ranking 
decisions. Since the strength of integrative or cohesive bonds tends to gradually 
weaken as more and more inclusive groups of organisms are taken (see for exam-
ple discussion by Mayr, 1987), it may be possible in many cases to objectively fix 
the species level as the most inclusive monophyletic group that is integrated or 
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cohesive with respect to “important” processes. Again, “important” has a context-
dependent meaning, and will often not refer to reproductive criteria. It may often 
be difficult to apply this standard, especially if macroevolutionary processes occur 
(even rarely) involving groups at high taxonomic levels (Gould, 1980; Jablonski, 
1986). If so, integrated and/or cohesive groups may occur at much more inclusive 
levels than anyone would wish to name as basal taxonomic units.
The problem of (at least partial) non-comparability of species taxa in differ-
ent groups of organisms is a real one (Sober, 1984; Hull, 1987; Ghiselin, 1987). 
However, as pointed out by Mishler and Donoghue (1982), this has always been 
the case, despite the fact that many users of species taxa – ecologists, philoso-
phers, paleobiologists, biogeographers, for example – remain blissfully unaware. 
This difficult situation has not come about because (as suggested by Ghiselin, 
1987) systematists working with organisms other than birds are incompetent, 
but rather reflects a fact of nature. The pluralistic ranking concept of the PSC 
was proposed to allow different biological situations to be explicitly treated. 
Persons interested in studying some biological processes simply cannot avoid 
the responsibility of learning enough about the systematics of the organisms they 
are studying to ensure that the entities being compared are truly comparable 
with respect to that process.
To take one example that has been widely recognized (Mayr, 1987), asexual 
organisms present insurmountable difficulties for the biological species con-
cept. One proposed solution has been to deny that such organisms form species 
(Bernstein et al., 1985; Eldredge, 1985; Hull, 1987; Ghiselin, 1987). This reductio 
ad absurdum of the biological species concept demonstrates how a monistic 
ranking (and grouping) concept based on interbreeding criteria can obscure 
actual patterns of diversification. One of us (B.D.M.) happens to work on a 
genus of mosses (Tortula, see Mishler, 1985, for references), in which frequently 
sexual, rarely sexual, and entirely asexual lineages occur. The interesting thing 
is that the asexual lineages form species that seem comparable in all important 
ways with species recognized in the mostly asexual lineages and even in the 
sexual lineages.12 It just happens in this case that potential interbreeding or lack 
thereof seems of little or no importance in the origination and maintenance of 
diversity. The application of the PSC here is able to reflect an underlying unity 
that the biological species concept could not.
Indeed there seems to be a fundamental confusion at the heart of the bio-
logical species concept and its insistence that only sexual organisms can form 
species. Potential interbreeding and the lack thereof (i.e., breeding barriers) can 
be observed in nature and so can be used as a ranking criterion for species. But 
why should it be so used, or rather, why should it be the only ranking criterion 
used? We suspect that part of the rationale stems from a confusion over the roles 
of potential interbreeding and actual interbreeding.
12 A similar result has been arrived at by Holman (pers. comm.) based on comparisons between 
bdelloid rotifers (which are exclusively parthenogenic) and monogonont rotifers (which occasion-
ally reproduce sexually). Using numbers of synonymous species names as an index of taxonomic 
distinctness of species, he has shown that bdelloid species are apparently more consistently 
recognized by taxonomists than are monogonont species.
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Actual interbreeding is a process. It results in lineages (but not always lineages 
important enough to be named species – e.g., short-lived hybrid populations). The 
process of (actually) interbreeding also inevitably leads to a certain amount of inte-
gration. In sexual species, it undoubtedly is one of the important processes hold-
ing the species together. But potential interbreeding is not a process and therefore 
has no effect on the integration or cohesion of species. The dispersed parts of a 
sexual species are not bound together by this non-process; they may be bound 
together by sharing common environments or common developmental programs, 
but they cannot be bound together by “potential interbreeding.”
In general, the potential to interbreed is based on organisms sharing com-
mon environments and common developmental programs. The processes 
that result in groups of organisms sharing such features and in discontinuities 
between such groups are multifarious, and are not restricted to sexual organ-
isms. Organisms share common developmental programs because they share a 
common ancestor. Reproduction is a relevant process here, but not necessarily 
sexual reproduction.
It is our argument that the PSC is superior to the biological species con-
cept (or to the evolutionary species concept of Simpson, 1961, and Wiley, 1978, 
which is similar in these ways to the biological species concept) in two fun-
damental ways. First, monophyly as a grouping criterion is superior to ability 
to interbreed because it will lead to a consistently genealogical classification. 
Second, the pluralistic ranking concept of the PSC is superior to the monistic 
insistence on breeding barriers of the biological species concept because it can 
more adequately reflect evolutionary causes of importance in different groups.
Other cladistic species concepts such as the “phylogenetic species concept” 
of Cracraft (1983) which is very similar to the species concept of Nelson and 
Platnick (1981) are also inferior to the PSC of Mishler and Donoghue, but for 
somewhat different reasons. The grouping concept used by the former authors 
(i.e., a cluster of organisms defined by a unique combination of primitive and 
derived characters) does not rule out the possibility of paraphyletic species, 
unlike the PSC (see next section). Furthermore, the concepts of Cracraft and 
Nelson and Platnick (in addition to the concept of Rosen, 1979, that does use 
presence of synapomorphies as a grouping criterion) are incomplete in that they 
lack a ranking criterion. It is not sufficient to say that a species is the smallest 
diagnosable cluster (Cracraft, 1983) or even monophyletic group, because such 
groups occur at all levels, even within organisms (e.g., cell lineages). Some judg-
ment of the significance of discontinuities is needed.
Monophyly
One final area in need of clarification is the concept of monophyly. Traditionally, 
the cladistic definition of monophyly (which we favor) has not been applied to 
the species level. Hennig (1966) did not do so because he was committed to a 
biological species concept and thought that there was a clean break at the spe-
cies level, with reticulating genealogical relationships predominating below and 
diverging genealogical relationships predominating above. Later cladists (e.g., 
Wiley, 1981) have followed Hennig and defined a monophyletic taxon as one 
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that originated in a single species and that contains all descendants of that spe-
cies. Species are taken to be monophyletic a priori, therefore it is argued that 
they need not possess synapomorphies or really be monophyletic in the sense 
of higher taxa (e.g., Wiley, 1981). One major reason for this is the supposed 
problem of “ancestral” species.
It is our view that properly clarified, there are no insurmountable problems 
with applying the concept of monophyly explicitly to species (as the basal sys-
tematic taxon). Furthermore, this application  must  be carried out in order to 
have a consistently genealogical classification.
Monophyly should be redefined in such a way as to apply to species:
A monophyletic taxon is a group that contains all and only descendants of a com-
mon ancestor, originating in a single event.
“Ancestor” here refers, not to an ancestral species, but to a single individual. 
By “individual” here, we do not necessarily mean a single organism, but rather 
an entity (less inclusive than the species level) with spatiotemporal localization 
and with either cohesion or integration or both (as defined above). In particular 
cases, this ancestral individual could be a single organism, a kin group, or a local 
population. We would argue that it would never be a whole species because we 
share the widespread view that new species come about only via splitting, not 
by any amount of anagenetic change.
The originating “event” of a monophyletic group referred to in the definition 
above could be due to the spatiotemporally restricted action of a number of dif-
ferent causes. These could include, in different cases, the origin of an evolutionary 
novelty which causes a new monophyletic group to be subject to a different selec-
tive regime than the rest of the “parent” species or which causes a disruption of 
the normal developmental canalization of the “parent” species. These could also 
include acquisition of an isolating mechanism or even the origin of a new species 
by hybridization between parts of two “parent” species. This diversity of causes 
for evolutionary divergence reinforces the need for a pluralistic ranking concept.
Some examples of the application of this concept should clarify the defini-
tion. It is thought at the present time that a common mode of speciation is via 
peripheral isolation. In such a case, the peripherally isolated part of the spe-
cies, if spatiotemporally localized (say on the same island at the same time) and 
either cohesive, integrated, or both (say by interbreeding and sharing a com-
mon niche), would qualify as a monophyletic group under our definition. This 
would be true even if several rather unrelated members of the original species 
were the founders of the peripheral population, as long as the above conditions 
obtain. On the other hand, if two similar but non spatiotemporally connected 
peripheral populations (say on two different islands) have been established by 
members (even closely related ones) of the original species, these two popula-
tions would have to be considered as two separate monophyletic groups. They 
are two separate monophyletic groups because they originated in two different 
events. Hybrid speciation provides similar examples. If two original species pro-
duce a hybrid population in one place (say a single valley) at one time (say in a 
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single breeding season), and if this hybrid population behaves as an integrated 
and/or cohesive entity, then it is a perfectly good monophyletic group under 
our definition. However, if similar hybrids are produced elsewhere in the ranges 
of the two original species, or if hybrids are produced in the same locality but 
discontinuously in time (i.e., if the first hybrid population goes extinct before the 
new hybrids are produced), then the separate hybrid populations would have to 
be considered as separate monophyletic groups and could not be taken together 
and named as a new species. Note that this conclusion is directly opposite that 
of Kitcher (1984a:314–315). The implications of our concept of monophyly for 
the original species in the above examples will be discussed below.
This concept of monophyly is, of course, only a grouping criterion. It does 
not imply that any particular peripheral isolate or hybrid population must be rec-
ognized as a species. It only specifies the genealogical conditions under which 
such groups can be recognized if the ranking criterion applied in a particular 
case supports recognition at the species level. The grouping and ranking criteria 
can thus be seen to interact in producing a species classification. Note that a 
corollary of the PSC is that not all organisms will belong to a formal Linnaean 
species since some monophyletic groups (e.g., hybrid populations that arise, 
but then quickly go extinct) will not be judged to be “important” monophyletic 
groups. The hybrid organisms in such a case would not formally belong to either 
original species.
The definition of monophyly given above solves the problem perceived by 
Hennig (1966), Wiley (1981), and Cracraft (1983) with “ancestral species.” No 
such things exist. Only parts of an original species give rise to new ones, as 
in the above examples. If a currently recognized species is found to be para-
phyletic because parts of it can be demonstrated to be more closely related to 
another species (Fig. 3.1; see also discussions and diagrams of such a situation in 
Bremer and Wanntorp, 1979; Avise, 1986), then the paraphyletic species should 
be broken up into smaller monophyletic species.
Note that if Species 1 (Fig. 3.1) is actually integrated by gene flow, then 
over time its cladistic structure should approach that of Species 1 in Fig. 3.2. 
Moreover, over an even longer time in such a truly integrated species, patterns 
of character distribution should even out such that no autapomorphies remain to 
distinguish lineages within the species, and Species 1 would be represented in a 
cladogram by a single line (albeit still without any synapomorphies to distinguish 
it as a species). In systematic studies, a situation is frequently encountered 
(Fig. 3.2) in which a number of unresolved lineages exist, one or more of which 
are deemed worthy of recognition as separate species, and the rest of which have 
traditionally been considered a species taken together. This type of situation has 
been confused with paraphyly. However, it is actually a case of a taxon (e.g. 
Species 1 in Fig. 3.2) with a uncertain status between paraphyly and monophyly. 
With further study, synapomorphic characters may be found uniting some part 
of Species 1 with the lineage of Species 2 and 3 (as in Fig. 3.1). If that becomes 
the case, Species 1 truly is paraphyletic and must be broken up. On the other 
hand, further study may demonstrate synapomorphies uniting all of the lineages 
in Species 1, thus making it an unproblematic phylogenetic species.
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It has been cogently argued by Donoghue (1985) that a group such as Species 1 
in Fig. 3.2 could acceptably be named a species in a tentative and pragmatic 
way, pending further study designed to resolve the relationships, as long as a 
special convention was followed to indicate the uncertain status of the spe-
cies (Donoghue suggests marking the binomial name of all such species with 
an asterisk). This solution is practical because it avoids unnecessary naming of 
highly localized species (if, for example, all recognizable lineages in Species 1, 
Fig. 3.2, were formally named). It is also probably unavoidable, since if specia-
tion by peripheral isolation occurs frequently, such situations may often be in 
principle unresolvable, as discussed above. Donoghue (1985) suggested calling 
this type of species a metaspecies, to clearly distinguish it from a known mono-
phyletic species. Following the prefix he suggested, we suggest the need for a 
new term, “metaphyly,” to refer to the status of groups that are not known to be 
either paraphyletic or monophyletic. Although beyond the scope of the present 
paper, this term would clarify similar situations with respect to higher taxa, and 
may thus prove more widely useful.
Conclusion
The “species problem” as discussed in this paper involves a search for a defini-
tion of the basal systematic unit that will be at once practical, provide optimal 
general-purpose classifications, and reflect the best current knowledge about 
evolutionary processes. We have claimed that the PSC will fulfill these criteria. 
FIGURE 3.2 A hypothetical cladogram showing three named species. Synapomorphies 
are shown as cross-bars; autapomorphies are not shown. Species 1 is metaphyletic.
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However, we certainly have not claimed that all  important biological entities 
can be recognized using the PSC.
As pointed out clearly by Holsinger (1984), a multitude of interesting biologi-
cal entities, often non-overlapping, are behaving as (at least partial) individuals 
with respect to a multitude of interesting processes in any particular group of 
organisms. While we do need to settle on criteria for recognizing formal taxa for 
our Linnaean taxonomic system (including species), we are of course in no way 
prohibited from informally naming and studying other entities of interest that do 
not fit the formal taxonomic system. That is, as long as different types of entities 
are explicitly distinguished from each other.
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Conceptual History
Various attempts have been made at forging a species concept compatible 
with phylogenetic systematics or cladistics. Several such concepts have been 
called  the  Phylogenetic Species Concept, thus leading to considerable con-
fusion in the literature. We support one version of the Phylogenetic Species 
Concept, one that, we will argue, can serve as a synthesis of all versions, but for 
historical clarity, we will distinguish among different versions, their origins, and 
motivations (see also discussion by Baum 1992).
Hennig himself apparently held a view on species close to the Biological 
Species Concept. He defined species as “a complex of spatially distributed 
reproductive communities” (1966:47). He made an important distinction 
between tokogenetic relationships (ones that obtain between an “individual and 
its descendants and predecessors of the first degree” 1966:65) and phylogenetic 
relationships (ones that obtain between different lineages, “each bounded by 
two cleavage processes in the sequence of individuals that are connected by 
tokogenetic relations” 1966:20). In other words, tokogenetic relationships are 
diachronic, ancestor-descendant connections, whereas phylogenetic relation-
ships are synchronic, sister-group connections.
Hennig’s approach, although sound in many respects, errs in our opinion by 
postulating that there is one single breaking point at which reticulating tokoge-
netic relationship ends and divergent phylogenetic relationship begins. As we 
will discuss in detail below, there is not a clear cutoff point at which reticulation 
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of lineages ceases, and furthermore, the point at which the possibility of reticu-
lation goes to zero is well above the level at which cladistic structure can be 
reconstructed.
Hennig was also in error, in our opinion, when he used reproductive criteria 
to group organisms into species. The inappropriateness of using breeding com-
patibility in cladistic analysis was first pointed out by Rosen (1978, 1979) and 
Bremer and Wanntorp (1979). The fundamental problem is that the ability to 
interbreed (potential or actual), as a plesiomorphy by definition, is not a phylo-
genetically valid grouping criterion. Rosen argued (correctly, we think) that the 
basis for grouping in a cladistic system should be synapomorphy.
One phylogenetic species concept, based on unique patterns of shared 
characters, was proposed and defended by Eldredge and Cracraft (1980), 
Cracraft (1983), and Nixon and Wheeler (1990). For purposes of discussion, in 
this essay, we shall refer to this general approach as the Phylogenetic Species 
Concept sensu Wheeler and Platnick, abbreviated Phylogenetic Species Concept 
(W–P). Oddly enough from a phylogenetic standpoint, unlike the concept of 
Rosen, this concept was explicitly not based on synapomorphy, but rather on a 
shared combination of characters (tracing back in this way to the species concept 
of Nelson and Platnick 1981). This approach to phylogenetic species followed 
the view of Hennig, seeing a fundamental break at the species level between 
diverging phylogenetic relationships above and reticulating tokogenetic relation-
ships below.
Following up on some of Rosen’s suggestions, Mishler and Donoghue (1982) 
presented and discussed another phylogenetic species concept [but they did 
not call it such until 1985 (Donoghue 1985; Mishler 1985)]. For purposes of 
discussion, we shall refer to this general approach as the Phylogenetic Species 
Concept sensu Mishler and Theriot, abbreviated Phylogenetic Species Concept 
(M–T). We are not particularly concerned about names for concepts; the con-
cepts themselves are the important matter. However, we do not think priority is 
particularly important in such cases. Although we admit that Cracraft (1983) first 
used the name Phylogenetic Species Concept, we argue that a name should first 
and foremost reflect the meaning of a concept, and will point out in the next 
section that the Phylogenetic Species Concept (M–T) is uniquely suited for a 
classification based on phylogeny.
The empirical emphasis of Mishler and Donoghue (1982) was twofold. First, 
they pointed out the obvious noncorrespondence between groupings of organ-
isms defined by different criteria. That is, an ecologically coherent group may 
be either less or more inclusive than the actively interbreeding group, and nei-
ther may correspond to a morphologically and/or genotypically coherent group. 
Second, as one looks at less inclusive and more inclusive groupings with respect 
to any one of these factors, there is no fundamental level, no level with some 
special reality for evolutionary studies. The theoretical emphasis of Mishler and 
Donoghue (1982) was also twofold. First, organisms should be grouped into spe-
cies on the basis of evidence for monophyly, as at all taxonomic levels; breed-
ing criteria, in particular, have no business being used for grouping purposes. 
Second, ranking criteria used to assign species rank to certain monophyletic 
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groups must vary among different organisms, but might well include ecological 
criteria or the presence of breeding barriers in particular cases.
The two versions of the Phylogenetic Species Concept differ strongly in 
how they view reticulate relationships and characters in cladistic analysis. The 
Phylogenetic Species Concept (W–P) argues that units having reticulate relation-
ships are inappropriate for phylogenetic analysis (because that is inherently a 
study of branching relationships) and that such units can be the unambiguous 
phylogenetic species. “Fixed” combinations of characters were considered to be 
the empirical evidence for such units. The Phylogenetic Species Concept (M–T) 
argues that reticulation can occur throughout the hierarchy of life and so is not 
a special species problem, but rather one of more general difficulty. Under this 
view, apomorphies were considered to be the necessary empirical evidence for 
unambiguous phylogenetic species, as for phylogenetic taxa at all levels.
It might appear from the literature and the above discussion that the two 
basic versions of the Phylogenetic Species Concept are diametrically opposed. 
However, the differences can be overemphasized. Looking at the history of 
ideas and research groups in the manner pioneered by Hull (1988; see also 
Mishler 1987), it is clear that both in a phylogenetic sense and a phenetic sense, 
the two Phylogenetic Species Concepts are much closer to each other than 
either is to phenetic, biological, or evolutionary concepts. Both Phylogenetic 
Species Concepts have origins in the theory of phylogenetic systematics, and 
both emphasize that species be diagnosable. Differences in underlying philoso-
phy remain, however. Wheeler and Platnick’s Phylogenetic Species Concept has 
emphasized epistemology in its central focus on character evidence, whereas 
our Phylogenetic Species Concept has emphasized ontology in its central focus 
on monophyly. Difficulties in arriving at a synthesis of these two general phylo-
genetic approaches to species include finding the right balance between primary 
systematic patterns (i.e., character evidence) and evolutionary process theories. 
Clearly, it makes no sense to apply a species concept that requires prior spe-
cific knowledge of processes (e.g., reproductive behavior or ecological sorting). 
On the other hand, it is necessary that recognized species taxa be compatible 
with processes acting to produce phylogenies if phylogenetic classification is 
to be adopted as the general reference system. A unified Phylogenetic Species 
Concept can be proposed, based primarily on our Phylogenetic Species Concept 
in terms of its generalized ontological view about the meaning of phylogenetic 
criteria at any hierarchical level, but also incorporating the epistemological focus 
on character evidence from the Phylogenetic Species Concept (W–P).
Definition
The following paragraph provides a formal definition of our Phylogenetic Species 
Concept (based primarily on that of Mishler and Brandon 1987). The definition 
is complex, but then again so are the issues involved in producing hierarchical 
classifications from phylogenies:
A species is the least inclusive taxon recognized in a formal phylogenetic classifi-
cation. As with all hierarchical levels of taxa in such a classification, organisms are 
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grouped into species because of evidence of monophyly. Taxa are ranked as spe-
cies rather than at some higher level because they are the smallest monophyletic 
groups deemed worthy of formal recognition, because of the amount of support 
for their monophyly and/or because of their importance in biological processes 
operating on the lineage in question.
Some elaboration of terms from this definition is needed (see also Mishler 
and Brandon 1987).  Monophyly  is defined synchronically, following the “cut 
method” of Sober (1988), as all and only descendants of a common ances-
tor existing in any one slice in time. The ancestor is not an ancestral species, 
but rather a less inclusive entity such as an organism, kin group, or popula-
tion that had spatiotemporal localization and cohesion/integration (as discussed 
by Mishler and Brandon 1987). The synchronic approach is necessary to avoid 
the time paradoxes that arise when classifying ancestors with descendants (see 
discussion by Hennig 1966). Given that ontology, the evidence required for a 
hypothesis of monophyly is primarily corroborated patterns of synapomorphy 
(but may include other factors, such as geography).
The ranking decision (Mishler and Donoghue 1982; Donoghue 1985; Mishler 
1985, Mishler and Brandon 1987) can involve practical criteria such as the 
amount of support for a putative group (e.g., number and “quality” of synapo-
morphies, bootstrap percentage, or decay index) and may also involve biological 
criteria in better-known organisms (e.g., the origin of a distinctive mating system 
at a particular node). This ranking decision is forced because systematists have 
legislatively constrained themselves to use a ranked Linnaean hierarchy. A larger 
issue is the recent call for reforming the Linnaean system by De Queiroz and 
Gauthier (1992) to remove the concept of ranks. Such a move would decrease 
the arbitrariness of ranking decisions at the species level as well, but the implica-
tions of this are beyond the scope of this paper (see Mishler 1999 for a discus-
sion of the implications); we assume here that the current Linnaean system of 
ranked classifications is to remain in place.
Phylogenetic trees are the primary result of systematic study; they are hypoth-
eses about nature, and thus “real” in that sense. However, any application of 
fixed names to phylogenetic trees (which result from continuous processes of 
divergence and reticulation) has to be arbitrary to some extent (particularly rank-
ing). Grouping (based on monophyly) will be less arbitrary, but will still involve 
ancillary decisions about character homology and about how much support 
is necessary before one believes a hypothesis of monophyly. The main reason 
for providing a classification (beyond simply presenting the phylogeny, which 
could otherwise speak for itself) is to give a convenient handle, a name, for 
those monophyletic groups that we need to discuss or about which we need 
to record data. We need to name distinctive lineages as part of the process 
of inventorying, conserving, and using biological diversity. We also need to 
refer to specific phylogenetic groups in studies of processes acting to generate 
and maintain distinctive lineages. Not all discovered monophyletic groups, at 
whatever level, need to or should be named: some will be trivial in evolution-
ary terms (i.e., of short temporal duration or marked only by minor, selectively 
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neutral apomorphies), some cryptic (i.e., marked only by molecular or chemical 
apomorphies and thus nearly impossible to distinguish for practical uses), and 
some poorly supported (and thus subject to frequent change as more characters 
and taxa are discovered). There will not always be a “smallest” monophyletic 
group in an ontological sense; monophyletic groups exist in many organisms 
(especially clonal ones, but also any group with limited dispersibility) at much 
smaller levels than one would want to recognize formally with a Linnaean name. 
Thus, application of the species rank, like any other, is never automatic – it 
always requires independent justification.
Phylogenetic Justification
Our basic position is that there is no species problem per se in systematics. 
Rather, there is a taxon problem. Once one has decided what taxon names are 
to represent in general, then species taxa should be the same kinds of things, 
just the least inclusive. As discussed above, it must be recognized that there 
is an element of arbitrariness to the formal Linnaean nomenclatorial system. 
Evolution is real, as are organisms (physiological units), lineages (phylogenetic 
units), and demes (interbreeding units), for example. On the other hand, our 
classification systems are obviously human constructs, meant to serve certain 
purposes of our own: communication, data storage and retrieval, and predictiv-
ity. These purposes are best served by classification systems that reflect our best 
understanding of natural processes of evolution, and the field of systematics, in 
general, has settled on restricting the use of formal taxonomic names to rep-
resent phylogenetically natural, monophyletic groups. We will not repeat here 
the many reasons for preferring the phylogenetic approach to general-purpose 
instead, having accepted principles of phylogenetic classification, we will argue 
for the thoughtful application of these principles to the species level.
A phylogenetic systematic study of a previously unknown group of organ-
isms involves three major temporal, logical phases. To understand the uniquely 
phylogenetic basis for our approach to species, it is necessary to elaborate on 
these phases:
1. In the precladistic phase the elements of a cladistic data matrix are 
assembled. These elements include OTUs (operational taxonomic 
units), characters, and character states. OTUs are assembled initially 
from grouping together of individual specimens that are homoge-
neous for the characters then known (see also discussion by Vrana 
and Wheeler 1992). Hennig (1966) himself laid this process out quite 
well. In his words, “the individual is to be regarded as the lowest taxo-
nomic group category” (1966:65). In Hennig’s system, the individual 
organism is regarded as being composed of semaphoronts (character 
bearers), which are basically “the individual in a certain, theoretically 
infinitely small, time span of its life, during which it can be considered 
unchangeable” (1966:65). Semaphoronts are connected by ontogenetic 
relationships to form the individual organism; individual organisms 
classifications (see Hennig 1965, 1966; Nelson 1973; Wiley 1981; Farris 1983); 
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are connected by tokogenetic relationships to form ancestor-descen-
dant lineages. Hennig was quite explicit (1966:66–70) in showing that 
although the above ontology is clear, the empirical process of group-
ing individual organisms together into hypotheses of species is far from 
clear. This complex process involves considerable reciprocal illumina-
tion (because developing hypotheses of distinct, independent charac-
ters with discrete states goes hand in hand with developing hypotheses 
of homogeneous OTUs). There is no “magic bullet,” no obvious, theory-
free way to individuate species. The process must involve analysis, and 
that analysis must be explicitly phylogenetic.
2. Cladistic analysis involves translation of the data matrix into a clado-
gram. Reciprocal illumination is often involved here as well because 
incongruence between characters or odd behavior of particular OTUs 
may lead to a return to phase 1, a reexamination of OTUs and charac-
ters, primarily to check for fit to the assumptions of the cladistic method 
(i.e., that OTUs should be homogeneous for the characters used and 
should be the result of a diverging phylogenetic process rather than a 
reticulating, tokogenetic process; characters should be discrete, heri-
table, and independent).
3. Classifications based on an assessment of the relative support for dif-
ferent clades provide a basis for evolutionary studies. Formal taxa 
(including species) are named here on the basis of clear support for 
their existence as monophyletic cross-sections of a lineage and for their 
utility in developing and discussing process theories.
Discussion and Conclusions
reticulation
Certain fundamental assumptions must be made in order to justify the use of 
cladistic parsimony for phylogenetic reconstruction. These have been discussed 
by a number of people (see summary by Sober 1988); Mishler (1994) argued that 
five basic assumptions are necessary:
1. Replication (in the sense of Hull 1980; Brandon 1990) must occur to 
form lineages (the diachronic ancestor-descendant relationship; Wilson 
1995).
2. Particular features to be used as historical markers (characters) must 
have discrete variants (character states  empirically,  transformational 
homologs ontologically) that show a strong correlation (heritability in a 
population genetic sense) between parent and offspring.
3. Divergence (branching of lineages) must occur, as compared with 
reticulation, giving rise to patterns of  taxic homologs  (in the sense of 
Patterson 1982) shared among sister groups (the synchronic monophyly 
relationship).
4. Independence must occur among different characters; that is, no process 
(e.g., natural selection, gene conversion, developmental constraints) is 
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operating to produce nonhomologous character associations that over-
whelm taxic homologs, indicating common history.
5. Transformation in particular characters must occur at a relatively low 
rate, as compared with divergence (see Mishler 1994 for discussion and 
further literature references).
Note that the first and third assumptions are ontological, whereas the second, 
fourth, and fifth assumptions are merely epistemological. If one of the latter 
are violated to some extent, we can still get the true relationships. If the third 
assumption is violated by reticulation, true relationships of the resulting hybrid 
literally cannot be obtained via cladistic parsimony. Note that this is, of course, 
the case with any other phylogenetic reconstruction algorithm introduced, 
whether based on distances, phenetics, maximum likelihood, or some other 
criterion. However, there is hope for future development of algorithms to detect 
reticulation because it is possible to infer hybridity based on genomic studies 
(using chromosomal markers or allelic markers such as allozymes or RAPDs 
[randomly amplified polymorphic DNAs]; Rieseberg et al. 1990; Arnold et al. 
1991; Rieseberg 1991; Arnold et al. 1992).
Reticulation is thus the  bête noire  for cladistics, as initially recognized by 
Hennig. There are a number of different sources of homoplasy (incongruency 
between certain character distributions and the cladogram based on maximum 
parsimony), such as adaptive convergence, gene conversion, developmental 
constraints, mistaken coding, and reticulation. The last-named factor is the most 
problematical because it involves the fundamental model of reality underlying 
cladistic analysis. The other factors are cases of mistaken hypotheses of homol-
ogy, whereas homoplastic character distributions due to reticulate evolution 
involve true homologies whose mode of transmission is not treelike.
Hennig and later Nixon and Wheeler were correct in focusing on reticulation 
and the problems it causes for cladistics. Our opinion of the significance of this 
problem for the species question differs to some extent from theirs, however, for 
the following reasons: (1) just as barriers to reticulation are often not complete, 
reticulation is not a complete barrier to cladistic analysis; and (2) reticulate rela-
tionships range from intense (in panmictic, sexually reproducing groups, where 
individual relationships are exclusively reticulate) to less intense (in spatially or 
temporally subdivided groups, where both reticulate and divergent relationships 
exist, facultatively and/or obligatorily, among individuals).
The presence of some reticulation is not an absolute barrier to cladistic 
reconstructions. We can reconstruct relationships in the face of some amount of 
reticulation (how much is not yet clear, but is amenable to study). For example, 
McDade (1992) has shown that incorporating a few known hybrids in an analysis 
of “good” species does not seriously affect the cladistic topology of the good 
species. Of course, the hybrids cannot be placed correctly in a reticulate posi-
tion solely via cladistic analysis, but the relationships of the nonhybrids may 
be perfectly reconstructable. McDade actually gives rules predicting what a 
hybrid taxon should do in a cladistic analysis; thus, there may be a self-correct-
ing mechanism here, as there is with other sources of homoplasy; even major 
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convergence (e.g., in cave animals) can be uncovered via cladistic analysis. As 
with convergence, where the application of cladistic analysis provides the only 
rigorous basis we have for identifying homoplasy and thus demonstrating non-
parsimonious evolution (Farris 1983), the only way we can identify reticulation 
on the basis of character analysis alone is through the application of cladistic 
parsimony, followed by the examination of homoplasy to attempt to discover 
its source.
Furthermore, there is no consistently clear demarcation between reticulate 
and branching relationships. Hybridization takes place between clades of various 
patristic/cladistic degrees of relatedness. There is no sharp distinction between 
sexually versus asexually reproducing populations in a great many organisms. 
Bacteria exchange genetic material in a variety of ways. Diatoms, cladocerans, 
and rotifers commonly undergo many asexual generations, with occasional sex-
ual generations occurring in response to environmental change; some lineages 
within these groups can be obligately asexual. In many diatoms, only part of 
a single clonal lineage can become sexual at any given time. Other forms of 
reticulation occur throughout nature. Rare, high-level hybridizations may occur 
among very divergent lineages, such as among genera of orchids; viral-mediated 
lateral transfer of genetic material is suspected at much higher levels.
Thus, just as there may be no largest cladistic unit for which reticulation is 
impossible, there may be no smallest irreducible cladistic unit within which 
no further diverging phylogenetic patterns occur; ontologically speaking, we 
are dealing with a fractal pattern. When one looks at a lineage closely, one 
sees a pattern of divergence of lineages within (and some reticulation, perhaps 
increasingly greater, as one looks at less inclusive lineages). Asexuals are the 
most extreme case; cladistic structure will go down to the organism level. This 
fractal pattern of reticulation and branching is a severe problem for phylogenetic 
inference by any means. But as argued above, phenomena such as symbiosis 
are discovered as incongruence between organismal and character phylogenies. 
Massive convergence in one character system is discovered by incongruence 
between that system and other characters. By presuming that synapomorphy is 
equivalent to strict taxic homology of sister groups, cladistic analysis implies that 
homoplasy is explainable by all other processes, including reticulation. Lacking 
other information, reticulation must always be presumed to be a possible expla-
nation for homoplasy.
Assuming we want to discover reticulation by objective means (Vrana and 
Wheeler 1992), it will be important to focus further attention on the problem 
of reticulation. Were cladistic analysis to be attempted on individuals within 
a panmictic group, consensus cladograms would presumably be nearly com-
pletely unresolved. This would be the correct result: there is little or no cladistic 
structure to reconstruct in such cases. Admittedly, however, one might still get a 
single most parsimonious tree even with heavily reticulating units. An unproven 
assumption in such cases of intense reticulation among OTUs is that there would 
be a disproportionate number of nearly most parsimonious trees. One might 
also expect to observe nonrandom distributions of homoplastic characters (con-
certed homoplasy) in cases of hybridization. How modes of reticulation actually 
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affect character distributions on cladograms is a productive avenue for empirical 
and theoretical investigations.
This avenue reflects one of the great strengths of the direct character analysis 
procedure of cladistics. Methods that sum information across all characters (dis-
tance or phenetic methods) instead of treating them discretely cannot directly 
discover reticulation. Although direct observation of reticulation (e.g., field stud-
ies of hybridization) would indicate that cladistic analysis is inappropriate for 
phylogenetic inference, the presence of fixed characters at some level of group-
ing is neither direct nor indirect evidence for reticulation below that level. Only 
homoplasy may be used as indirect evidence for reticulation.
In conclusion, reticulation is not a species-specific problem. Modes of reticu-
lation may differ and may be more or less intense in different kinds of organ-
isms. The central difficulty remains identifying reticulation events in the midst 
of cladistic events. At higher levels, there seems to be wide consensus that syn-
apomorphy can be discovered in spite of reticulation. Our Phylogenetic Species 
Concept, a species concept that identifies species as taxa identifiable by apo-
morphy, is consistent with the entire phylogenetic system and in principle is 
no more or less vulnerable to violation of its assumptions than is any level of 
phylogenetic analysis.
asexual reproduction
Our Phylogenetic Species Concept as defined above is clearly equally applicable 
to sexual and asexual organisms. This is important because many lineages exist 
that reproduce solely or mainly by nonsexual means. On the other hand, despite 
claims to the contrary, Wheeler and Platnick’s Phylogenetic Species Concept is 
not appropriate for asexual species, in part because it lacks clearly defined rank-
ing criteria. Cladistic relationships exist down to the individual level in asexual 
species. Furthermore, plesiomorphically defined groups may be clades, but they 
are also likely to be simply grades or even polyphyletic assemblages, as is the 
case for higher taxa. Thus, only apomorphic characteristics can identify phylo-
genetically natural groups in asexual species; the only applicable concept here 
is the Phylogenetic Species Concept (M–T).
The species situation in clonal organisms was explored in detail in a series 
of papers in Systematic Botany, introduced by Mishler and Budd (1990). First of 
all, despite the impression given by certain writers in the field, there is no sharp 
distinction between sexually and asexually reproducing organisms (as discussed 
above). Every degree of frequency of sex exists among populations of different 
species, ranging from absolute asexuality, through rare fertilization events, to 
panmixia. One instance of sexual recombination in a million asexual genera-
tions does not suddenly change the ontological or epistemological status of a 
species. Secondly, the supposed difference in phylogenetic patterns between 
sexually and asexually reproducing organisms does not hold up under close 
examination.
Mishler (1990) addressed previous predictions about the discreteness of sex-
ual versus asexual species, using a cladistic analysis of the moss genus Tortula (a 
clade within which a spectrum of sexuality occurs, ranging from frequent sexual 
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reproduction to total asexuality). It would be predicted under standard evolu-
tionary theory that sexual species should be more variable than asexual species 
within populations (because of recombination) and less variable between popu-
lations (because of the homogenizing effect of gene flow). Therefore, species in 
asexual groups should be less discrete than those in sexual groups. However, 
measures of species distinctness, either cladistic (i.e., the number of autapo-
morphies) or phenetic (i.e., ordinations or analyses of variance of morphomet-
ric data), showed no particular correlation with mode of reproduction. Mishler 
concluded that processes other than gene flow may be responsible for species 
formation and maintenance even in sexual groups, a finding that has implica-
tions for speciation studies (see Budd and Mishler 1990; Mishler and Budd 1990 
for further discussion).
Speciation and the Phylogenetic Species Concept
Theriot (1992) investigated patterns of speciation in relation to species concepts 
in a species complex of diatoms with an extremely robust fossil record. He took 
“phenotypically irreducible clusters” (i.e., groupings of organisms not divisible by 
cladistically significant characters; basically the Phylogenetic Species Concept 
of Cracraft 1983) as OTUs in a cladistic analysis and compared the resulting 
phylogeny with known ecological, stratigraphic, and biogeographic data. He 
concluded that three autapomorphic species each were products of evolution 
and probably also units participating in the evolutionary process, whereas the 
widespread, plesiomorphic Stephanodiscus niagarae is neither a product nor a 
unit of evolution. Thus, he cautioned against accepting the smallest phenetically 
recognized clusters of organisms as basic units or products of evolution.
A number of potential empirical errors can occur in analyses of species, 
including those conducted under our Phylogenetic Species Concept. However, 
there is one potential “error” (i.e., characters undiscovered at the time of analy-
sis) for which our concept is robust with respect to other phylogenetic concepts. 
The diatom example again illustrates this point. Zechman et al. (1994) have 
begun to analyze these diatoms with molecular and morphological data, identi-
fying cladistic structure within S. niagarae, further demonstrating its paraphyletic 
nature. An important point to be made is that even if cladistic structure could be 
demonstrated as real within the autapomorphic species, their interpretation as 
an evolutionary lineage would not be altered. However, the discovery of cladis-
tic structure within the plesiomorphic species S. niagarae fundamentally shifts 
the view of S. niagarae as a natural unit to merely an aggregate of lineages. Thus, 
with regard to the primary goal of cladistic analysis and phylogenetic systemat-
ics, the discovery of natural groups, our Phylogenetic Species Concept applies 
a robust interpretation (i.e., that the identified group is monophyletic) to the 
discovery of new characters, whereas a concept lacking the use of apomorphy 
does not and cannot.
In general, our Phylogenetic Species Concept remains faithful to cladistic 
principles and thus is subject to exactly the same promise and problems of 
cladistic analysis that occur at any level. Any cladistic analysis that fails to take 
into account the possibility of reticulation may not be realistic. Not all lineages 
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may have evolved apomorphic characteristics, and so they may not be identifi-
able through character analysis. That is, there may be monophyletic groups for 
which there is no direct evidence. Once again, this is a general problem for 
cladistic analysis and is not special to the species problem. On the other hand, 
if the standard assumptions of cladistic analysis are met, then our Phylogenetic 
Species Concept identifies natural units regardless of relationships among indi-
viduals of that unit.
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Part II 
What Should Happen to Taxa 
at the Traditional Species 




General Principles of 
Rankless Classification 
Extended to the 
Species Rank
Calls for the reformation of the Linnaean hierarchy have been building since the early 
1990’s (e.g., De Queiroz & Gauthier 1992, 1994). These authors emphasized that the 
existing classification system is based on a non-evolutionary world-view; the roots of 
the Linnaean hierarchy are in a specially-created world-view. Perhaps the idea of fixed, 
comparable ranks made some sense under the view that classification was reflecting 
God’s plan with its nested elements, but under an evolutionary world view, the ranks 
just don’t make sense. They are a anachronism causing confusion in the modern world. 
There are several problems with the current nomenclatorial systems (International 
Code of Nomenclature for Algae, Fungi, and Plants, Turland et al. 2018; and the 
International Code of Zoological Nomenclature). Here are some of them:
1. The current system, using a single type for a name, cannot precisely name 
a clade, e.g., you may name a family based on a certain type specimen, and 
even if you were clear about what node you meant to name in your original 
publication, the exact phylogenetic application of your name would not be 
clear subsequently, after new clades are added to the picture.
2. There are not nearly enough ranks to name the thousands of levels of mono-
phyletic groups in the tree of life. Therefore people have been increasingly 
using informal rankless names for higher-level nodes, but without any clear, 
formal specification of which clade is meant.
3. The ranks can lead to instability of usage. When a change in relationships 
is discovered, names may need to be changed of groups whose circumscrip-
tion has not changed at all, e.g., when it was detected that the Cactaceae is 
nested inside of the Portulacaceae, one of these well-known family names 
had to be abandoned. This instability is particularly an issue at the species 
level, because of the binomial which links names at two different ranks. 
Splitting a genus into segregate genera results in many frivolous changes to 
species names without any change in postulated circumscription of them.
4. Groups given the same rank across biology are not comparable in any way 
(i.e., in age, size, amount of divergence, diversity within, etc.), but many 
users do not know this and employ numbers of taxa at a particular rank as 
an erroneous measure of diversity (Miller et al. 2018). In this way, formal 
ranks can lead to bad science.
4
86 What, if Anything, Are Species?
For all these reasons and more the PhyloCode was developed and has just been 
published (Cantino & de Queiroz 2020). Linnaean ranks are abandoned and instead, 
names of clades are regarded as hierarchically nested uninomials. A clade retains 
its name regardless of where new knowledge might change its phylogenetic posi-
tion, thus increasing nomenclatorial stability. Two or more types (called “specifiers”) 
are used, for an efficient and accurate representation of phylogenetic relationships. 
Furthermore, since clade names are presented to the community without attached 
ranks, users are encouraged to look at the actual attributes of the clades they com-
pare, thus improving research in comparative biology.
Despite all these advances, the species rank remains a controversial topic, even 
among PhyloCode advocates. Some (primarily zoologists) want to retain it as essen-
tially one fundamental rank in an otherwise rankless system, others (primarily 
botanists) want to get rid of it entirely. The current PhyloCode retains the use of 
species-rank taxa in several important ways and the debate about removing the men-
tions of species from the PhyloCode will no doubt continue to rage (e.g., Cellinese, 
Baum, & Mishler 2012, reprinted below).
My view continues to be that the principles of rankless classification should be 
applied to terminal taxa, including the former species rank (Mishler 1999, 2010, 
reprinted below). Names of clades (including the terminal level), should be hierarchi-
cally nested uninomials regarded as proper names (as at all levels in the PhyloCode). 
See Fig. 4.1, which illustrates how the PhyloCode could be applied in a taxonomic 
revision at the level formerly known as species (adapted from Fisher 2006).
Despite the taxonomic instability that is caused by using binomial names for spe-
cies in the current codes (discussed above), many feel there is value in a binomial 
name for species, in that having a higher level name (genus) to help place the lower-
level name (species). However, this perceived need is covered in the PhyloCode. 
A named clade at any level intrinsically has many higher-level names available to 
place it, available in the database RegNum (https://www.phyloregnum.org), some-
times called the “clade address.” If you are writing a general paper for readers who 
are not familiar with fine-scale classification in a group, you would include a higher 
level clade name to orient them (which is current practice now, actually). If I am 
talking about my favorite study moss (currently called Syntrichia caninervis as a 
binomial) in a non-specialist context I might write “Caninervis (Syntrichia)” or 
even “Caninervis (Syntrichia, Musci)” if writing in a very general context where the 
reader might not be expected to know Syntrichia is a moss.
At any one time, there will be a least-inclusive named clade, which can be called 
the Smallest Named and Registered Clades or SNaRCs (Mishler & Wilkins 2018, 
reprinted below). SNaRC is not a rank. There is no implication that the SNaRCs are 
necessarily comparable in any way other than that they are hypothesized to be clades 
like all other taxa named under the PhyloCode. There is also no implication that 
SNaRCs are the smallest clades in truth – they are just the smallest clades that a tax-
onomist wants to give a formal, registered name to in practice, i.e., the least inclusive 
clades that taxonomist feels comfortable naming, given current data.
The tree of life is inherently fractal. Look closely at one branch (lineage) of a 
phylogeny and it dissolves into many separate lineages, and so on down to a very fine 
scale. Thus clades occur at a very large number of nested levels. All are interesting 
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for certain questions, none are “fundamental.” Therefore to study biodiversity, its 
evolutionary origins and ecological interactions, the way forward is to study the 
whole tree and carefully choose clades to compare at the level appropriate to the 
question being asked. I’ll expand on this theme in Chapter 5.
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Abstract
This paper explores the implications of generalizing the species problem as a 
special case of the taxon problem. Once a decision is made about what taxa, in 
general, are to represent, then species, in particular, are simply the least inclusive 
taxon of that type. As I favor a Hennigian phylogenetic basis for taxonomy, I 
explore the application of phylogenetics to species taxa. Furthermore, I advocate 
a novel extension of the recent calls for rank-free phylogenetic taxonomy to the 
species level. In brief, the argument is: (1) Species must be treated as just one 
taxon among many; (2) All taxa should be monophyletic groups; (3) Because of 
problems with instability and lack of comparability of ranks in the formal Linnaean 
system, we need to move to a rank-free formal classification system; (4) In such 
a system, not all hypothesized monophyletic groups need be named, but those 
that are named formally should be given unranked (but hierarchically nested) 
uninomials; (5) The least inclusive taxon, formally known as “species,” should 
be treated in the same unranked manner. Finally, I explore the practical implica-
tions of eliminating the rank of species for such areas as ecology, evolution, and 
conservation, and conclude that these purposes are better served by this move.
The debate about species concepts over the last 20 years follows a curious pat-
tern. Rather than moving towards some kind of consensus, as one might expect, 
the trend has been towards an ever-increasing proliferation of concepts. Starting 
with the widely accepted species concept that had taken over in the 1940’s and 
1950’s as a result of the Modern Synthesis, the Biological Species Concept, we 
heard calls for change from botanists, behaviorists, etc. Despite the babel of 
new concepts, the BSC continues to have fervent advocates (Avise and Ball, 
1990; Avise and Wollenberg, 1997) and has itself spawned several new variants. 
A recent paper by Mayden (1997) lists no fewer than 22 prevailing concepts! It 
appears we can never eliminate any existing concept, only produce new ones.
Why is this? The obvious conclusion one might draw, that biologists are 
contrarians who each want to make their own personal mark in a debate and 
thus coin their own personal concept to defend, is really not the case – this 
is no debate about semantics. The conceptual divisions are major, and real. 
In my opinion, the plethora of ways in which different workers want to use 
the species category reflects an underlying plethora of valid ways of looking at 
biological diversity. The way forward is to recognize this, and face the implica-
tions: the basis of this confusion over species concepts is a result of heroic but 
doomed attempts to shoehorn all this variation into an outdated and misguided 
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classification system, the ranked Linnaean hierarchy. Most of the confusion can 
be removed simply by removing the ranks. The issues that remain can then be 
dealt with by carefully considering what we want formal classification to rep-
resent as the general reference system, and then carefully specifying criteria for 
grouping organisms into these formal classifications.
To develop this argument, I will first make the case for generalizing the species 
problem as a special case of the taxon problem. For a consistent general refer-
ence classification system, all taxa must be of the same type; species should be 
regarded as simply the least-inclusive taxon in the system. Then I will review the 
reasons for why phylogeny provides the best basis for the general-purpose classi-
fication; species should thus be considered as just another phylogenetically-based 
taxon. Next, I will address the recent calls for rank-free classification in general, 
and pursue the central thesis of this paper: the species rank must disappear along 
with all the other ranks. Finally, I will explore the practical implications of elimi-
nating the rank of species for such areas as ecology, evolution, and conservation.
Species as Just Another Taxon
Many authors have made a firm distinction, in their particular theories of system-
atics, between species and higher taxa (e.g., Wiley, 1981; Nelson and Platnick, 
1981; Nixon and Wheeler, 1990); see discussion by De Quieroz, this volume). 
The idea is that somehow species are units directly participating in the evolution-
ary process, while higher taxa are at most lineages resulting from past evolution-
ary events. However nicely drawn this distinction is in theory, these arguments 
have resulted more from wishful thinking than from empirical observations. When 
anyone has looked closely for an empirical criterion to uniquely and universally 
distinguish the species rank from all others, the attempt has failed.
One early suggestion was phenetic: a species is a cluster of organisms in Euclidean 
space separated from other such clusters by some distinct and comparable gap (e.g., 
Levin 1979). This has been clearly shown to be mistaken – phenotypic clusters are 
actually nested inside each other with continuously varying gap sizes. Current enti-
ties ranked as species are not comparable either in the amount of phenotypic space 
they occupy or the size of the “moat” around them, nor can they be made to be 
comparable through any massive realignment of current usage.
Another suggestion for a unique ranking criterion for species is expressed in 
the biological species concept: a species is a reproductive community separated 
by a major barrier to crossing with other such communities (Mayr, 1982). Like 
the phenetic gap, this view (nice in theory perhaps) fails when looking at real 
organisms. Despite the publication of many conceptual diagrams that depict 
a distinct break between reticulating and divergent relationships at some level 
(Nixon and Wheeler, 1990; Roth, 1991; Graybeal, 1995) actual data suggests 
that in most groups the probability of intercrossability decreases gradually as 
you compare more and more inclusive groups (Mishler and Donoghue 1982; 
Maddison 1997). There usually is not a distinct point at which the possibility of 
reticulation drops precipitously to zero.
Similar suggestions have been made based on ecological criteria: a species is 
a group of organisms occupying some specific and unitary ecological niche (Van 
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Valen, 1976). May be species “can define themselves” – we just need to see whether 
two organisms treat each other as belonging to the same or different species. Again, 
actual studies show no such distinctive level where ecological interactions change 
abruptly from “within-kind” to “between kind.” There can be cryptic, ecologically 
distinct groups below the species level, and large guilds of organisms from diver-
gent species acting as one group ecologically in some situations.
Finally, there have been attempts to distinguish species from all other taxa phy-
logenetically (Nixon and Wheeler 1990, Graybeal 1995, Baum, 1992). In this view, 
species are the smallest divergent lineage – inside of which there is no recover-
able divergent phylogenetic structure (only reticulation). Again, nice in theory, but 
unsound empirically, at least as a general principle (Mishler and Donoghue, 1982; 
Mishler and Theriot, in press). Some biological situations fit the model well (e.g., 
in organisms with complex and well-defined sexual mate recognition systems and 
no mode of asexual propagation). However, in many clonal groups (e.g., aspen 
trees, bracken fern) there are discernible lineages going down to the within-organ-
ism level (the problem of “too little sex”; Templeton, 1989). On the other hand, 
there are occasional horizontal transfer events (“reticulation”) between very diver-
gent lineages (the problem of “too much sex”; Templeton, 1989). In all such cases, 
there is a large gray area between strictly diverging patterns of gene genealogies 
and strictly recombining ones (contra Avise and Wollenberg, 1997).
To sum up, there is no (and is unlikely to be any) criterion for distinguishing 
species from other ranks in the Linnaean hierarchy. This is not to say that particu-
lar species taxa are unreal; they are, but only in the sense that taxa at all levels 
are. Species are not special.
The Necessity for Phylogenetic Classifications
The debate over classification has a long and checkered history. This is not the 
place to detail this history fully (see Stevens, 1994; and the chapter by Ereshevsky, 
this volume). I want to begin with the conceptual upheaval in the 1970s and 
1980s that resulted in the ascension of Hennigian Phylogenetic Systematics (for 
a detailed treatment see the masterful book by Hull, 1988). Many issues were 
at stake in that era, foremost of which was the nature of taxa. Are they just 
convenient groupings of organisms with similar features, or are they lineages, 
marked by homologies? A general, if not completely universal consensus has 
been reached, that taxa are (or at least should be) the latter (Hennig, 1966; 
Nelson, 1973; Farris, 1983; Sober, 1988).
A full review of the arguments for why formal taxonomic names should be 
used solely to represent phylogenetic groups is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but they can be summarized as follows: evolution is the single most powerful 
and general process underlying biological diversity. The major outcome of the 
evolutionary process is the production of an ever-branching phylogenetic tree, 
through descent with modification along the branches. This results in life being 
organized as a hierarchy of nested monophyletic groups. Since the most effec-
tive and natural classification systems are those that “capture” entities resulting 
from processes generating the things being classified, the general biological clas-
sification system should be used to reflect the tree of life.
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The German entomologist Willi Hennig codified the meaning of these evolu-
tionary outcomes for systematics, in what has been called the Hennig Principle 
(Hennig, 1965, 1966). Hennig’s seminal contribution was to note that in a system 
evolving via descent with modification and splitting of lineages, characters that 
changed state along a particular lineage can serve to indicate the prior existence 
of that lineage, even after further splitting occurs. The “Hennig Principle” fol-
lows from this: homologous similarities15 among organisms come in two basic 
kinds, synapomorphies due to immediate shared ancestry (i.e., a common 
ancestor at a specific phylogenetic level), and symplesiomorphies due to more 
distant ancestry. Only the former are useful for reconstructing the relative order 
of branching events in phylogeny. A corollary of the Hennig Principle is that 
classification should reflect reconstructed branching order; only monophyletic 
groups16 should be formally named. Phylogenetic taxa will thus be “natural” in 
the sense of being the result of the evolutionary process.
This isn’t to say that phylogeny is the only important organizing principle 
in biology, There are many ways of classifying organisms into a hierarchy, 
because of the many biological processes impinging on organisms. Many kinds 
of non-phylogenetic biological groupings are unquestionably useful for special 
purposes (e.g., “producers,” “rain forests,” “hummingbird pollinated plants,” 
“bacteria”). However, it is generally agreed that there should be one consistent, 
general-purpose, reference system, for which the Linnaean hierarchy should be 
reserved. Phylogeny is the best criterion for the general-purpose classification, 
both theoretically (the tree of life is the single universal outcome of the evo-
lutionary process) and practically (phylogenetic relationship is the best crite-
rion for summarizing known data about attributes of organisms and predicting 
unknown attributes). The other possible ways to classify can of course be used 
simultaneously, but should be regarded as special-purpose classifications and 
clearly distinguished from phylogenetic formal taxa.
The Advantages of a Rank-Free Taxonomy
A number of recent calls have been made for the reformation of the Linnaean 
hierarchy (e.g., De Queiroz & Gauthier, 1992). These authors have emphasized 
that the existing system is based on a non-evolutionary world-view; the roots of 
the Linnaean hierarchy are a specially-created world-view. Perhaps the idea of 
fixed ranks made some sense under that view, but under an evolutionary world 
view, they don’t make sense. Most aspects of the current code, including priority, 
revolve around the ranks, which leads to instability of usage. For example, when a 
change in relationships is discovered, several names often need to be changed to 
adjust, including those of groups whose circumscription has not changed. Frivolous 
changes in names often occur when authors merely change the rank of a group 
without any change in postulated relationships. While practicing systematists 
15 In Hennigian phylogenetic systematics, “homology” is defined historcially as a feature shared by 
two organisms because of descent from a common ancestor that had that feature.
16 A strictly monophyletic group is one that contains all and only descendants of a common ances-
tor. A paraphyletic group is one the excludes some of the descendants of the common ancestor.
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know that groups given the same rank across biology are not comparable in any 
way (i.e., in age, size, amount of divergence, diversity within, etc.), many users 
do not know this. For example, ecologists and macroevolutionists often count 
numbers of taxa at a particular rank as an erroneous measure of “biodiversity.” 
The nonequivalence of ranks means that at best (to those who are knowledge-
able) they are a meaningless formality and perhaps not more than a hindrance. At 
worst, in the hands of a user of classifications who naively assumes groups at the 
same rank are comparable in some way, formal ranks lead to bad science.
It is not completely clear at this point how exactly a new code of nomenclature 
should be written, but the basics are clear. Such a new code should maintain the 
principle of priority (the first name for a lineage should be followed) and other 
aspects of the current code that promote effective communication of new names 
to the community. However, the major change would be that the Linnaean ranks 
should be abandoned, for efficient and accurate representation of phylogenetic 
relationships. Instead, names of clades should be hierarchically nested uninomials 
regarded as proper names. A clade would retain its name regardless of where new 
knowledge might change its phylogenetic position, thus increasing nomenclatorial 
stability. Furthermore, since clade names would be presented to the community 
without attached ranks, users would be encouraged to look at the actual attributes 
of the clades they compare, thus improving research in comparative biology.
It is important to emphasize that, despite misrepresentations to the contrary that 
have appeared, those who advocate getting rid of ranks don’t at all advocate get-
ting rid of the hierarchy in biological classification. Nesting of groups within groups 
is essential because of the tree-like nature of phylogenetic organization. Think of 
a non-systematic example – a grocer might classify table salt as a spice and group 
spices together under the category “food items.” This simple hierarchy is clear but 
requires no ranks to be understood. In fact, all human thought is organized into 
hierarchies, and becoming educated in a field is essentially learning the hierarchi-
cal arrangement of concepts in that field. Taxonomy is unusual in the assigning of 
named ranks to its hierarchies – there are superfluous to true understanding.
Getting Rid of the Species Rank
Curiously, so far in this debate, even the advocates of rank-free phylogenetic 
classification have retained the species rank as a special case. All other ranks 
are to be abandoned, but the species rank kept, probably because the species 
concept is so ingrained and comfortable in current thinking. However, all the 
arguments that can be massed against Linnaean ranked classification can be 
brought to bear against the species rank as well. As difficult as it is to overthrow 
ingrained habits of thinking, logical consistency demands that all levels in the 
classification should be treated alike.
Given the background developed in the three previous sections, the con-
clusion seems inescapable. The species rank must go the way of all others. 
We must end the endless bickering over how this rank should be applied, and 
instead, get rid of the rank itself. This is truly the “radical solution to the spe-
cies problem” sought unsuccessfully by Ghiselin. Biological classification should 
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be a set of nested, named groups for internested clades. Not all clades need 
to be named, but those that are should be named on the basis of evidence 
for monophyly (see further discussion of the meaning of monophyly in Mishler 
and Brandon, 1987). We stop naming groups at some point approaching the 
tips of the phylogeny because we don’t have solid evidence for monophyly at 
the present stage of knowledge. This may be due to rampant reticulation going 
on below some point, or simply lack of good markers for distinguishing finer 
clades. But, we shouldn’t pretend that the smallest clades named at a particular 
time are ontologically different from other, more inclusive named clades. Further 
research could easily result in the subdividing of these groups, or the lumping of 
several of them into one if their original support is discovered to be faulty.
Given the redundancy now present in species epithets (e.g., “californica” is 
used in many genera), there needs to be a way to uniquely place each smallest 
named clade in the classification. My recommendation for nomenclature at the 
least inclusive level under a totally rank-free classification would be to regard 
names in a similar way as personal names are regarded in Arabic culture. Each 
clade, including the least inclusive one named, has its own uninomial name; 
however, the genealogical relationships of a clade are preserved in a polynomial 
giving the lineage of that clade in higher and higher groups. So, the familiar bino-
mial, which does after all present some grouping information to the user, could 
be retained but should be inverted. Our own short clade name thus should be 
Sapiens Homo. The full name for our terminal clade should be regarded as a poly-
nominal giving them more and more inclusive clades names all the way back. To 
use the human example, this would be something like Sapiens Homo Homidae 
Primate Mammalia Vertebrata Metazoa Eucaryota Life.17 But again as in a tradi-
tional Arabic name this formal and complete name would only be used rarely 
and for the most formal purposes (but would be very useful behind the scenes for 
data-basing purposes) – the everyday name of the clade would be Sapiens Homo.
Practical Implications
“Getting rid of species” has another, all too ominous meaning in today’s world. 
Named species are being driven to (and over) the brink of extinction at a rapid 
rate. What will be the implications of the view of taxa advocated in this paper? If 
we get rid of the species rank, with all its problems, will we hamstring conserva-
tion efforts? I tend to think not; scientific honesty seems the best policy here as 
elsewhere, The rather mindless approach that has been followed in conserva-
tion, that if a lineage is ranked as a species it is worth saving, while if it is not 
considered a species it is not worth considering, is misguided in many ways. It 
is wrong scientifically as discussed above; the species rank is a human judgment 
rather than any objective point along the trajectory of diverging lineages. It is also 
wrong ethically; any recognizable lineage is worth conservation consideration. 
17 Note that some of the nested clades will have a formal suffix indicating their previous rank (e.g., 
“-idae” for family). While these ending would be retained for exiting clade names, in order to 
avoid confusion, there would be no meaning attached to them and newly proposed clade names 
would have no particular suffix requirement.
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Not all lineages need be conserved, or at least given the same conservation pri-
ority, but such judgments should be made on a case by case basis.
All biologists are concerned about defining biodiversity and about its current 
plight, thus the radical move suggested here (getting rid of the species rank) 
will no doubt concern many. A common response to this move, from those 
who want to characterize and conserve biodiversity, involves a complaint that 
“without species, we will have no way of quantifying biodiversity or of convinc-
ing people to preserve it.” This viewpoint, while expressing commendable and 
important concerns, is ultimately misguided, both in theoretical and practical 
terms. There may a comfortable self-deception going on to the contrary, but 
only a moment of thoughtful reflection is enough to realize that species are not 
comparable in any important sense, and cannot be made so.
However, the recognition that a count of species is not a good measure of 
biodiversity, does not mean that biodiversity cannot be quantified. All named 
species are unique, with their own properties and features, and represent only 
the tips of the underlying iceberg of biodiversity. We must face these facts and 
move to develop valid measures of the diversity of lineages taking into account 
their actual properties and phylogenetic significance. A number of workers have 
suggested quantitative measures for phylogenetic biodiversity, which take into 
account the number of branch points, and possibly branch lengths, separating 
the tips on the tree (Vane-Wright et al., 1991; Faith, 1992a,b).
Many macroevolutionary studies are framed in terms of comparing diversity 
patterns at some particular rank (e.g., families of marine invertebrates, phyla of 
animals). The adoption of rank-free classification would (fortunately) make such 
studies impossible, but would it make all studies of macroevolution impossible? 
Of course not – comparisons among clades would still be quite feasible, but it 
would be up to the investigator to establish that the clades being compared were 
the same with respect to the necessary properties (i.e., equivalent age or dispar-
ity, etc.). Similar arguments could be made with respect to the many ecological 
studies that compare numbers of species in different regions or communities. 
The bottom line is that rank-free classification would lead to much more accurate 
research in ecology and evolution. This is because, instead of relying on equiva-
lence in taxonomic rank as a (very) crude proxy for comparability of lineages, 
investigators would be encouraged to use cladograms directly in their compara-
tive studies. Given the rapid progress in development of quantitative compara-
tive methods (Funk and Brooks, 1990; Brooks and McLennan, 1991; Harvey and 
Pagel, 1991; Martins, 1996), and the rapid proliferation of ever-improving clado-
grams for most groups of organisms, this can only be for the best.
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Abstract 
Are species uniquely real biological entities? This question is one of the most con-
troversial topics today in such areas of biology as ecology, systematics, conserva-
tion, population genetics, and evolution. “Species” currently play a central role in 
both theory and practice in these areas, and have a large place in the public’s per-
ception of biological diversity as well. This question can be decomposed into two 
parts: (1) Are species real, and in what sense? (2) If real, is their reality the same 
as entities smaller or larger than them – i.e., are they real in a sense that genera 
or subspecies are not? This paper will briefly review historical and current opin-
ions on these questions, but will primarily advocate one particular position that 
appears to fit biological reality as now understood: that species properly defined 
are real entities, but not uniquely real. The longstanding “species problem” can 
be solved by realizing that there is no such thing as species after all! The so-called 
“species problem” is really just a special case of the taxon problem. Once a 
decision is made about what taxa, in general, are to represent, then those groups 
currently known as species are simply the least inclusive taxa of that type. As I 
favor a phylogenetic basis for taxonomy, I want to look at how to include terminal 
taxa in the PhyloCode, currently a controversial topic even among PhyloCode 
supporters. In brief, my argument is: (1) life is organized in a hierarchy of nested 
monophyletic groups – some of them quite fine-scale, well below the level we 
currently call species; (2) not all known monophyletic groups need be named, 
just the ones that are important to process or conservation studies and that have 
good support; (3) those that are named taxonomically should be given unranked 
(but hierarchically nested) uninomials; and (4) formal ranks, including species, 
should be abandoned. I will conclude with a brief discussion of the implication 
of my position on species for academic studies in ecology and evolution as well 
as for practical applications in biodiversity inventories and conservation biology.
“But be warned, you who thirst for knowledge, be warned about the thicket of 
opinions and the fight over words.”  Hermann Hesse, Siddhartha
Historical and Current Views of Species
Over the history of science, people have taken a number of different positions 
on these issues involving the reality of species. The fundamental view throughout 
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the classical period (basically from the ancient Greeks until Darwin) was that spe-
cies are indeed the basic, real units of life. The basis for their reality was initially 
conceived of in a typological or idealistic framework; species were viewed as the 
basic kinds or types of living things. Later, under the influence of Christian theol-
ogy, the basis for the fundamental reality of species changed somewhat. They 
were still viewed as basic kinds, but now as specially created “ideas” in the mind 
of the creator. Taxonomic groups at more inclusive levels were also manifestations 
of the creator’s ideas, but species were the fundamental kinds, the building blocks 
of life. This idea continues to the present in the attitudes of the majority of the 
general public in the United States, under the influence of creationism.
The course of science took a somewhat different path than the public view. 
The Darwinian revolution did not question the reality of species in scientists’ 
thinking (although see below for Darwin’s contribution to a shift in thinking 
about their uniqueness), but changed the perception of their nature greatly. 
Instead of representing a natural kind defined by certain necessary and suf-
ficient characteristics, species came to be seen as a natural genealogical unit 
composed of organisms historically related to each other, with a beginning and 
an end, not defined by any characteristics (i.e., “individuals” in the philosophical 
sense; Ghiselin, 1974; Hull, 1978; Mishler & Brandon, 1987). They were viewed 
as a cross-section of a lineage (de Queiroz, 1999). In the Modern Synthesis 
(called such at the time, but looking rather dated these days!), a view solidified 
of species being the largest group of interbreeding organisms (the gene pool) and 
as such the most fundamental unit in which evolutionary change takes place 
(the biological species concept; BSC; Mayr, 1942, 1982). Species came to be 
regarded as a fundamental level in the hierarchy of biological organization (e.g., 
molecule, cell, tissue, organism, population, species, community, ecosystem).
This view was nearly unanimous until the 1960s, when, under the influence 
of highly empirical operationalist philosophies of science then in style, and 
the seemingly “objective” application of computer algorithms to science, an 
approach emerged called “numerical taxonomy” or “phenetics.” In this view, 
taxa at all levels, including species, were viewed in a nominalistic manner. A spe-
cies was just a cluster of similar organisms grouped at some arbitrary numerical 
level of similarity (the phenetic species concept; Levin, 1979; Sokal & Crovello, 
1970). It was considered to be unnecessary and wrong-headed to require any-
thing about a deeper basis for reality, whether relatedness or interbreeding abil-
ity, to describe species. If named species later turned out to be something useful 
for inferences about evolutionary or ecological processes, then fine, but their 
recognition as species was best kept separate from process considerations.
One trend apparent in the history of thinking about species has to do with 
organismal specialty; to a large extent, there has been a sociological differ-
ence among communities of systematists studying different kinds of organ-
isms. Zoologists tended to favor the biological species concept (Coyne, Orr, & 
Futuyma, 1988), while botanists and bacteriologists tended to favor the phenetic 
species concept (e.g., Levin, 1979; Sokal & Crovello, 1970). There have been 
some exceptions: for example, Grant (1981), Rieseberg and Burke (2001), and 
Stebbins (1950) represent a minority BSC tradition viewpoint among botanists, 
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while Wheeler (1999) represents a minority non-BSC viewpoint among zoolo-
gists. This striking distinction is probably mostly due to actual differences in 
reproductive biology among different branches of the tree of life. Specialists on 
organisms with either very open mating systems or highly clonal reproduction 
have always had trouble applying the BSC and have looked for alternatives.
The Hennigian phylogenetics revolution that began in the 1970s altered many 
aspects of theory and practice in systematics, but did not do much to prune the 
existing variety of species concepts, and in fact added several more. Hennig 
himself (1966) held to a version of the biological species concept, while other 
Hennigians preferred the evolutionary species concept (basically an interbreed-
ing group viewed through time as a lineage; Wiley, 1978) or various versions of 
a phylogenetic species concept. The latter are a heterogeneous set of concepts 
as well: some quite similar to the phenetic species concept (i.e., species viewed 
as a unique set of character states; Cracraft, 1997; Nixon & Wheeler, 1990; 
Platnick & Wheeler, 2000; Wheeler & Platnick, 2000a, 2000b), others applying 
Hennigian concepts of apomorphy and monophyly to the species level (Mishler 
& Donoghue, 1982; Mishler & Theriot, 2000a, 2000b,  2000c; Rosen, 1978).
In comparing different views of species it is important to distinguish two 
components of any species concept: grouping vs. ranking (Horvath, 1997). The 
grouping component of any species concept indicates the criteria for group 
inclusion, whether ability to interbreed, phenetic similarity, or sharing of apo-
morphies indicating monophyly. The ranking component of any species concept 
indicates the criteria for deciding whether a group counts as a species rather 
than a taxon at some other rank. Both components are necessary because all 
concepts define groups within groups, and the level of group corresponding to 
species needs to be specified. Some of the controversy over species concepts 
has been because people are not clear about this distinction.
The phylogenetic species concept in the sense of my work with Brandon and 
Theriot (Mishler & Brandon, 1987; Mishler & Theriot, 2000a, 2000b,  2000c) is 
clear about this distinction, and basically treats species as just another taxon (see 
also Nelson, 1989), taking the perspective that if we are going to be phylogenetic 
about taxa in general, we need to be phylogenetic about species. Theriot and 
I (Mishler & Theriot, 2000a) defined species as follows: “A species is the least 
inclusive taxon recognized in a formal phylogenetic classification” (p. 46). As 
with all hierarchical levels of taxa in such a classification, organisms are grouped 
into species because of evidence of monophyly. Taxa are ranked as species 
rather than at some higher level because they are the smallest monophyletic 
groups deemed worthy of formal recognition, due to the amount of support for 
their monophyly and/or their importance in biological processes operating on 
the lineage in question. One obvious question follows from the definition given 
above: doesn’t the ranking decision sound arbitrary? The short answer is: Yes! If 
not completely arbitrary, the decision does depend on local context – ranking 
criteria are pluralistic rather than universal (Mishler & Donoghue, 1982).
The ranking decision in the phylogenetic species concepts discussed above 
is present because of the way the current codes of nomenclature are written. 
Monophyletic taxa not only have to be discovered and diagnosed, they must be 
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given a specific rank, including species. But this doesn’t have to be so. We can 
remove this arbitrary aspect of taxonomy; the best approach is arguably not to 
designate any ranks at all. I now advocate an extension of the recent calls for 
rank-free phylogenetic taxonomy to the species level (e.g., Mishler, 1999; Pleijel, 
1999), and will develop this position in the following sections.
Return to a Darwinian View of Species
Let’s consider the two-part question introduced above: (1)  Are species 
real?  (2)  Are species uniquely real?  All working biologists today think that 
the answer to the first question is yes: species are real entities in some sense 
(although the grouping criterion considered to be the basis for their reality varies 
as described above). The current debate concentrates on the second question: 
whether or not species are a special level either in biological organization or 
in the taxonomic hierarchy. In other words, is there a unique ranking criterion 
for species? The two possible answers to this question can be contrasted as 
the Darwinian view vs. the Mayrian view.
One of Darwin’s important novel contributions to biology was the explicit rec-
ognition that the species level is an arbitrary point in the divergence of two lin-
eages. The Origin (Darwin, 1859) is full of passages indicating Darwin’s view that 
the species rank is arbitrary, even though the lineages are quite real. His view was 
that divergence between two lineages happens, and at some point, it is conve-
nient to call the two lineages species according to the judgment of a competent 
taxonomist, but nothing particularly special or universal occurs at that point.
The Modern Synthesis, in its bringing together of population genetics and tax-
onomy, emphasized a different point of view on species than Darwin. Species 
were now viewed as an important and distinct level of biological organiza-
tion (like “molecule” or “cell”), the largest group within which evolution occurs, 
held together by sharing a gene pool. Ernst Mayr is particularly responsible for 
pushing this viewpoint (Mayr, 1982). Following Mayr, many today (scientists and 
public alike, in a strange convergence between evolutionary biologists and cre-
ationists) see species in this special light. Note that I am not calling Mayr or any 
evolutionary biologist a creationist. I am only pointing out an interesting parallel 
to their position in this one particular area. I don’t think the parallel is an acci-
dent, however. I think that the idea of distinct, basic, natural units (i.e., species 
as the building blocks of biodiversity) is so ingrained in Western thought (coming 
from before the Christian era so not due to creationists directly) that most evo-
lutionary biologists and ecologists have serious trouble letting go of it. Darwin 
was a really original and courageous thinker whom many biologists even today 
have trouble emulating.
There is abundant empirical evidence presented since Darwin’s time that 
shows he had the right view and that the actual “species situation” is much more 
complex than modeled by the Modern Synthesis adherents (Mishler & Theriot, 
2000a, 2000b, 2000c). Gene pools (potential horizontal transfer of genes at 
some level of probability) usually occur at many nested levels within one lin-
eage, and the most inclusive level is often higher than anyone would want to 
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call species (e.g., corresponding to the current generic and even familiar level 
in flowering plants). On the other hand, sometimes gene pools don’t exist at all 
in a lineage, in the case of asexual organisms. Alan Templeton (1989) succinctly 
summarized this spectrum of problems with the Mayrian BSC as ranging from 
“too much sex” to “too little sex.”
It would be conceptually cleaner if Mayr was right that there is a particular, 
unique level, comparable across the tree of life, at which “species-ness” arises as 
two lineages diverge. However, empirical reality intrudes on this tidy BSC con-
cept; we need a more flexible concept since such a clean species break rarely if 
ever appears to be the case. My own view is that Darwin’s richer conception is 
better, and that the supposed advances of the Modern Synthesis were actually ret-
rograde, at least as far as species concepts are concerned. To make progress in this 
area we need to reject the simplistic Mayrian view and emulate Darwin’s view.
My own answer on the twin questions italicized at the beginning of this sec-
tion is this: entities that are currently called species are indeed real, if grouped 
correctly as monophyletic groups, but they are not uniquely real, i.e., they are 
only real in the sense that other levels of monophyletic groups are – there is 
no special ranking criterion for species. The processes causing divergence of 
lineages, and keeping them separate afterward, are many. We must develop a 
richer view of the tree of life and how best to understand and classify it. Such a 
view must consider the many nested levels of divergence and reticulation in the 
tree of life, not just the one we arbitrarily happen to call species.
To develop this view, we need to look closely at several related concepts. 
One is the nature of monophyly. There have been two basically different ways 
of defining monophyly within the Hennigian tradition of phylogenetic system-
atics: one is synchronic (i.e., “all and only descendants of a common ances-
tor”); another is diachronic (i.e., “an ancestor and all of its descendants”). I have 
argued elsewhere (Mishler, 1999) that the former view (Hennig’s own view) is 
better, because it avoids the time paradoxes inherent in placing the ancestor in 
a group with its descendants. Just like a zygote is not one of the cells of an adult 
organism (instead it is all  the organism at its beginning), the ancestor is not a 
member of a synchronic monophyletic group when looked at later – it was the 
whole monophyletic group back in its day.
A further consideration is that the word “species” appears in many definitions 
of monophyly (including Hennig’s). This obviously matters if we are discussing 
the application of monophyly to the species level, because of circularity con-
cerns. We need a definition that is both synchronic and neutral about taxonomic 
ranks, like this: a monophyletic group is all and only descendants of a common 
ancestor, where “ancestor” is interpreted broadly to mean an individual in the 
philosophical sense of Ghiselin (1974) and Hull (1978), e.g., an organism, or 
breeding groups of various sizes.
Another distinction that is needed is between  clades  and  lineages. While 
sometimes treated loosely as synonyms, they are not exactly the same thing – 
some refinement of terminology is needed. Fig. 4.2 shows the difference. A 
“clade” is a synchronic entity, a monophyletic group as discussed above (a 
group composed of all descendants of a common ancestor). A “lineage,” by 
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contrast, is a diachronic concept, a series of ancestors and descendants (replica-
tors in the abstract sense of Hull, 1978) through time. They are related terms, of 
course: a clade could best be viewed as an instantaneous snapshot of a lineage.
This distinction helps us clarify some of the murky debates over phylogenetic 
species concepts. Some phylogeneticists have focused their species concepts on 
clades (e.g., Baum & Shaw, 1995; Mishler & Brandon, 1987; Mishler & Theriot, 
2000a, 2000b, 2000c), and some on lineages (e.g., de Queiroz, 1999; Wiley, 
1978), but it is important to note that both clades and lineages form hierarchies. 
Clades are obviously nested inside of other clades, but less widely understood 
is that the same is true of lineages. A smaller-scale lineage (say of cells) is nested 
inside of larger-scale lineages (such as organisms or larger groupings acting as 
individuals in a philosophical sense). There is no privileged level that can be 
recognized in either of these nested hierarchies; there is no unique species rank 
in either clades or lineages.
I prefer applying our formal classification system to name clades (i.e., mono-
phyletic groups) for the following reasons: (1) clades are more nicely nested 
hierarchically than lineages; (2) we have a well-thought-out code of nomencla-
ture available for naming clades (the PhyloCode); and (3) there are many more 
kinds of lineages, biologically speaking, due to the multiple kinds of replication 
which can occur in nature. Some recent workers have thought about providing 
a code to name lineages, i.e., a “Species Code” (see discussion in the PhyloCode 
preface at http://www.ohiou.edu/PhyloCode/preface.html), perhaps to comple-
ment the PhyloCode (which is based on clades), but this will prove to be very 
challenging.
The generalized view presented above, abandoning species in favor of describ-
ing clades at several nested levels, has many advantages in theory. Yet it requires 
considerable further explication before being applied in practice, since so many 
other areas of biology are accustomed to using species as a unit. I will go through 
several of these areas below, beginning with systematics, where it all starts.
FIGURE 4.2 The distinction between clades and lineages. A clade is a synchronic, 
monophyletic set of lineage-representatives, where monophyly is defined synchronic-
ally as “all and only descendants of a common ancestor” (represented by A’ in this 
case). A lineage is a diachronic ancestor-descendant connection (between A and D in 
this case): “species” in the de Queiroz sense.
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Practical Implications
truly rank-Free Classification, all the Way Down
As covered in many previous papers (summarized by Mishler, 2009), it has 
become clear that the ranks in the Linnaean system are problematic for classifi-
cation, both theoretically and practically. Let me just summarize these general 
arguments briefly here. Rapid advances in phylogenetic research have made it 
obvious that there are not nearly enough ranks to suffice in classifying the tree 
of life, with its thousands of nested levels of clades. The need to maintain the 
hierarchy of the ranks leads to instability, with names being changed without 
good reason, as, for example, when one currently recognized genus is found 
to be nested inside another (a common occurrence). Ranked classifications can 
lead to bad science in such fields as ecology or macroevolution, if a user of a 
classification naïvely (but understandably) assumes that taxa placed at the same 
rank must be comparable in some way.
The current codes of nomenclature can be tweaked to name monophyletic 
groups, but they are far from ideal for that purpose. The current codes are used to 
name all kinds of groups; thus a user has no way of easily knowing if a given taxon is 
thought to be monophyletic. Only a search into the literature can uncover the basis 
for a particular taxon name under the current codes, while under the PhyloCode 
one knows that the author of the name hypothesized it to be a monophyletic group. 
A name that can be used to convey anything really conveys nothing.
It has become clear that the current codes don’t lend themselves well to 
naming monophyletic groups unequivocally, primarily because there is only one 
type specimen. It is possible to patch the current codes of nomenclature to 
name phylogenetic taxa, as suggested by (Barkley et al., 2004). But, for many 
reasons, it would be better to develop a new code of nomenclature specifically 
designed for phylogenetics. It really is time to bite the bullet and complete a 
synthesis between the Darwinian revolution and the Hennigian revolution (de 
Queiroz, 1988). Ranked classifications are a hold-over from the pre-Darwinian 
creationist mindset (Ereshefsky, 2002). They are not just a quaint anachronism; 
they are resulting in miscommunication at many levels. Completely rank-free 
phylogenetic classifications are far better for teaching, research, communicating 
with other scientists, and interfacing with the larger society.
What about the fundamental taxonomic level, species? Most published 
discussions about rank-free taxonomy are based on considerations of higher 
taxa alone, yet all the criticisms of taxonomic ranks summarized above can be 
extended to species – it is clear that all the arguments about the inadequacy of 
the current codes for naming phylogenetic taxa apply to the species level also.
The developing PhyloCode may be accessed online (http://www.ohiou.edu/
PhyloCode/). This code maintains many of the features of current rank-based 
codes, but removes all ranks from clade names, and also uses multiple types 
(called “specifiers”) to precisely fix the name of a clade. Important to this dis-
cussion, the current draft of the PhyloCode, unfortunately, does not deal well 
with providing names for what have been called species. Many uncomfortable 
special conventions are currently suggested for dealing with this particular rank. 
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Thus even the community of supporters of the PhyloCode is conflicted about 
what to do about species! More work is needed to make the PhyloCode work 
seamlessly at all taxonomic levels.
How could rank-free classification be applied to terminal taxa? Exactly as at 
other levels: names of all clades (including the terminal level) should be hierar-
chically nested uninomials regarded as proper names (current usage should be 
followed as much as possible to retain links to the literature and collections). As 
at all taxonomic levels, we could use either node-based or stem-based names 
with multiple internal specifiers (I personally think the use of apomorphy-based 
names is incoherent at any level, but that is another argument!). Specifiers should 
be actual specimens (this should be true at all levels).
In my opinion, species names should be converted from the current epithets 
(despite the current prohibition of this is the PhyloCode draft; see example of 
this in Fisher, 2006). The overriding principle is to achieve maximum continuity 
with previous literature for the sake of preserving connections to databases, lit-
erature, museum specimens, etc. There are two additional important principles, 
in my opinion: the naming system should be consistent for clades at all levels, 
and the PhyloCode should be distinct from the existing codes in terms of rules. 
In this approach, then, each clade named under the PhyloCode, including the 
terminal-most clade, has a uninomial given name, but also has associated with 
it a set of more and more inclusive “family names” (its clade address). In a data-
base at least, all the higher clades to which a taxon belongs would be regarded 
as part of its complete name; this would help computers (and users) keep track 
of information in the database. Homonyms, which would result when convert-
ing species epithets to uninomials, can thus be told apart by higher-level clade 
names if their context is unclear, just as a teacher uses last names to distinguish 
among several children in class having the same first name.
Phylogenetic Monography
How can monographs be done under this view of species? In a rank-free 
framework, they can be done as well as or better under the current codes, 
as exemplified through the pathbreaking approach by Fisher (2006). Her 
approach was as follows: (1) use earlier taxonomies as a criterion for stratified-
random selection of specimens to study (Hennig’s semaphoronts); (2) after 
that, ignore taxonomic designation during character analysis and character 
scoring; (3) once operational taxonomic units are established (based on scored 
characters), conduct phylogenetic analysis; (4) use the resulting phylogenetic 
tree to inform taxonomic decisions, including naming of terminal clades con-
sistent with the PhyloCode’s treatment of more inclusive monophyletic groups. 
Specifiers used are specimens on deposit in an herbarium or museum, and 
the formal specifiers, as well as other specimens studied, are cited much as in 
traditional monographs. [See Fig. 4.1.]
DNa Barcoding
This discussion touches upon the current debates over DNA barcoding, another 
recently proposed system for characterizing species, which uses a short stretch 
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of DNA sequence from a standard gene. Similarity above a certain percent-
age, say 2%, equals species status. This approach has gained popular appeal, 
but suffers from obvious philosophical problems. Contrary to their posturing as 
cutting-edge, DNA barcoders are actually returning to an ancient, typological, 
single-character approach, and are maintaining a pre-Darwinian view of spe-
cies. There are two aspects to DNA barcoding, one good (but not new), the 
other new (but not good): DNA-based identification (i.e., using sequence data 
from a standard gene) and DNA taxonomy (i.e., using sequence data from a 
short stretch of a standard gene to recognize and name taxa). All critics (includ-
ing me) are strongly in favor of the good idea of using DNA for identification of 
already well-characterized taxa, but that is old hat – the important use of DNA 
for identification goes back to the beginning of molecular systematics. The DNA 
barcoders can’t take any credit for that – the most that they can claim is that 
they will scale-up, standardize, and database. But, there is really no need to set 
up a new bureaucracy or new databases (wasting the money of naïve funding 
agencies, who could be directing their attention toward real phylogenetic sys-
tematics) – current efforts elsewhere (such as GenBank) are more than sufficient. 
The new idea that DNA barcoding can replace normal taxonomy for naming 
new species and studying their relationships is not only bad philosophically, it is 
destructive in a practical sense. We should use all available resources to build 
real capacity to do systematics right (Will, Mishler, & Wheeler, 2005).
Implications for Ecology, Population Genetics, and Evolution
The species level is highly embedded in current ecological theory and prac-
tice. It is widely accepted that within- and between-species interactions are 
different in kind. Niche theory is usually conjoined with a view that the spe-
cies level provides a fundamental break. Gause’s (1934) theory of competitive 
exclusion talks about the ability of species needing to differentiate in order to 
live in the same environment. The species level is likewise highly embedded 
in studies of population genetics. The species is thought to be the largest unit 
in which gene flow is possible, thus the largest group that can actually evolve 
as a unit.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on the ways to modify 
ecological theory to fit with a rank-free view of phylogenetic diversity (i.e., 
no species or other ranks). It needs to be done, however – based on the argu-
ments presented above it is clear that the world is more complex than the 
current BSC allows for. If the systematic community moves to a rank-free view 
of biodiversity, then basic ecological and evolutionary research must be modi-
fied to account for this view. Fortunately, phylogenetic comparative methods 
are under active development in many areas (beginning with seminal studies 
such as Burt, 1989; Cheverud & Dow, 1985; Felsenstein, 1985; Harvey & Pagel, 
1991; Huey & Bennett, 1987; and Martins, 1996). Studies can go forward on 
niche differentiation, competition, coexistence, species-area curves, commu-
nity assembly, gene flow, macroevolutionary diversification, etc., but in a more 
rational manner taking into account nested hierarchical levels in these phenom-
ena, without using ranks.
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Implications for Conservation Biology
As argued in detail above, biodiversity isn’t species – biodiversity is the whole 
tree of life, not just the arbitrary place at which species are named. There are 
clades smaller and larger than the traditional species level. Species are not com-
parable between lineages in any manner, just an arbitrary cut-off somewhere 
along a branch in the tree of life. Thus only someone sharing the BSC view that 
species are fundamental (a view interestingly shared by creationists, as discussed 
above) should think that species are the basic units of biodiversity, or that a list 
of currently named species in some way provides an inventory of biodiversity. 
Biodiversity is a much richer tapestry of lineages and clades.
So how can we inventory biodiversity without species? Since counting spe-
cies or measuring their ranges and abundances is a poor measure of biodiversity, 
what should be done? New quantitative measures for phylogenetic biodiver-
sity need to be applied which take into account the number of branch points 
(and possibly branch lengths) that separate two lineages. Phylogenetic measures 
of biodiversity have been developed that could be used as a basis for rank-
free measures of biodiversity (Faith, 1992a, 1992b; Mishler, 1995; Vane-Wright, 
Humphries, & Williams, 1991). There are two possible approaches: counting of 
number of nodes separating two terminal clades, or summing the branch lengths 
separating two or more terminal clades. Advantages and disadvantages of each 
exist, and more work needs to be done, but the direction to move is clear.
What does “rarity” mean without ranks? This relatively new phylogenetic 
worldview can clarify greatly this term (Mishler, 2004). Rarity fundamentally 
means having few living close relatives, and these days “few” and “close” can 
be defined quantitatively on cladograms. Conservation priorities can actually 
be better guided by phylogenies rather than by taxonomy per se. Phylogenies 
provide a richer view of our knowledge of nested clades, and are directly associ-
ated with the evidence used to build them. Just like in the more theoretical areas 
discussed above, the most practical application of systematics in the modern 
world, conservation, needs to drop its reliance on species.
Postscript: Counterpoint
I agree with the quote at the beginning of Dr. Claridge’s paper (about mountains 
in Switzerland) and with his statement that “species taxa represent attempts to 
recognize real biological entities.” I believe mountains and taxa are real; as I 
explained in detail above, the issue for me is not whether taxa are real (they 
are, if monophyletic), but whether entities given the rank of species are real 
in a unique and special way that entities larger and smaller than them are not. 
Claridge and I agree that the entities we call species are real biological units. 
Our main difference is in what that reality is due to: for me it is monophyly, for 
Claridge it is sharing reproductive bonds. In either case, my point is that there 
are such real entities deeply nested inside each other, with no one level funda-
mental or unique. Species are real, but not in a unique and special way.
Claridge understates the fundamental differences between interbreeding 
groups and monophyletic groups; they are not the same thing theoretically or 
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practically. In fact, they are diametrically opposed, by definition. As was first 
pointed out by Rosen (1978), the ability to interbreed is certainly a plesiomorphy 
and thus not a good guide to monophyly. It is the derived inability to interbreed, 
say the origin of a new mate recognition system, that can be an apomorphic fea-
ture useful to diagnose a monophyletic group. Any empirical test for reproduc-
tive compatibility is certain to be measuring plesiomorphic similarity. The BSC 
is (and should be) anathema to a cladist, which makes it puzzling how someone 
could be a solid cladist at all levels but species.
I agree with Claridge that breeding relationships are very complex and diverse – 
but would point out that this observation actually strengthens my point. There 
are smaller inbreeding groups (sometimes actual, sometimes potential) nested 
inside of larger interbreeding groups: local populations, clusters of populations, 
geographic regions, even up to the intergeneric level in flowering plants like 
orchids. The potential to successfully interbreed gradually trails off as one looks 
at more and more distantly related populations (as Darwin pointed out). Claridge 
acknowledges this when he says that “the process of speciation is a continuous 
one, so that drawing real lines between species as they evolve will be very diffi-
cult and intermediate stages must be expected,” but then he contradicts himself 
in the same paragraph by saying: “species are of unique and real biological sig-
nificance.” In most organisms, there is no magical level at which the probability 
of successfully interbreeding suddenly drops from near 100% to near 0%. Thus 
even under the biological species concept, there is no unique and special level. 
Again, keep in mind the important distinction between grouping and ranking: 
breeding groups are very real – no one is denying that – it is the ranking decision 
about which level among many levels of nested breeding groups is to be called 
species that is arbitrary. Darwin was very aware of this distinction; we should 
still take his views seriously.
Evolutionary biology will be richer and much more accurate in its models of 
the world if this Darwinian hierarchical perspective is accepted. Evolutionary and 
ecological processes are occurring at many nested levels. “Speciation” is a major 
field of study, with many books and papers to its credit, which my point of view 
would seem to denigrate. But while I do think that “speciation” is an oversimplified 
concept, like the biological species concept on which it is based, I believe that 
there are important processes being studied by these researchers. I call it “diver-
sification,” the splitting of lineages influenced by a variety of interesting processes 
(ecological, reproductive, genetic, developmental, etc.). The important distinction 
I make is that diversification happens at many nested levels, not a single magical 
one, and full accounting of these is needed for a complete understanding of evolu-
tion. Focusing at the level of the entities taxonomists happen to call species in a 
particular case, as in standard studies of “speciation,” is a one-dimensional look at 
a multidimensional, hierarchically nested process.
We can do better with a completely rank-free view of taxonomy. Claridge 
thinks that my discussion of rank-free classification is peripheral to our argument 
over species, but of course it is central to my position. The arguments against 
comparability of entities at a particular rank apply to “species” as much as “fami-
lies” or “orders.” Evolutionary processes are not just operating to produce what 
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we happen to call species; they operate at many nested levels in producing 
the tree of life, “which fills with its dead and broken branches the crust of the 
earth, and covers the surface with its ever branching and beautiful ramifications” 
(Darwin, 1859, pp. 170–171).
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Systematic Biology 61: 885–891. [reprinted by permission]
The motivation for the development of phylogenetic nomenclature (originally 
called “phylogenetic taxonomy”) was to allow biological classification (or “sys-
tematization”), to represent phylogenetic relationships, and to embody impor-
tant principles such as “the untenability of paraphyletic groups” (de Queiroz and 
Gauthier 1990). From this starting point, de Queiroz and Gauthier developed 
a creative new basis for systematization in which the entities are not ranked 
taxa but clades (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1990, 1992, 1994; de Queiroz 1992, 
1994). Instead of attaching names to taxa by reference to a type and a rank, as 
in traditional biological nomenclature, phylogenetic nomenclature labels taxa 
by the use of multiple “specifiers” – specimens or apomorphic traits that unam-
biguously refer to a particular monophyletic taxon. The subsequent develop-
ment of phylogenetic nomenclature included formation of a scholarly society, 
the International Society for Phylogenetic Nomenclature, and development of 
a formal Code, the PhyloCode (http://www.phylocode.org), that is now in final 
preparation for publication at University of California Press. The hope for many 
phylogenetic systematists was for a new system of nomenclature that would 
firmly connect taxonomy to phylogeny and would allow for more stable ways 
to name the many significant clades that make up the Tree of Life. However, 
a major challenge for the development of the PhyloCode has been the treat-
ment of species. We argue in this paper that the approach taken to species 
in the PhyloCode is at odds with the motivations that drove many to support 
phylogenetic nomenclature and that these problems should be fixed before the 
PhyloCode is published and officially implemented.
The debate over the nature of species has plagued biological systematics 
throughout its history. Darwin (1859), in one of his most original contributions 
to biology, provided a cogent solution to the species problem, recognizing that 
species are merely labels applied to a continuous divergence process: during 
the divergence of lineages, there is no magical level that corresponds to the 
rank of species (Ereshefsky 2010; Mishler 2010). Under the Darwinian approach, 
particular species may be meaningful evolutionary groups of organisms, just like 
particular genera, sections, subspecies, and varieties, but the species rank is not 
qualitatively distinct from other ranks. The Modern Synthesis reversed Darwin’s 
advance, attributing renewed significance to the species rank and presenting 
species as the unit of evolution (see Mishler 2010 for more discussion of this 
checkered history).
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Partly in reaction to the preeminent position given to species during the Modern 
Synthesis, the past few decades have seen the proliferation of species concepts 
(Mayden 1997, listed at least 24 different concepts). Although the development 
of these concepts has helped clarify alternative ways of prioritizing biological 
concepts and phenomena, there has certainly been no clear winner: We are no 
closer to finding a single universally accepted definition of species than we were 
in Darwin’s time. Fortunately, the challenge of designing a system of phylogenetic 
nomenclature can (and should) be separated from the species concept debate.
The approach to species currently adopted in the PhyloCode was presented 
and defended by Dayrat et al. (2008). They stressed the incompatibility of 
Linnaean binomial nomenclature with phylogenetic nomenclature and con-
cluded that species and clades are two different kinds of entities and that the 
former should not be accommodated within the PhyloCode system of rank-
free nomenclature. In taking the stance that species are distinct from clades, 
Dayrat et al. (2008) adopted the particular conception of species proposed by 
de Queiroz (2007). According to this view, species are separately evolving but 
connected subpopulations (metapopulations), and as such species are not clades 
but rather segments of lineages. Although de Queiroz’s lineage-based species 
concept has been criticized (e.g., Baum 2009; Hausdorf 2011; see also the cri-
tique below), the pros or cons of his species concept are not the most pressing 
issue here. Accepting that lineages are not the same entities as clades, and that 
the PhyloCode is about naming clades, our main disagreement with Dayrat et al. 
(2008) is that they still retain species in the PhyloCode. In doing so, they effec-
tively impose on all would-be users of the PhyloCode their view that species are 
lineages. We believe, in contrast, that the only way to improve the PhyloCode, 
so that it can be used by anyone who wishes to name clades, regardless of what 
they think about the nature of species, is to remove all mention of species and to 
treat all clades, from the very smallest to the very largest, equally. This will allow 
systematists freedom to equate species with clades, or with lineages, or to deny 
the existence of species entirely.
de Queiroz’s (2007) views on the nature of species have, unfortunately, (and 
unnecessarily) played a tremendous role in shaping the PhyloCode resulting in 
a Code that is not useable by the many individuals who are fully committed to 
the principles of phylogenetic nomenclature but do not accept this particular 
view of species. A system of nomenclature should not be tied to a particular 
philosophical outlook on something as controversial as the nature of species, 
especially a system focused on the naming of clades.
It is not our intent here to review the history of the debate over species and 
phylogeny or to anoint any particular species concept as the correct one. Instead, 
in this paper, we propose that the PhyloCode be amended to remove mention 
of “species” and to accommodate users who wish to be able to attach names to 
clades that approximate taxa at the traditional species level. Before doing so, we 
provide an overview of those principles that guide the system of phylogenetic 
nomenclature in general that are most relevant to the question of whether and 
how species names might be accommodated and then a brief history of how 
species have been treated in this system so far.
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Background
Phylogenetic Systematics and Nomenclature
The motivation for phylogenetic nomenclature was to facilitate the precise nam-
ing of any monophyletic group in such a way that nomenclature can remain 
stable as long as knowledge of phylogenetic relationships remains stable. For 
the purposes of this discussion on species, it is important to clarify the concept 
of monophyly since “ancestral species” are mentioned in some definitions. The 
distinction between diachronic lineages and synchronic clades is illustrated in 
Fig. 4.3. Lineages are relationships through time between ancestors and descen-
dants, whereas clades are composed of sets of tips that are in existence at any 
one time. A simple definition of monophyly, and hence clades, is: “a mono-
phyletic group is all and only the descendants of a common ancestor” (Mishler 
2010). The ancestor in this definition is not a species but rather a part of a 
lineage, such as an organism, kin group, or population (as discussed by Mishler 
and Brandon 1987). Also, as pointed out by Baum (2009), monophyly of a group 
does not (and can not) mean monophyly on every single gene tree – horizon-
tal transfer and incomplete lineage sorting are frequent enough to ensure this. 
Instead, monophyly refers to an ensemble characteristic of organismic and/or 
genic descent.
Traditional nomenclature has limitations as applied to the modern under-
standing of the Tree of Life. First, the Tree of Life is a deeply nested hierarchy 
of monophyletic groups. There are far too many levels in this hierarchy for the 
FIGURE 4.3 The distinction between clades and lineages, showing the incompatibility 
of different views of species. A clade is a synchronic, monophyletic set of lineage repre-
sentatives, where monophyly is defined synchronically as “all and only descendants of a 
common ancestor” (represented by A’ in this case). Note that the terminal-most named 
clade is a “species” in the sense of Mishler and Theriot (2000a, 2000b, 2000c). A lineage 
is a diachronic ancestor-descendant path (gray line up the left side of the tree), whereas a 
lineage segment is a part of a lineage that connects two nodes (A and D in this example), 
note that the latter are “species” in the de Queiroz (2007) sense. 
(Redrawn from Mishler (2010).)
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number of ranks available in the traditional Codes of nomenclature. The rules in 
the traditional Codes that do not allow taxa to be nested inside taxa at the same 
rank lead to frustrating instability in names as our knowledge of phylogenetic 
relationships progresses. Second, formulating a taxon concept around a single 
type does not allow precise reference of a monophyletic group because it is not 
clear exactly what node on the tree is being named. As when triangulating in 
navigation, it is necessary to refer to at least two points of reference (“specifiers” 
in the PhyloCode) to unambiguously attach a name to a clade. Third, the tradi-
tional Codes are rank-based, but taxa at the same rank have nothing necessarily 
in common and are not comparable. Since ranking is highly subjective, whereas 
assignment of organisms to clades is largely objective (if not always easy), it 
seems prudent to build a nomenclatural system around clade affiliation rather 
than rank assignment. Clades exist regardless of rank, and the addition of rank 
to a clade, for example, whether they are referred to as genera or families, does 
not add any value to our nomenclatural system. For all these reasons and more, 
there has been a movement to develop a new code of rank-free phylogenetic 
nomenclature, the PhyloCode.
The development of a new nomenclature for species names has been almost 
as controversial as the species problem itself. A major point of contention 
between the traditional Codes and the PhyloCode is the lack of mandatory ranks 
in the latter. As a result, Linnaean species binomials are incompatible with phy-
logenetic taxonomy because they naturally imply the existence of both a genus 
rank and a species rank.
A number of initial proposals on how to treat species names in the light of 
phylogenetic taxonomy have been presented in the literature (de Queiroz and 
Gauthier 1992; Graybeal 1995; Schander and Thollesson 1995; Cantino 1998; 
Cantino et al. 1999; Ereshefsky 1999; Mishler 1999; Pleijel 1999; Pleijel and 
Rouse 2000, 2003; Artois 2001; Hillis et al. 2001; Dayrat et al. 2004; Dayrat 
2005; Wolsan 2007; Baum 2009). These approaches worry primarily about 
how to convert traditional binomials into rank-free names that could be used in 
phylogenetic nomenclature. Sundberg and Pleijel (1994) proposed retaining the 
Linnaean species binomials for clades, with the traditional genus name serving as 
a prenomen: not part of the species name, but added by convention in order to 
retain historical name legacy. Cantino (1998) proposed, instead, the hyphenation 
of genus and epithet, thereby conserving the current generic name and includ-
ing it as a part of the species name. However, this option was criticized because 
it would naturally lead people to consider species with the same prenomen as 
being closely related even though they might not be (Schander and Thollesson 
1995). From that position, the combination of a higher taxon name (serving as 
a clade address) with a species uninomial would be preferred (Graybeal 1995; 
Schander and Thollesson 1995; Mishler 1999; Pleijel 1999). Although unino-
mials composed of species epithets have many virtues, they pose significant 
problems regarding their uniqueness within and across biological domains. A 
series of expedients to avoid name duplication were explored, using a com-
bination of names followed by sequential numbers, registration numbers, etc. 
(see a full list of proposals in Cantino et al. 1999; Artois 2001; Wolsan 2007). 
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In addition to worrying about the form of species names, some authors con-
sidered ways to make it clear from the name itself whether a certain taxon is 
at the species rank or not. Graybeal (1995) suggested the use of different kinds 
of parentheses to indicate species uninomials. Pleijel and Rouse (2000) recom-
mended the use of an initial upper case letter for clade names that do not refer 
to least-inclusive taxonomic units (LITUs), and lower case for uninomials that 
do refer to LITUs. However, no agreement has been achieved as to the form of 
species names, mainly because these nomenclatural issues tended to be con-
founded with philosophical positions on the nature of species, in particular, 
whether species are clades or some other kind of biological entity and, if they 
are clades, whether the species rank is special.
It is worth highlighting that, regardless of one’s view of species ontology, in 
many empirical studies that sample a large number of specimens, the set of organ-
isms that were traditionally considered to comprise a single species are often 
found to approximately correspond to a clade. The same is of course true for sets 
of organisms that have been traditionally ranked as genera, families, etc., and are 
often found to correspond to clades. This is one reason why Baum (2009) argued 
that the PhyloCode ought to at least allow systematists to name clades that happen 
to approximately correspond in composition to a traditional species.
a Brief History of the Phylocode with reference to Species
The first original draft of the PhyloCode was sketched at a workshop held at Harvard 
University in 1998 and was modified and subsequently made public in April 2000 
via the Internet at www.phylocode.org. This draft covered the general application 
of clade naming rules that revolved around the philosophical principles of phylo-
genetic nomenclature. The publication of this early draft generated a large body 
of literature, some of which was supportive (Bremer 2000; Brochu and Sumrall 
2001; Ereshefsky 2001; Laurin 2001, 2005; Bertrand and Pleijel 2003; Pleijel and 
Rouse 2003; Lee 2005 and many others) and some critical (Lucas 1992; Lidén and 
Oxelman 1996; Lidén et al. 1997; Dominguez and Wheeler 1997; Moore 1998; 
Benton 2000; Nixon and Carpenter 2000; Nixon et al. 2003, among others).
In 2002, a second workshop held at Yale University focused more on species 
names and the best approach to handle their nomenclature. Much disagree-
ment characterized the debate and the issue was left open for further discussion, 
although the clear majority felt that a separate Code covering species would 
ultimately be necessary.
The First International Phylogenetic Nomenclature Meeting was held in Paris in 
July 2004. Further discussion about species and their names took place among the 
over 70 attendees. Different approaches were proposed, including two by Dayrat 
Dayrat et al. (2004) proposed to add three levels of uniqueness to species 
uninomials: (1) the traditional species epithet, (2) the original author’s name, and 
(3) the date of publication. In cases where the three levels would still not provide 
uniqueness, page numbers and letters (a, b) could be added to the name string. 
Through such measures, it was shown to be possible to develop a clade-based 
naming system that encompassed taxa at or below the traditionally recognized 
species rank (Dayrat and Gosliner 2005).
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and Clarke (ironically, both authors in Dayrat et al. 2008) who argued for a uni-
nominal system within the PhyloCode. Under both proposals, species were treated 
differently to clades: the species names being defined using the formula “the spe-
cies that includes specimen X,” with the author clarifying the kind of species entity 
to which the name refers. It was then agreed that Dayrat and Clarke should form a 
committee with the specific charge of drafting a Code for species along these lines.
The attempt to develop a phylogenetic code of nomenclature for species faced 
major challenges and ultimately failed due to the difficulty of reconciling several 
important issues including: (1) the realization that species defined under the tradi-
tional Codes vary widely in concept, (2) difference between ICZN and ICBN in 
how they handle species, (3) the conviction that every species name established 
under the current Codes would have to be converted into a PhyloCode name, 
and (4) the realization that lineages are nested inside of each other in complicated 
patterns meaning that if species are to be defined as lineages, they will nest at sev-
eral hierarchical levels. Given these issues, the committee proposed at the Second 
International Phylogenetic Nomenclature Meeting held at Yale University in 2006 
that species names continue to be established via the traditional Codes (ICBN, ICZN, 
and ICNB) and that subspecific groups be viewed as kinds of species. This proposal 
was favored by a clear majority of the meeting attendees, but with several nays 
(including the two authors of this paper who attended the meeting). This approach 
was then adopted by the committee that oversees the PhyloCode as described 
positively by Dayrat et al. (2008) in their summary of the recommendations:
On May 24, 2007, the Committee on Phylogenetic Nomenclature (CPN) […] 
adopted a new article in the PhyloCode addressing the naming of species in the 
context of phylogenetic nomenclature. This vote […] represents a major step in the 
development of the PhyloCode.
This statement was meant by its authors to portray the ultimate achievement of the 
PhyloCode, but we feel that this vote represents instead a conclusive defeat for phy-
logenetic nomenclature. After years of debates in the literature, and at meetings and 
workshops, the difficulty of dealing with naming species in a phylogenetic context 
culminated with a surrender of species names to the traditional Codes.
Several revisions to the PhyloCode were made based on Dayrat et al. (2008). 
Notably, in the current PhyloCode draft (version 4c), art. 21 states that
This code does not govern the establishment or precedence of species names. 
To be considered available (ICZN) or validly published (ICBN and ICNB), a species 
name must satisfy the provisions of the appropriate rank-based code (e.g., ICNB, 
ICBN, and ICZN) This article describes how species names governed by the 
rank-based codes are to be interpreted and used under this code.
Although acknowledging the value of democratic decision making, we remain 
deeply disappointed that the difficulty of dealing with naming species in a phy-
logenetic context culminated with a surrender not just of species taxa (which we 
are happy to let go) but species names as well. We here wish to argue that this 
poor decision should be revisited and reversed.
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The General Lineage Species Concept and the Problems  
it Poses for the Phylocode
The de Queiroz (2007) approach to species is implicitly enshrined in the current 
version of the PhyloCode, which clearly states that clades and species do not 
equate (Art. 1.1) and implies that species are lineages (Rec. 21.4C). Many different 
species concepts are currently applied across the different biological domains, 
and many scientists find some of these useful whether conceptually, practically, 
or both. Many practitioners believe that species are ranked or unranked clades; 
many do not. But this disagreement is not relevant to a code of nomenclature 
that is rank agnostic. Rather than trying to attain a unified species concept, a 
sort of biological holy grail, we may have to just accept and embrace the diver-
sity of thoughts about species and agree that phylogenetic nomenclature should 
remain logically independent from the philosophical debate about species. It is 
not constructive to anoint an “official” species concept in the PhyloCode, which 
is only a nomenclatural tool for naming clades not a ground for reconciliation.
We understand de Queiroz’s position on species as segments of lineages and 
we agree with him that these are not the same kind of entity as clades. Lineages 
are diachronic, whereas clades are synchronic. Many authors since Hennig have 
appreciated this distinction, although it is sometimes muddled. Our disagree-
ment with de Queiroz boils down to these points: (1) many currently named 
species are certainly not lineages. We have evidence for only a small number 
of them being actual lineages (it is empirically difficult to demarcate lineages 
as compared to the well-worked out evidential procedures for finding clades); 
(2) even when we can detect lineages, it is clear that nested levels of lineages 
can be discovered and it is unclear how one privileged level should be rec-
ognized as species. In other words, the species-ranking problem is in no way 
solved by equating species with lineages (regardless of exactly how lineages are 
defined). However, this disagreement should be irrelevant to the PhyloCode. 
The PhyloCode governs only clades. Other important biological entities such as 
lineages, genes, trophic levels must be named in other ways preferably in such 
a way that they are clearly distinguished from clade names (even in cases where 
they have the same nomenclatural root).
The PhyloCode as currently constructed works under the assumption that 
species are not clades, yet paradoxically brings species into the Code by stipu-
lating that species names are disallowed for clades (Dayrat et al. 2008). When 
a clade happens to approximate a traditional species in content, the PhyloCode 
mandates that clade be given a new name, distinct from the traditional species 
name. However, when a clade happens to approximate a traditional genus or 
family (or any higher rank), it strongly recommends retaining and converting the 
traditional name whenever possible. This constraint is incompatible with several 
reasonable positions one might take on the nature of species and on the goals of 
phylogenetic nomenclature.
Some reasonable biologists believe in the existence of clades and doubt that 
species are meaningful real entities that warrant inclusion in a formal taxonomic 
system. For these individuals, the current PhyloCode poses severe problems 
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because it inhibits their ability to name clades at or below the traditional species 
level. Likewise, a biologist who accepts that species are distinct from clades but 
who believes that a certain traditional species or subspecies name is best viewed 
as referring to a clade cannot apply that name to that clade.
Even more so, the PhyloCode discriminates against individuals who believe that 
species correspond to clades of some (perhaps arbitrarily determined) rank. These 
individuals not only have trouble naming clades at or below the species level but, 
when they discover a clade that closely approximates a named species, they are 
forbidden from given that clade its logical name – the relevant species epithet.
The current PhyloCode requires systematists to refer to species and subspe-
cific taxa whose names are regulated by the traditional codes. The Code allows 
for no other way to utilize such taxa. Furthermore, the PhyloCode also allows, 
in fact, encourages the use of species taxa as specifiers in phylogenetic clade 
definitions (Art. 11.7). This approach poses some critical problems:
1. Having to depend on traditional Codes implies that the PhyloCode is 
not freestanding. We feel that the PhyloCode ought to be legally inde-
pendent of the existing Codes (although some similarities in spirit are 
common to all, of course). In other words, no rules in the PhyloCode 
should depend on rules in the traditional Codes, including for species 
names. However, the PhyloCode as it stands does depend on tradi-
tional Codes, and these are not controlled by proponents of phyloge-
netic nomenclature. For example, ICBN could amend their Code to say 
that species names are invalid if, when published, there was intent to 
treat the genus name as a “prenomen” under the PhyloCode.
2. The current Code calls on systematists to name new species under the 
traditional Codes even if they intend only to use the names as specifiers 
within phylogenetic nomenclature (Art. 21.4). We feel that it is intellec-
tually dishonest to assign a genus name to a new species (as required 
under the traditional codes) when in fact the “genus” is believed to be 
an artificial concept and its use would be later dropped by the author 
of the name. Even more dramatic is the case where a new species 
does not fall under any of the traditionally described genera, implying 
that the author should first establish a new genus under the traditional 
Codes before creating a new species, also subjected to traditional rules.
3. Species established under the traditional Codes and clades named under 
the PhyloCode are different entities, hard to precisely compare because 
they are fundamentally defined by a single-type and multiple specifiers, 
respectively. Therefore, adopting traditional binomials to label clades 
and their specifiers generates natural inconsistencies between clades 
and what traditional names actually represent. This is a fundamental 
reason why specifiers under the PhyloCode should be museum speci-
mens (physical reference objects) at all levels, never Linnaean binomi-
als. Similarly, a nested taxon can be equally used as a specifier of a 
larger clade, as long as the reference taxon has been previously defined 
according to the rules of the PhyloCode with reference to specimens.
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4. In many cases, biologists discover clades with finer phylogenetic struc-
ture within a currently terminal taxon that approximately compare to 
species as circumscribed based on one of the many species concepts. 
In these instances, it seems logical to retain a clade reference to the 
original species name and allow that it contains smaller subclades 
requiring new names. This contrasts with what happens when a spe-
cies is split under the traditional Codes, where the species name must 
be transferred down to one of the newly discovered subclades (the one 
containing the type), resulting in serious difficulties keeping track of 
synonymy in databases. Therefore, treating names of current terminal 
taxa just like clade names at all levels has a decided benefit for stabil-
ity and biodiversity informatics. Yet this is banned under the current 
PhyloCode by rules that disallow on from assigning any species name 
to a clade.
A Solution to Naming Species in Phylogenetic Nomenclature
We suggest that the rules governing names of clades at and around the tradi-
tional species level should be identical to the rules that apply at higher levels. 
As there are no ranks under the PhyloCode, it seems illogical to have an implicit 
rank of species. However, Dayrat et al. (2008) define a position that is laid out 
in the current version of the PhyloCode, which effectively applies special rules 
at the “species” level in the PhyloCode hierarchy. Such an implicit ranking exists 
due to articles in the PhyloCode that imply or overtly specify that clades at or 
below the level of species are not governed by the PhyloCode and may not be 
given clade names. For example, it is allowed that the specifiers of clade names 
be species rather than particular type specimens. Because it is wrong to use spe-
cies as specifiers for clades that approximate to traditional species or sub-clades 
thereof, this approach implies that clades cease to exist or cease to be nameable 
at the approximate level of species.
Furthermore, Article 10.9 of the PhyloCode states: “A clade name may not be 
converted from a preexisting specific or infraspecific epithet (ICBN and ICNB) 
or from a name in the species group (ICZN).” This implies that if we discover a 
clade that happens to conform in content to a traditional species, and we have 
developed a suitable definition for that clade, we are nonetheless forbidden 
from using the traditional species name for that clade. Such a restriction does 
not apply to genus-approximating clades, showing that the PhyloCode applies 
different nomenclatural rules to clades whose content approximates species 
than to other hierarchical levels.
We believe that in order to maintain continuity with past literature, system-
atists should be allowed to recognize clades that roughly correspond in con-
tent to traditional species (or subspecies) and to use their former epithets as 
uninominal clade names. We certainly do not advocate mass conversion of all 
existing species names established under the traditional Codes to clade names, 
as many of these, in fact, do not even correspond to clades. Furthermore, just as 
for higher clades, only relevant species names should be converted into clades 
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names at the discretion of expert systematists. Fisher (2006) provides an exam-
ple of a monograph treating clades that approximate species using rigorously 
defined uninomial clade names that would be invalid under the current draft of 
the PhyloCode.
We are fully aware that many epithets are very common within and between 
domains. However, homonyms can be fully resolved by the addition of refer-
ences to the name string, for example, clade name author, year, registration 
number, and/or clade address, following up the strategy articulated by Dayrat 
et al. (2004) but applying it to all levels instead of only species. It is already 
determined that valid clade names will be assigned registration numbers by 
RegNum (Cellinese 2012), an on-line database, currently in its final stage of 
development that stores and manages phylogenetic definitions. This mechanism 
will readily allow users to redeploy a former species (or subspecific) epithet to 
clade without leading to ambiguity due to homonyms. For example, the epithet 
digitata is common to 299 plant species (IPNI). However, Adansonia digitata L. 
could be converted to Digitata Linnaeus 1759, 2:1144 [New Author] (Adansonia) 
RegNum-number, whereas Ceinfugosia digitata Cav. would convert to Digitata 
Cavanilles 1787, 3:174 [New Author] (Ceinfugosia) RegNum-number. We believe 
that naming the clade (Adansonia) Digitata need not prevent individuals rec-
ognizing the traditional species Adansonia digitata L. Even if the composition 
of these two taxa were to diverge over time, for example, because the species 
A. digitata came to be divided into two while the clade continued to refer to 
the larger grouping, we are confident that systematists would be able to com-
municate without confusion. After all, several competing ideas on species limits 
may coexist in the current system, yet systematists are quite able to indicate the 
taxon of interest in a particular case using conventions such as sensu. Although 
our proposal would result in a name string containing a few more components 
than traditional species names, these measures would largely remain behind 
the scenes in databases, ensuring the required uniqueness of clade names, and 
providing a stable link to important legacy data.
Conclusions
We do not agree with the assessment of Dayrat et al. (2008) that the PhyloCode’s 
development is complete. Much progress still needs to be made before it is pub-
lished. In particular, we cannot support the adopted approach for “resolving” the 
species problem by tying the PhyloCode to Linnaean binomials named under 
the traditional Codes. This approach, if enforced, will result in many previous 
supporters of Phylogenetic Nomenclature refraining from using the PhyloCode. 
The PhyloCode needs to be extended to cover all clades, including those that 
approximate to or are within traditional species, and should be made philosoph-
ically inclusive so that it can be adopted by anyone regardless of their preferred 
species concept.
If monophyly provides the basis for classification, then there is no reason why 
a clade-naming system should not be extended to cover all clades even those 
that may have similar content to someone’s concept and/or rank of species. 
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Therefore, it seems clear to us that phylogenetic nomenclature must be able 
to handle clades at all levels and, for reasons of clear communication and fair 
reference to the legacy literature, that one ought to be able to assign them the 
traditional names (or some derivative thereof).
The species problem does not need to be resolved for the purposes of final-
izing the PhyloCode. No species concept (including the ones advocated by the 
authors of the present paper) should be enshrined in the PhyloCode. Since its 
purpose is to name clades, any mention of “species” in the PhyloCode should be 
removed. We need to streamline the PhyloCode to focus solely on rational rules 
for naming clades at any level including the traditional species level.
The authors of this paper have submitted the needed modifications to the 
PhyloCode in a proposal to the Committee of Phylogenetic Nomenclature 
(Appendix 1, Dryad doi:10.5061/dryad.sr2hd7md) and sincerely hope that they, 
or some equivalent set of changes, will be adopted before the official publication 
of the PhyloCode. We hope that this paper will stimulate discussion and result in 
a more open-minded Code that can be applied to all clades in the Tree of Life.
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Supplementary material including an online-only appendix can be found in the 
Dryad data repository at https://datadryad.org/stash/dataset/doi:10.5061/dryad.
sr2hd7md.
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Abstract 
We argue that the logical outcome of the cladistics revolution in biological sys-
tematics, and the move towards rankless phylogenetic classification of nested 
monophyletic groups as formalized in the PhyloCode, is to eliminate the species 
rank along with all the others and simply name clades. We propose that the 
lowest level of formally named clade be the SNaRC, the Smallest Named, and 
Registered Clade. The SNaRC is an epistemic level in the classification, not an 
ontic one. Naming stops at that level because there is no currently acceptable 
evidence for clades within it, not because no smaller clades exist. Later, included 
clades may be named. They would then become the SNaRCs, while the original 
SNaRC would keep its original name. We argue that all theoretical tasks of biol-
ogy, in evolution and ecology, as well as practical tasks such as conservation 
assessment, are better approached using this rankless phylogenetic approach.
Keywords
species, species concept, monophyly, phenomena, explanation, taxonomy
“For the Snark’s a peculiar creature, that won’t be caught in a commonplace way”.
–Lewis Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark (1876)
Introduction
Species are often thought to be the fundamental units of evolution, ecology, 
genetics, and/or systematics (Agapow, Bininda-Emonds, et al. 2004; Birky, 
Adams, et al. 2010; Blaxter, Mann, et al. 2005; Claridge, Dawah, et al. 1997; 
Green 2005; Hull 1975; Reydon 2005). However, species are empirically unsta-
ble objects, being revised regularly. Moreover, they are theoretically unstable as 
well; discussions over what counts as a species, and what criteria are to be used 
to delineate one from another, show no signs of abating (Hausdorf 2011; Naomi 
2011; Staley 2013; Wilkins 2011). Some have suggested the other extreme: that 
species are no more fundamental than monophyletic taxa (that is, those having 
a single common ancestor) at any rank (Mishler 2010), and furthermore that the 
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species rank should disappear as part of a general move to rankless taxonomy 
(Ereshefsky 1999; Mishler 1999; Pleijel 1999).
As it stands, most taxonomists resist rankless taxonomy and think that ranked 
taxa, particularly species, represent natural kinds or explanations of biological 
groupings. Some (Fitzhugh 2005, 2009) even think that delineating taxa such 
as species are explanations in themselves. Even many of those committed in 
general to the idea of rankless taxonomy make an exception for species and 
think that this one taxonomic rank is important to keep (Cantino and de Queiroz 
2000; de Queiroz 2005, 2007). Other supporters of rankless taxonomy advocate 
a consistent treatment of names for all levels of clades under the PhyloCode, the 
revision of taxonomy proposed to replace the Linnaean scheme (see below). 
That includes even the levels corresponding to what have been called species 
(Cellinese, Baum, et al. 2012).
This topic is thus maximally controversial along several axes of opinion. Are 
species unique entities of biodiversity or are they the same as taxa at higher and 
lower levels, either within a ranked or rankless nomenclatorial system? If they 
are unique, what is their supposed uniqueness due to?
Background About Species
Since the inception of modern botany and zoology, biologists have had the 
notion of a “good species,” and although it is not universally agreed what that 
means, each taxonomist has little trouble in identifying these entities in their 
chosen study group of organisms, through some sort of prototypic approach 
(Amitani 2015). Such prototypes have a folk taxonomic origin. All societies have 
folk concepts of living kinds of one kind or another (Medin and Atran 1999), 
albeit usually not in a formally ranked nomenclature. In most early classifica-
tions, taxa were not ranked. While folk kinds are generally nested in a hierarchy, 
there are no fixed and specified levels or grades of kinds in most folk taxonomies 
(Atran 1990, 1999), and prior to the early modern period in the life sciences 
(“natural history”), there was no such rank either (Wilkins 2018). Thus, species 
were named before there was any biological theory to speak of, first by botanists 
and later by zoologists. Christian theological considerations impinged on the 
question of rank early. The need for a species rank appears to have arisen as a 
result of attempts, by Johannes Buteo and Athanasius Kircher in the 16th century 
work out logistically how many kinds (species in Latin) were on the Ark. Other 
pre-Darwinian theorists of classification also viewed higher ranks such as phyla 
as indicating major elements of God’s creative plan (Agassiz 1859). Ranked clas-
sifications, in general, are a late innovation, and one due to professional and 
historical contingencies in modern biology (McOuat 2001).
Only after Darwin did the question “What makes a species a species?” come 
into general discussion. It emerged particularly after Johanssen’s failed “pure 
lines” argument during the Mendelian revolution, in which he held that species 
were pure gene lineages (Wilkins 2010, 2011). The species problem, as it came 
to be known, became a central issue of the Modern Synthesis with Dobzhansky 
(cf. Breidbach and Ghiselin 2006; Buteo 1554; Kircher 1675; Wilkins 2013), to 
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(1935, 1937). Prior to the Mendelian revolution, there was a “species question” 
(What is the origin of species?), addressed by Darwin, but not a “species prob-
lem” (What are species?) (Wilkins 2013b).21 Darwin, who addressed the species 
question, clearly thought species were simply less transient varieties and left the 
species problem at that; evolution did not license ranking. Many subsequently 
concluded (erroneously) that Darwin thought were no such things as species, 
when what he really thought was that the species rank was arbitrary (Mishler 
2010; Wilkins 2018).
Taxa are supposed, in any biological classification, to represent or name natu-
ral groupings, and monophyly is the modern criterion of a natural group in phy-
logenetics. This criterion, however, admits of more than one interpretation, in 
part depending on whether the monophyletic group is thought of as synchronic 
(representing a single time slice across lineages descended from a common 
ancestor) or diachronic (representing the historical causal relations between a 
common ancestor and its descendants). In other words, is the ancestor included 
in the group (diachronic) or not (synchronic)? The diachronic view that a group 
is monophyletic if it includes a single historical common ancestor we might 
call diamonophyly (Vanderlaan, Ebach, et al. 2013). The synchronic view that 
monophyly is a property of extant or extinct taxa in a simple relationship to each 
other, such that a group of specimens are more closely related to each other than 
to an outgroup, we might call synmonophyly.
However, what are commonly regarded as a “good species” are often 
not monophyletic under either definition. Named species can be formed by 
repeated speciation (Turner 2002) or by hybridization between other species 
(Bogart 2003; Rieseberg 1997). Or particular species may have an incomplete 
coalescence of genetic lineages or haplotypes (Beltrán, Jiggins, et al. 2002; 
Després, Pettex, et al. 2002).
Mayr made an important distinction between species as particular taxa and 
species as a general category. Mayr held that both a given species taxon and the 
species category were natural and therefore real (Mayr 1996). Others (known as 
species nominalists) have held that neither species taxa nor the species category 
are natural or real (Hey 2001, 2006; Pleijel 1999; Vrana and Wheeler 1992). Still, 
yet others (e.g., Darwin, Mishler) have held that species as individual taxa can be 
natural but that the species category (the rank) is unnatural. Let us first consider 
these three approaches to the species category, or rank, before offering a solu-
tion in terms of monophyly.
approaches to Species as a Category
1. Theoretically defined species: Mayr formulated and promoted a 
theoretical account of the species category, the Biological Species 
Concept (BSC), which many biologists adopted uncritically. Widely 
held during the twentieth century, this is the view that a group of 
organisms is a species if and only if it satisfies a theoretical criterion, 
21 The observation is due to Jody Hey (pers. comm.). Contrary to Mayr’s and others’ characteriza-
tions, Darwin did not intend to define species, but to explain why they existed.
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specifically that it is reproductively isolated. One major problem 
with a theoretically-defined species account such as this is that it 
excludes groups that are empirically regarded by biologists as “good 
species” but which do not satisfy its criterion. Examples include 
asexual organisms (Bogart 2003; Lodé 2013; Moritz and Bi 2011), 
mostly asexual (yet occasionally prolifically exchanging genes) 
microbial organisms (Ochman, Lerat, et al. 2005; Wilkins 2007a), 
and, as mentioned, hybridizers.
The BSC is not the only possible theoretical species concept, of course. 
For example, the Ecological Species Concept (Van Valen 1976) uses filling 
an ecological niche as a criterion, and the General Lineage Concept (de 
Queiroz 1999, 2007)22 uses forming a lineage as a criterion. Both, along 
with the BSC, have been criticized for empirical vagueness of application 
and lack of congruence with what are empirically regarded as “good 
species.”23 Altogether, there are around twenty-eight theoretical defini-
tions of the species category (Wilkins 2018). None match all and only the 
species taxa empirically identified by taxonomists and ecologists.
The well-known “species-as-individuals” thesis (the SAI or Individualist 
Thesis) was built on a philosophical foundation: individual species are 
unique historical objects, held together by theoretically important pro-
cesses, rather than natural kinds (Gayon 1996; Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1976; 
cf. Wilkins 2007b). These important processes were most often consid-
ered to be reproductive cohesion, although other processes could be 
involved (see Ghiselin 1997; Mishler and Brandon 1987, for discussion). 
Under this view, organisms are parts of a species, rather than members 
of it, and species are seen as occupying a unique level in the tree of life. 
This stands in contrast to the philosophical view that there are “natural 
kinds,” in which members of a species share a unique set of traits (Dupré 
1981; Hacking 1990, 2007; Khalidi 2013; Rieppel 2010; Wilkins 2013a).
2. Antirealism about species: Another widespread view is that the spe-
cies category and sometimes also particular species taxa are unreal 
objects in biology. On this view, they are merely conventional terms, 
names without name-bearers. This is often held erroneously to be the 
“Darwinian” view (Wilkins 2009, 129ff), although it really came into 
prominence around 1900 (Anon 1908). This view is also sometimes 
called “species nominalism,” based on the medieval philosophical posi-
tion of nominalism, which holds that only individual objects exist. This 
22 It is misleadingly also known as the “Unified Species Concept.” This term is misleading because, 
although all species to the extent they are natural objects form lineages, that is also true of taxa at 
all ranks. It is entirely unclear what kind of lineages uniquely qualify to be named at the species 
rank. So this conception is unified (and general) just to the extent that it proposes a necessary but 
insufficient criterion for a natural species concept.
23 “Good species” form the proof of concept for biologists for concepts of species (the rank). Every 
biologist knows what form good species take in their specialty, but each subdiscipline differs in 
subtle or gross ways from other subdisciplines. See Amitani (2015) for a discussion of this and a 
characterisation of “good species” as a form of prototypical reasoning.
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view reached its apogee in the phenetics era in taxonomy (e.g., Levin 
1979; Sokal and Crovello 1970), but it still has advocates today.24
3. Monophyletic species: Many cladists,25 but by no means all, have taken 
an intermediate position, between the two previous views. They hold 
that individual species taxa can be real objects in biology if they are 
monophyletic, but also that the species category is neither natural nor 
uniquely real since there are monophyletic groups at many levels. This 
is sometimes called the phylogenetic species concept (PSC), although, 
as with monophyly, there are at least two contenders for the PSC label, 
one based on historical monophyly (Mishler and Theriot 2000), and one 
based on diagnostic characters (Wheeler and Platnick 2000). A major 
problem perceived by some for the PSC is that there is often monophy-
letic structure below “good species” that leads to potential taxonomic 
inflation, an explosion in the number of species that are described (Isaac, 
Mallet, et al. 2004; Zachos and Lovari 2013). Likewise, it has been argued 
by some that the use of a phylogenetic conception based on monophyly 
could lead to excessive lumping (Staley 2006). Both criticisms result from 
the fact that the use of monophyly for species needs some criteria exter-
nal to monophyly to decide which “level” of monophyletic group to rank 
as species. These external criteria vary from group to group (Mishler and 
Donoghue 1982), and under this view, it is difficult to see species as a 
unique level in the tree of life (Mishler 1999, 2010).
A Way Forward: Species are at Least Initially Phenomena
It is perhaps feasible to adopt a somewhat different approach, in this as in other 
epistemic matters in science: to take species as phenomena to be accounted for.26 
This means treating species as explananda (things which need to be explained) 
rather than as explanantia (things which explain). As discussed above, folk tax-
onomies demonstrate that human cultures generally perceive species as phe-
nomena. Phenomena have been deprecated in the philosophy of science since 
the theory-observation dichotomy was criticized and abandoned. Recently, 
24 Numerical taxonomy, also known as the phenetics school (from the Greek phaineros for “appear-
ance”) classified groups according to their “overall similarity.” This fell prey to the problems 
discussed by Nelson Goodman; as he says, similarity is cheap (see Decock and Douven [2011] 
for a discussion): “Similarity, I submit, is insidious. And if the association here with invidious 
comparison is itself invidious, so much the better. Similarity, ever ready to solve philosophical 
problems and overcome obstacles, is a pretender, an impostor, a quack. It has, indeed, its place 
and its uses, but is more often found where it does not belong, professing powers it does not 
possess.” (Goodman 1972, 437) Depending on the characters used, phenetic groups, known as 
Operational Taxonomic Units or OTUs, could contradict other analyses using different characters 
of the same organisms.
25 Cladism is the approach to classification that defines taxa by uniquely shared common ances-
try (monophyly), as evidenced by shared derived characters. It is also known as phylogenetic 
systematics.
26 Existing species concepts (except the conventional ones) define species in terms of some model 
or process, which is to say, as entities of a particular theoretical kind. To treat species as phenom-
ena in need of explanation is to not beg the question in favor of a prior mechanism, which we 
take to be a scientific virtue. Thanks to a reviewer for raising this question.
129General Principles of Rankless Classification Extended to the Species Rank
though, phenomena have been revisited as a source for scientific discovery (Apel, 
Dullstein, et al. 2009; Massimi 2008, 2011; Schindler 2011; Woodward 2000). 
Phenomena represent a relation between the observer/classifier and the world 
(Bogen and Woodward 1988; Schindler 2011). Observed phenomena can repre-
sent real states of the world, but they are dependent upon the pattern recognition 
capacities of the observer (Wilkins and Ebach 2013). They do not necessarily rely 
upon prior definitions in order be observed. Some observed phenomena may 
of course turn out not to represent real states of the world; astrological signs or 
astronomical constellations which are recognized in different cultures are in this 
category. Phenomena should be treated by science as things to be explained that 
can be dissolved upon further analysis, and which are often revised.
As an example of a real phenomenon, take a standard philosophical case: 
mountains. We can identify examples of mountains, but not universally define a 
category of “mountain” as distinct from “hill” or “plateau.” There is no standard 
height, geological basis, or other property that defines all and only mountains, and 
what may be called a mountain in Australia, for example, is a mere hill on most 
other continents. There is no fundamental hierarchical level of “mountainhood” 
– within what is recognized as a major mountain range there are recognized sub-
ranges and individual peaks. Therefore, in terms of the argument in this paper, 
“mountain” is a rankless concept. Nevertheless, the reality of even an Australian 
mountain can be demonstrated by the fact that to get to the other side of it, one 
must go over, around or through it. Though the category is a construct, that does 
not mean the individual objects delineated within the category are constructs.
Phenomenal Taxa
Phenomenal taxa are evident groupings of organisms at all levels that have been 
apparent to folk going back thousands of years. Their perception does not ini-
tially rely upon prior definitions – the criteria used are operational and rely on 
covariances of traits of all kinds, most often the so-called morphological kind.27 
Phenomenal taxa are patterns that call for hypotheses; defensible scientific clas-
sifications result when phenomenal taxa are tested, and sometimes dissolved or 
at least revised on the basis of subsequent assays and phylogenetic analyses.28
Phenomenal Species
As discussed above, the lowest level of phenomenal taxa can be recognized 
as phenomenal species, starting with folk classifications (Atran 1999).29 Species 
27 Which traits are selected to use for such comparisons depend a lot on prior experience rather 
than theoretic criteria, in traditional societies as well as in modern taxonomy.
28 See Scerri (2007) for an example from chemistry, the periodic table. The properties of elements 
were experimentally measured and the periodicity of these properties noted before any theo-
retical explanation (such as valency theory or electron shells and proton number) was avail-
able. Likewise, plate tectonics was observed as a phenomenal pattern before an explanation was 
offered (Oreskes and LeGrand 2003).
29 There is an extensive literature on folk taxonomy. We simplify here and are not suggesting that the 
same basic taxa are recognized in all or even most cultures (Berlin 1973, 1976; Berlin, Breedlove, 
et al. 1973; Durkheim and Mauss 1963; Medin and Atran 1999; Sousa, Atran, et al. 2002; Zachar 
2000).
130 What, if Anything, Are Species?
phenomena set up the conditions for an explanation, and once these are offered 
we may revise them, or even dissolve them. Many commonly recognized spe-
cies turn out not to represent natural states of the world, now that the science of 
systematics has a good theoretical understanding of monophyly and a good set 
of empirical tools. New tools have emerged from rapid technological advances 
in computer hardware and software and in molecular biology. On the other 
hand, many commonly recognized species have been confirmed this way.
There is an old distinction between an explanandum and an explanans, or 
roughly the phenomena and the theory. In these terms, species do not explain 
anything; instead, they set up the problem that theoretical explanations solve. 
Species are explanantia. It used to be said that theories “save” the phenomena; 
this came to mean that they would solve the problems posed by explaining the 
phenomena (Hacking 1983, 222f). The advantage of the phenomenal approach 
is that it is empirically driven but not absolutely ranked.
Rankless Taxonomy
As indicated briefly above, the systematics community has reached a consensus 
that monophyly is the best criterion for a natural group30 in classification. This 
consensus comes from several important criteria of classification (Mishler 2009; 
Wilkins and Ebach 2013), including information content (summarizing what is 
known about organisms), predictivity (what is not yet known about organisms), 
and function in theories (capturing entities involved in important natural pro-
cesses). The latter tracks causal relations (e.g., evolution from common ances-
tors) even in the absence of detailed knowledge of those causes.
Given the adoption of monophyly as the basis of classification, many empiri-
cal and theoretical problems have arisen with the current codes of nomenclature 
with their mandated taxonomic ranks. There are not enough ranks to name the 
thousands of levels of clades that have been discovered, and instability is intro-
duced when groups at the “same” taxonomic rank are found to be nested inside 
of each other. Most importantly, it is impossible to precisely specify a named 
clade with only one type specimen (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1992, 1994). The 
idea of removing ranks from nomenclature has developed as a response to these 
perceived problems and has gained much support and much criticism.
The major attempt to develop a rankless code of nomenclature to date is the 
PhyloCode (Cantino and de Queiroz 2000). Its basic philosophical foundation is 
that all groups should be natural (monophyletic), rank-free, and uniquely identified. 
Though there are no ranks, there is still hierarchy, as names are nested within names. 
The PhyloCode uses two or more type specimens (called “specifiers”) to triangulate 
precisely to the clade being named. All new names are registered in a database 
(REGNUM31) with associated metadata including specifiers; the hierarchical nesting 
of clade names is thus clear, and a name can be applied stably into the future.
30 In taxonomy, a natural group is a real fact about the organisms’ interrelationships. It is contrasted 
to artificial groups, which are merely conventional, or based upon arbitrary characters.
31 http://www.phyloregnum.org/
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However, even within the PhyloCode community, there is vehement con-
troversy about species (see discussion in Cellinese, Baum, et al. 2012). The 
PhyloCode as it stands retains species as a special level and explicitly excludes 
the normal application of uninomial names to clades recognized at the tradi-
tional species level. This, despite the obvious paradox of a code designed for 
rankless classification retaining one rank as privileged! This issue is an area of 
active debate, and it is unclear how it will be resolved in the long run in the 
PhyloCode. Regardless, for the solution to the species problem proposed here, 
we argue in favor of the application of concepts of monophyly and rankless 
phylogenetic classification “all the way down.”
Capturing the SNaRC
What are the natural objects of taxonomy? If monophyly is the criterion, then 
we must recognize and name the most differentiable clades based on the data 
available, and the assays used (that is, the differentia that we can access as 
characters and character states). These were mostly morphological traits prior 
to the molecular revolution, and subsequently mostly gene sequences, but the 
methodology remains the same. Taxa, including species, are first recognized as 
phenomena, then tested by phylogenetic analysis.
Following the principles of rankless taxonomy and the synchronic definition of 
monophyly, the smallest named clade should be treated like other levels and given 
a formal (uninomial32) name registered in a database. These we call the Smallest 
Named and Registered Clades (SNaRCs).33 Note that this is the smallest level in 
a hierarchical classification of clades in an epistemological sense rather than an 
ontological one. These are the finest-scale clades that can be convincingly dem-
onstrated with current data; no claim is made that they are the smallest clades that 
exist in that group. Further research in the next generation may well find clades 
within what was regarded as a SNaRC in the current generation (in short, new 
biodiversity has been discovered). In that case, the finer ones are now the SNaRCs 
but the original clade retains its name. Thus, the completely rankless naming sys-
tem is much more stable than the current codes of nomenclature which use a 
binomial and one type specimen. Currently, if a species is split into finer species 
taxa, the binomial name must move to one of the finer taxa, causing endless prob-
lems with using species names to organize databases and match comparable data.
It is important to note, however, that the cladistic concept of monophyly 
is itself in need of refinement. Horizontal transfer (reticulation) is much more 
32 If monophyly is the key, then the name or structure of the including clade is not relevant to the 
identification of that smallest (currently known) clade. Hence a genus name, giving a binomial, is 
not necessary.
33 This is similar in some respects to Pleijel and Rouse’s notion of a Least Inclusive Taxonomic 
Unit, or LITU (Pleijel and Rouse 2000), in that there is no rank that is fundamental. They say 
“Identification of taxa as LITUs are statements about the current state of knowledge (or lack 
thereof) without implying that they have no internal nested structure.” However, with SNaRCs 
we restrict the naming of terminal taxa to entities regarded as clades, by requiring the author of a 
SNaRC name to present evidence of monophyly.
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common in nature than realized twenty years ago (see a nice summary by 
Mallet, Besansky, et al. 2016). Despite having been presented as such (e.g., 
Wheeler and Platnick 2000), reticulation is not just a problem for the species 
level; clades at all levels can be subject to horizontal transfer.34
In the modern genomic world, because of the mounting evidence of horizon-
tal gene transfer at all levels, monophyly can no longer mean monophyly of a 
group of organisms on every gene tree (as assumed by earlier generations of cla-
dists, before there were data to the contrary). We would have few to no mono-
phyletic groups, at any level, in that strict sense. Rather, monophyly refers to an 
ensemble characteristic of organismic descent as discussed by Baum (2009). 
Monophyly refers to the preponderance of gene lineages making up a clade 
(using the clade-lineage distinction from Mishler 2010; see Fig. 4.4). Gene lin-
eages that don’t match the pattern of descent shown by the majority of lineages 
need a different explanation (e.g., horizontal transfer or incomplete lineage sort-
ing) than the majority. We note this is analogous to the distinction people have 
made for a long time between homology and homoplasy (Mallet, Besansky, et 
al. 2016; Nixon and Carpenter 2011); in fact, horizontal gene transfer is best 
viewed as a type of homoplasy.
If there is no majority consensus pattern of lineage descent, then there is 
no good evidence of a clade, and one is below the SNaRC level given current 
knowledge. Just like clades at all levels, SNaRCs should not be recognized and 
named based on a single gene’s evidence, but rather on congruence among 
the majority of gene trees and other types of phylogenetic characters available. 
SNaRCs are the finest-scale clades named at a given point in time, and they can 
be counted and used in comparative analyses as long as one keeps in mind the 
34 Horizontal genetic transfer can occur in a number of ways, summarized by (Soucy, Huang, et al. 
2015). However, it is notable that this usually offers a different phylogeny and recovers different 
taxa for the gene tree, not the taxon tree (Degnan and Rosenberg 2009).
FIGURE 4.4 The distinction between clades and lineages. A clade is a synchronic, 
monophyletic set of lineage-representatives, where monophyly is defined as “all and 
only descendants of a common ancestor” (represented by B in this case). A lineage is a 
diachronic ancestor-descendant connection (between A and D in this case): “species” 
in the de Queiroz sense. 
(Redrawn from Mishler 2010).
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caveats that: (1) they are not comparable to each other in time depth, or bio-
logically significant properties, or amount of evolutionary change, and (2) they 
may well be subdivided in the future, given more knowledge. Keeping these 
warnings in mind, SNaRCs can be used as a better starting point than species for 
scientific studies of biodiversity, in ways described below.
Using SNaRCs in Systematic, Evolutionary, and Ecological Studies
Studies in such areas as systematics, conservation biology, population genetics, 
macroevolution, community ecology, and biogeography currently use “species” 
as a unit of biodiversity in their respective investigations. For example, in ecol-
ogy, species are used as a stand-in for niche occupiers or trophic nodes. But 
species are a poor surrogate for biodiversity under an evolutionary worldview. 
They are at best one level on the tree of life, and there are clades both larger and 
smaller than named species. Furthermore, a large proportion of currently named 
species are not units on the tree of life at all, in that they are not monophyletic.35 
All of these factors can potentially confound process studies. Thus phylogenies 
and rankless phylogenetic taxonomies provide a better theoretical framework 
than species do for all of these disciplines, and better practical methods for such 
purposes as conservation assessment as well (Mishler 2010).
Some complain that knowledge in their particular study group is too limited 
to take a phylogenetic approach to taxonomy. But even if sampling is poor, 
one can still build a phylogeny with the specimens one has, and this act is 
no more methodologically suspect than the typical approach to such a situa-
tion, which is building a phenogram (a similarity-based classification). Science 
is about sampling, and one does not need to have sampled every clade in one’s 
group to make the first phylogeny. Phylogenies are hypotheses to be tested by 
future sampling. Likewise, lacking molecular data is not an excuse to avoid phy-
logenetic classification including naming SNaRCs. Perfectly good phylogenetic 
hypotheses can be built using morphological characters. True, it is likely that 
SNaRCs named with morphological synapomorphies may be particularly sub-
ject to subdivision once molecular data are available, but subdivision does not 
falsify them if they remain monophyletic according to the new data.
Fisher (2006) is a groundbreaking example of in-the-trenches taxonomy using 
SNaRCs. Her monographic study on a group of tropical mosses relied on all the 
traditional data-gathering methods: fieldwork making new collections, searching 
herbaria and literature, measuring morphological characters, sequencing DNA 
from exemplars, etc. [See Fig. 4.1]. Once she had a phylogeny, she named the 
best-supported nodes on the tree, as any cautious taxonomist would do. Not 
all nodes were named; some did not have enough support to be worth nam-
ing. For all clades that were named, including the terminal-most clades (i.e., 
the level formerly treated as species), she provided uninominal PhyloCode-style 
names. She placed earlier binomial names in synonymy as appropriate, to allow 
35 This is to be expected, since monophyly is only a relatively recent desideratum (for some) in 
taxonomy, many species were named before the cladistics revolution, and a large number of 
practicing taxonomists still do not accept monophyly as a desideratum.
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a connection to the literature and herbaria. For example, the clade Revolutus 
(a SNaRC in our terminology) has Syrrhopodon revolutus and Syrrhopodon 
microbolax listed as synonyms. She provided a key to the SNaRCs in the normal 
manner for practical use in identification. Thus, all the important contributions 
of a systematic monograph are present for use in other studies.
This example shows it is possible, and indeed more precise, to do standard 
monographic taxonomy using rankless classification all the way down. As long 
as we take into account synonymies with traditional taxa, to allow linkages with 
past literature and databases that use traditional ranked names, there is no bar-
rier to rankless taxonomy. In fact, removing the ranks forces users to consider 
the nature of clades they compare instead of relying on a false correspondence 
of ranks.
The taxonomic situation with orangutans provides a nice illustration of the 
difficulties with ranked classifications. Over the last twenty years there have 
been debates over the specific status of Sumatran (Pongo abelii) and Bornean 
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) (Groves 1986; Hobolth, Dutheil, et al. 2011; Xu 
and Arnason 1996), based primarily on genomic data (Locke, Hillier, et al. 2011). 
For most of the twentieth century, primatologists identified one orangutan spe-
cies (P. pygmaeus) and several subspecies. Groves rang the change in 1986 when 
he declared that the P. p. abelli and the Sumatran (P. p. pygmaeus) “subspecies” 
were in fact full species, despite reproductive compatibility (adopting a phylo-
genetic species concept, Groves 2004). This debate continued until the early 
2000s (Muir, Galdikas, et al. 2000; Muir, Galdikas, et al. 1998; Muir, Fleming, 
et al. 2000; Zhang, Ryder, et al. 2001) when a preponderance of molecular, 
morphological, and ecological data showed that the phylogenetic structure of 
the two populations was approximately the same in time and degree as between 
the Pan troglodytes (common chimpanzee) and Pan paniscus (bonobo) popula-
tions (Locke, Hillier, et al. 2011; Muir, Galdikas, et al. 2000; Muir, Galdikas, et 
al. 1998). However, there are still “subspecies” of P. pygmaeus (Caldecott and 
McConkey 2005):
• the northwest Bornean orangutan, P. p. pygmaeus;
• the central Bornean orangutan, P. p. wurmbii; and
• the northeast Bornean orangutan, P. p. mono.36
Moreover, there is considerable haplotype structure within the new species 
P. abelii (Kuhlwilm, de Manuel, et al. 2016). As more data become available, 
the question of specific rank becomes more urgent under the current paradigm, 
with concerns about taxonomic inflation. However, a rankless taxonomy, with 
names applied to SNaRCs supported by a preponderance of gene trees using a 
concordance-based approach (Steel and Velasco 2014), would resolve much of 
this concern.
36 A recent paper now assigns specific status, Pongo tapanuliensis, to a central Bornean population 
(Nater, Mattle-Greminger, et al. 2017).
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Evolutionary and ecological studies are also better done using clades instead 
of taxonomic ranks. Diversification studies are often done using species number 
as a proxy for diversity present in a larger clade (e.g., Alfaro, Santini, et al. 2009), 
but would be better served by looking at phylogenies down to the SNaRC level, 
since the number of named species is often not comparable across different 
groups due to differences in taxonomic customs or amount of taxonomic effort. 
Rather than comparing species, ecological studies would be more rigorously 
done comparing clades, as in modern approaches to community phylogenetics 
(Vamosi, Heard, et al. 2009; Webb, Ackerly, et al. 2002). Clades at any level 
might be filling a specific niche such as a role in a food web. The important 
question to be addressed is what level in the tree is filling which ecological role. 
We should not assume that only named species can do so.
Conservation studies should also be based on phylogenetic approaches that 
take into account branch lengths on trees rather than species counts per se. 
Faith (1992) pioneered a concept of phylogenetic diversity (PD) that can be 
used to characterize biodiversity much more accurately than species number. 
A related metric has appeared more recently called phylogenetic endemism 
(PE), which is a measure of how range-restricted lineages are (Rosauer, Laffan, 
et al. 2009). There is a burgeoning school of research called “spatial phylo-
genetics” that takes advantage of the availability of large-scale phylogenies, 
and big distributional data sets derived from museum digitization efforts, to 
look at patterns of PD and PE on the landscape (Gonzalez-Orozco, Pollock, et 
al. 2016; Mishler, Knerr, et al. 2014; Nagalingum, Knerr, et al. 2015; Schmidt-
Lebuhn, Knerr, et al. 2015; Thornhill, Baldwin, et al. 2017; Thornhill, Mishler, 
et al. 2016). The results from these studies enable rankless phylogenetic evalu-
ations of conservation priorities, as well as studies of evolution, ecology, and 
biogeography.
Conclusion
Whether the PhyloCode accepts the SNaRC approach or not, and regardless 
of how radical it sounds, it is an important step for systematics to take to best 
account for the theoretical and methodological advances of the last twenty 
years. As discussed above, it is possible to do all the theoretical and empirical 
work biological scientists need to do without species or other ranks, and indeed 
to do it better.
SNaRCs represent the smallest clades for which we have evidence. These 
are the infimae clades. These may or may not coincide with traditional “good 
species.” However, they are the product of good science, and so we should 
accept them in favor of naïve classifications. While convention may prefer 
“good species,” these are objects of a refined folk taxonomy, not science. For 
scientists, phenomena such as species are only a starting point for analysis and 
explanation.
“For the Snark was a Boojum, you see.”
–Lewis Carroll, the Hunting of the Snark (1876)
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What Would the World 
Be Like without the 
Species Rank?
Even if it is accepted that the species level is arbitrary, as argued initially and most 
cogently by Darwin (see Mishler 2010 for an explication of Darwin’s argument), 
the case is not closed when one gives up the species rank. Given how importantly 
the species rank has featured in academic biology as well as in conservation and 
management, one cannot just reject species without providing a replacement view. 
People need to get on with their work. So, how to proceed in ecology and evolution-
ary biology? What interacts in an ecosystem? What evolves? What are the units of 
biodiversity? How can people interested in more practical issues, like conservation, 
biodiversity inventories, field guides, monographs, restoration ecology, etc. move 
forward?
IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDIES OF ECOLOGY
Species have figured prominently in ecological theory and practice. They have 
widely been considered the actors in the “Ecological Theater and the Evolutionary 
Play” (Hutchinson 1965). Ecologists have traditionally treated infra-specific interac-
tions to be different in kind than inter-specific interactions. So… if we are agreed 
that the species rank is meaningless, then can we still do ecology? Of course! In fact, 
we can develop a richer and more accurate view of ecology by considering clades 
at different levels as potential ecological interactors. There was never any reason to 
treat the species level as some kind of a magical dividing line. The view advanced 
in this book frees up ecology to be done in a more realistic multi-level manner. In 
truth there are clades interacting in various ways at a variety of nested scales, none 
of which are “primary.” The level at which ecological interactions change should be 
left as an open question, as interesting hypotheses to test, rather than making an a 
priori assumption that the species boundary is always the answer.
Therefore, ecological interchangeability of organisms is seen to be an empirical 
question, not a theoretical one. Often very fine-scale populations, much smaller than 
anyone would want to call “species” are found to be locally adapted physiologi-
cally and are definitely not interchangeable with other members of the same-named 
species. This is the basis of recent arguments in restoration ecology to use local 
genotypes (McKay et al. 2005, Gustafson et al. 2014), and there is a whole indus-
try developed to supply this demand. Other times large clades such as cacti have 
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conservative habitat preferences that allow them to be assigned to a distinctive niche 
at a high level. The level in a phylogeny where ecological traits change, and why, 
is a tractable trait reconstruction problem – sorting out evolutionarily rapid from 
evolutionarily conservative ecology is one of the most fascinating areas of study in 
biology today.
The implications for ecology go on and on, but the answers are similar in each 
case. For example, studying climate change responses at the species level, while 
by far the most common approach, can now be seen to be quite limited. Species 
are unlikely to respond to climate change as a whole entity. Their physiology is 
often genetically variable across their range. Which of course is a good thing: local 
populations will (hopefully) adapt at the margins of their clade’s range. So-called 
“assisted migration,” controversial for several reasons, suffers from this problem as 
well: care needs to be taken when deciding which genotypes of a named species 
should be moved, if any.
Likewise, food webs are not best thought of as exclusively comprised of species-level 
entities. Sometimes the relevant players in food webs are local populations, like a particu-
lar salmon run; other times they are much deeper clades, like diatoms. Ecological action 
is a contingent question and needs to be approached with an open mind. There certainly 
are ecological actors in Hutchinson’s sense; however, they are most often not the named 
species but are instead clades at finer or deeper levels in the tree of life.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDIES OF “SPECIATION” 
(=“DIVERSIFICATION”)
If we are agreed that the species rank is meaningless, then another controversial 
implication is that there is no such process as “speciation.” Many would object, of 
course, since they have labeled their entire research program as studies of “specia-
tion!” But their field does not disappear, it actually becomes richer. Just like ecol-
ogy, you can still study evolutionary divergence without species; in fact you can do 
it better without wearing species blinders. There are lineages diverging from each 
other (and sometimes coming back together) at many levels in evolution. No one 
level is “most important” or privileged in any way. Different processes are involved 
at different levels, and to fully understand what is going on in the diversification of 
a group, you need to look at all the levels, not just concentrate on the one labeled 
by traditional taxonomists as the species level. This remains an important field, but 
diversification is the right name to use for it, rather than speciation. There needs to 
be both an appreciation for multiple levels of divergence, and an appreciation that 
gene flow (or lack thereof) is not the only process to consider.
The process of studying diversification should always start with a phylogeny down 
to as fine a level as is possible to resolve with the data at hand (i.e., the SNaRCs). To 
understand the “cutting edge” of diversification, one should compare the terminal-
most sister clades to each other to see which traits (i.e., genomic, morphological, 
physiological, geographic, developmental, reproductive, etc.) are reconstructed to 
change on the branches separating them. Those characters are the candidates for 
possible causes or constraints affecting diversification in that particular sister pair. 
If one looks at many terminal sister pairs across the same phylogeny in this way, 
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then one can look for common denominators to see whether there is some dominant 
process operating in that particular group.
For example, if the terminal sister pairs differ most often by the acquisition of 
some reproductive isolating mechanism in one or both of the pair, that is prima facie 
evidence that cessation of interbreeding is indeed the most important factor driving 
primary divergence in that particular group. Or, if terminal sister pairs differ most 
often by the acquisition of a novel ecological niche in one of the lineages, that is 
prima facie evidence that ecology is the most important factor in primary divergence 
in that particular group. Or, if terminal sister pairs differ most often by geographic 
isolation that is prima facie evidence that allopatry is the most important factor in 
primary divergence in that particular group. And so on for different combinations 
of processes.
Even though the terminal-most sister pairs provide the best evidence for inferring 
the “cutting edge” of recent divergence, one can and should, of course, also compare 
sister lineages deeper in the tree to make inferences about processes affecting earlier 
stages of evolutionary divergence. The age-old debate, stemming back to the dif-
ferent viewpoints of Darwin and Wallace (discussed in Grant 1981), as to whether 
reproductive isolation arises early and is the cause of later ecological difference 
(Wallace) or vice-versa (Darwin) can be settled in this way, at least for particular 
groups. Other debates such as the role of different modes of geographic isolation 
(Mayr 1982) can be settled in this manner also.
Thus it is not necessary to decide a priori which of the many proposed species con-
cepts might best capture mechanisms featuring in divergence of one’s study group. 
We can and should initially be neutral about mechanisms to begin with, and let the 
data reveal what processes are most likely operating. The SNaRC approach allows 
us to do this: build phylogenies first, then map inferences of changes in mechanisms 
second. One should name taxa last, taking into account what has been discovered in 
this neutral manner. This stands the current field of “speciation” on its head, since 
the usual procedure now is to begin with traditional species classifications and then 
try to figure out how those entities differ (e.g., Doyle et al. 2004)!
IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDIES OF EVOLUTION
The view of species advocated here also would imply that neither the common dis-
tinction between micro- and macroevolution nor the common distinction between 
population genetics and systematics (e.g., Avise 1989) – using the species level as the 
boundary – make sense. The species level should not be viewed as a magical divid-
ing line here either. As discussed earlier, the processes of divergence and reticulation 
don’t respect species boundaries; both are, in fact, happening within and among 
named species. The preponderance of one versus the other may change at different 
scales, but this is another contingent issue worthy of study rather than the a priori 
assumption that divergence only happens above the species level and reticulation 
only happens below (Nixon & Wheeler 1990).
Diversification is often used in a different sense these days than advocated in 
the previous section. It is often taken to mean the net accumulation of species in a 
clade, i.e., speciation minus extinction (e.g., Nürk et al. 2020). However, taking the 
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hierarchical view of lineages I am arguing for here, it would be better to use diversi-
fication to refer to splitting of lineages at various levels, extinction to refer to the loss 
of lineages at various levels, and diversity (or richness) to refer to the net number of 
lineages at some level present at a given time. So, diversity = diversification – extinc-
tion. Diversification and extinction are process terms, while diversity in this sense is 
just a metric summarizing the current situation. There are other, perhaps more use-
ful, phylogenetic metrics of diversity as well; see below.
One of the worst metrics of diversity to use is the number of named species (or 
genera) in a clade, but unfortunately, there is a tendency in the literature to use just 
this measure (e.g., Nürk et al. 2020). There are a number of problems with this, most 
important of which are the arguments developed above for why named species taxa 
are not, and cannot be, comparable entities even with ideal knowledge. Furthermore, 
there are artifacts incorporated in this metric given the less than ideal situation in 
most cases: different major groups have had very different amounts of taxonomic 
study and the number of named species is likely just to be a reflection of how well-
studied a group is. There are also quite different traditions of splitting and lumping in 
communities of taxonomists who work on different major groups. Many traditional 
taxonomists do not take monophyly as an important criterion, so many named spe-
cies were not even intended to be minimal clades. So given a simple observation of 
20 named species listed for one clade, and 200 listed for its sister clade, you don’t 
really know how biodiversity compares between the two.
The neutral approach discussed in the previous section is useful here as well – to 
compare the diversity in different clades objectively one should build a phylogeny 
down to SNaRCs. Comparing the number of SNaRCs among sister groups gives you 
a rough estimate of the net amount of lineage-splitting that is represented in each. 
However, given the potential for artifacts discussed above, it is important to ensure 
that about the same amount of sampling and the same level of care have gone into 
reconstructing the phylogeny of the sister groups being compared.
The number of SNaRCs (i.e., richness) can thus tell you something about evolu-
tionary patterns, but there is much more information to be gained from the phylog-
eny than simply counting the number of known tips. The branches connecting the 
tips are important also, and adding inferences about them adds depth to the evolu-
tionary comparisons that can be made. The distribution of branch lengths on the tree 
tells you about the “shape” of evolution (Gould et al. 1987). Furthermore, there are 
multiple ways to represent branch lengths on a tree; thus evolution has more than one 
shape at the same time, depending on how you measure it. Faith (1992) pioneered an 
evolutionary metric of biodiversity called phylogenetic diversity (PD), which sums 
up the branch lengths connecting the tips of a tree that are present in a clade, or in a 
geographic location, or co-occupying an ecological community.
There are different dimensions to phylodiversity. As discussed by Kling et al. 
(2018), given a fixed phylogenetic topology, there are three main types of representa-
tions of branch lengths, yielding three distinct facets of phylodiversity that can be 
used to assess biodiversity in a location using PD: (1) if branches are scaled to char-
acter change (resulting in a phylogram), then PD is a measure of trait disparity; (2) 
if branches are scaled to time (resulting in a chronogram), then PD is a measure of 
evolutionary time elapsed; and (3) if all branches are scaled to equal length (resulting 
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in a cladogram), then PD is a measure of the net amount of lineage-splitting. Each 
of these facets, and more besides, can be measured using PD, which complements 
the simple metric of richness and adds multiple dimensions to studies of the origin 
and maintenance of biodiversity. For example, comparing PD between sister clades 
is much more informative for studies of diversification than simply comparing the 
number of named taxa they contain (Miller et al. 2018). Comparing ecological com-
munities using measures of PD is much more informative than simply comparing 
how many species each contains (Webb et al. 2002). Yet another place where the 
power of this approach is demonstrated is when you place different measures of PD 
on a map, which has led to the development of a new field of biogeography as out-
lined in the following section.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF BIOGEOGRAPHY
To summarize the previous section, our perception of the patterns of biodiversity, and 
their ecological and evolutionary significance, is vastly enhanced when phylogenetic 
branch lengths are added to simple measure of richness (whether of SNaRCs or of tra-
ditional species). Alpha-diversity has usually been measured geographically by exam-
ining changes in the number of species across a region to identify areas of particularly 
high species richness and endemism. Beta-diversity, or turn-over on the landscape, is 
likewise typically measured by comparing proportions of species shared among sub-
areas of a region. Adding a phylogenetic approach by considering branch lengths that 
connect SNaRCs greatly improves studies of both alpha- and beta-diversity.
Recent developments in this area have led to the development of a new field that 
we call spatial phylogenetics. This is “big data” research, integrating massive dis-
tributional datasets (largely derived from recent digitizing efforts in museum and 
herbarium collections), rapidly accumulating molecular datasets (e.g., cheaper DNA 
sequencing feeding the exponential growth of Genbank), and new computational 
methods allowing reconstruction of very large phylogenies. Using phylogenies 
encompassing whole biotas allows you to put evolutionary history on a map in a GIS 
context, opening up many avenues of spatially explicit studies.
Building on the concept of phylogenetic diversity (PD, i.e., the portion of a global 
phylogeny found in a local area), Rosauer et al. (2009) developed a new metric called 
phylogenetic endemism (PE), that weights the contribution to PD of each branch 
inversely by how widespread it is. Mishler et al. (2014) developed additional phylo-
genetic tools, including two new metrics, relative phylogenetic diversity (RPD) and 
relative phylogenetic endemism (RPE), and a new spatial randomization statistical 
test called categorical analysis of neo-and paleo-endemism (CANAPE), that clas-
sifies different types of endemism. RPD and RPE are ratios that compare PD or PE 
(respectively) measured on the original tree (either a phylogram or a chronogram) 
with PD or PE (respectively) measured on a comparison tree where all branches are 
of equal length (i.e., a cladogram); thus they allow the discovery of significant geo-
graphic concentrations of long or short branches. Laffan et al. (2016) took the next 
step and looked at beta-diversity in PD and PE, developing a really useful metric of 
phyloturnover that emphasizes lineages that are rare on the map called phylogenetic 
range-weighted turnover (PhyloRWT).
148 What, if Anything, Are Species?
These spatial phylogenetic methods are all rankless, since it does not matter what 
taxonomic level the terminals of the phylogeny represent, as long as they are mono-
phyletic and their geographic distribution can be characterized, and are thus relatively 
robust to lumping and splitting decisions by taxonomists. Hotspots of diversity and 
endemism can be mapped, their make-up assessed, and similarities and differences 
among them characterized. Using hypothesis tests based on spatial randomization, 
insights can be gained into ecological, evolutionary, and biogeographic processes 
that have shaped these patterns. Furthermore, understanding such patterns of bio-
diversity on the landscape is also important for conservation planning, given the 
need to prioritize efforts in the face of rapid habitat loss and human-induced climate 
change (see next section). Note that all these insights into biodiversity are gained by 
directly using the properties of phylogenies themselves, rather than counting species 
or other taxa. Thus spatial phylogenetics provides one of the main empirical ways 
forward in a world without the species rank.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDIES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
We have applied these spatial phylogenetic methods, while further developing them, 
to the floras of many parts of the world, including Australia (Thornhill et al. 2016, 
González-Orozco et al. 2016), Chile (Scherson et al. 2017), Florida (Allen et al., 
2019), Norway (Mienna et al. 2019), and all of North America (Mishler et al. 2020). 
We found that not only do they help with understanding academic issues of ecology 
and evolution, they lend themselves to applied studies of conservation as well.
Understanding patterns of biodiversity is critical for conservation planning, given 
the urgent need to prioritize efforts in the face of rapid habitat loss and human-
induced climate change. Biodiversity is almost always measured by counting species 
within a region to identify areas of particularly high species diversity as targets for 
conservation. So… if we are going to eliminate the species rank, then how are we to 
proceed in conservation? By this point in the book you can guess the answer: make 
use of the phylogeny. Biodiversity is not just the named species – it is the whole tree 
of life. So instead of counting species to measure biodiversity, let’s use the tree itself 
as a measuring device via the methods of spatial phylogenetics. Rarity traditionally 
has meant not having many living close relatives. We can now quantitatively define 
what we mean by “many” and “close.”
Since we have done comprehensive studies of the California flora, I will use this 
as my primary example. Baldwin et al. (2017) looked carefully at the issue of justi-
fying the grid cell size and at potential biases in herbarium data, while presenting 
patterns of species richness and endemism, This non-phylogenetic study was done 
as a baseline to allow contrasts with a second study using the same spatial data but 
employing spatial phylogenetics (Thornhill et al. 2017). The latter analyses showed 
that examining the geographic distributions of branch lengths in a statistical frame-
work did indeed add a new dimension which, in comparison with climatic data, helps 
to illuminate causes of endemism. In particular, the concentration of significant PE 
seen in more arid regions of California extends previous ideas about aridity as an 
evolutionary stimulus. The patterns seen were largely robust to phylogenetic uncer-
tainty and time calibration but were sensitive to the use of occurrence data versus 
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modeled ranges, indicating that special attention toward improving geographic dis-
tributional data should be a top priority in the future for advancing understanding of 
spatial patterns of biodiversity.
Kling et al. (2018) then conducted a thorough conservation assessment for the 
flora of California, developing and applying a novel phylogenetic algorithm that 
implements the principle of complementarity. This is the principle that one should 
take into account what has already been protected, when choosing the next loca-
tion to protect. The priority in choosing the next location is to pick the place that 
maximizes the total biodiversity protected, thus the top choice will tend to be quite 
different from what has been protected before. Using this algorithm, grid cells are 
selected in order of conservation priority based on having poor protection, high 
intactness of natural vegetation, and high biodiversity value (i.e., many resident taxa 
with long phylogenetic branches that have small ranges and poor protection across 
their ranges). This study provided the most sophisticated “gap analysis” currently 
available, and we have been working since with the California Native Plant Society, 
the Nature Conservancy, and others to inform conservation efforts in the state. This 
approach implements an objective, rankless approach to conservation, and goes far 
beyond what could be done with the distribution of taxa alone, by using a phylogeny 
as its main measuring device.
IMPLICATIONS FOR NATURAL HISTORY
I described above (in Chapter 4) how formal taxonomic work would be done using 
a rankless approach at the former species level. But those who work on the practical 
side of systematics may be nervous at moving to rankless classification at this level. 
How can we teach people about nature without species? How can we do biodiversity 
inventories, record occurrence observations, write field guides, etc.?
Let’s discuss teaching first. I know from personal experience while leading nature 
walks and teaching field courses that the first thing students and members of the 
public want to know is the name of a species they encounter. What is that bird? What 
is that tree? The public has a strongly typological view of species, many from a reli-
gious perspective (“species are the things God made”), some from a simple scientific 
perspective (“species are the basic kinds of life, separated by reproductive barriers”), 
and almost none with a more sophisticated scientific understanding of the actual 
evolutionary complexity of lineages discussed in this book.
Does the fact that people, from all cultures ranging from modern urbanites to tradi-
tional hunter-gatherers, strongly believe in the existence of species (Berlin 1973, Atran 
1999) mean that scientists need to believe in species also? Shockingly, I have often heard 
that argument made by scientists, including some of my personal heroes (e.g., Gould’s 
1980 “a quahog is a quahog” argument). But really folks, public belief is a very poor 
guide to scientific truth, and scientists should know this. People believe in astrology; they 
don’t believe in climate change. Should astronomers and ecologists throw up their hands 
and go with the public consensus? Of course not, and neither should evolutionary biolo-
gists. Our first responsibility as scientific educators should be to convey what we think is 
true about the world, and the methods we use to decide (for the moment) that something 
is true. We should not cater to ignorance, even if it is easier to do so.
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Students and the public can handle the truth about species if it is explained to them. 
I find, for example, that it is easy to explain rankless classification in a public workshop 
or a biology class, which I do first, before getting into species. Anyone who has worked 
with classification at all knows how arbitrary it is to say something is a genus instead of 
a subgenus or a class instead of an order. After I have convinced them of this principle 
in general, then I introduce the topic of species – what about the species rank? Isn’t it 
arbitrary also? I find that understanding comes easily, without much prompting.
Teaching biodiversity using the tree of life as a guide, rather than presenting a long, 
hierarchically ranked list of taxa to memorize, is not only more accurate scientifically, 
it is more interesting and easier to assimilate. The former approach gives people a 
visual framework (like a roadmap of a city) to organize their knowledge about char-
acteristics of organisms; the latter approach is akin to asking someone to memorize a 
phone book listing addresses of people in that city. Teaching the fluidity of processes 
responsible for the clades that we observe in nature is a good way to get people to 
understand and accept evolution rather than keep thinking like a creationist.
What about printed natural history guides, websites, or social media apps that 
are meant to help people learn about biodiversity, identify taxa they encounter, and 
record their observations? Do you need ranked classifications including species for 
these purposes? We do need names for groups for sure, but we certainly don’t need 
the ranks; e.g. it doesn’t matter if a distinctive flowering plant is considered a species 
or a subspecies, if it can be told apart from its relatives.
In many taxonomic groups, it is very difficult to identify a specimen down to 
fine taxonomic scales without a microscope and knowledge of technical terms, or 
a DNA sequence, so it is common under the current ranked codes of nomenclature 
to have a field guide “stop” at an entry for a higher taxon. For example, Powell & 
Hogue’s (1979) California Insects goes down to the species level in many butterflies 
because they are well-known and easy to tell apart, but in many other groups, the 
“terminal” treatments are for higher-level taxa, e.g., Springtails (order) or Fruitflies 
(family). There is absolutely nothing wrong with this; it is a rational adjustment to 
the capabilities and goals of the users of the guide. But note that “Springtail” (or 
“Collembola”) works fine as a name for identification; the fact that it is ranked as an 
order is irrelevant to whether you can recognize it.
The best way to think about the act of identifying an organism is as the act of 
placing it on a phylogenetic tree. It does not need to be attached to a terminal branch 
for a person to gain some inferences about its traits and biology. Knowing something 
is an orchid, whale, liverwort, spider, or a springtail is a start for a beginner, and 
helps them begin to understand nature even in a new part of the world they might 
travel to. As a beginner learns and becomes more advanced in knowledge about a 
group, they can handle distinguishing finer clades (e.g., that liverwort is a Riccia!). 
No ranks are needed in the process of learning about nature, just a mental model of 
the tree of life that one keeps enriching by learning new branches.
SUMMARY
In all these areas of application, ranging from academic science to practical uses of 
classification in everyday life, matching the naming system as closely as possible 
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to the evolutionary processes driving observed biodiversity patterns is beneficial. 
We get a more useful classification by incorporating our best models of biological 
reality (i.e., phylogenies) in them. Natural evolutionary processes have no “ranks” 
at any level – including the one formerly known as species – lineages diverge from 
each other (and sometimes reticulate again) at many nested levels, all of which 
are interesting from one standpoint or another. We should name the sufficiently 
diverged lineages with a rankless uninomial and can keep track of the nesting of 
such clade-based names mentally (to the extent that we personally “know” a group) 
and comprehensively in databases used to enable comparative evolutionary studies, 
ecological applications, biogeographic algorithms, conservation assessment, identi-
fication guides, and teaching materials. The species rank no longer makes sense in 
the biological world as we know it today; it needs to disappear along with all other 
taxonomic ranks.
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 1. B.D. Mishler and M.J. Donoghue. 1982. Species concepts: a case for pluralism. System-
atic Zoology 31: 491–503. [reprinted by permission] (P.11)
 2. Gould (1979) and others have defended the biological species concept on the grounds that 
the same taxa recognized by western taxonomists are recognized by tribespeople in New 
Guinea, etc. There are several problems with this kind of argument. First, it is not clear 
that this finding constitutes an independent test because, after all, New Guinea tribespeo-
ple are human too, with similar cognitive principles and limitations of language. It should 
also be borne in mind that the observer is by no means neutral. Folk taxonomies have 
been collected by people with a knowledge of evolution and modern systematic concepts. 
Second, it is generally not a strong argument to show that a pre-scientifìc society has 
recognized something that modern science currently accepts. Surely a modem astrono-
mer would not consider it very strong evidence that a primitive mythology supported one 
cosmological theory over another. Finally, the taxa recognized by western taxonomists 
(and often by natives at some level of their linguistic hierarchy) in these instances are 
not known to be biological species – for the most part, they are morphological units that 
are believed to be reproductively isolated from other such units. (P.13)
 3. Initially, the biological species concept was embraced and promulgated by plant 
systematists interested in evolution (Stebbins, 1950; Grant, 1957). Cronquist (1978) 
detailed Grant’s efforts (from 1956 to 1966) to apply the biological species concept 
in Gilia (Polemoniaceae). It very soon became apparent that the biological species con-
cept was fraught with difficulties, but Grant chose to amend the concept (rather than 
abandon it altogether), first (1957) with the notion of the syngameon (i.e., the unit of 
interbreeding higher than the species), later (1971) by adopting an evolutionary species 
concept. Finally, in the second edition of his classic book on plant speciation, Grant 
(1981) treats species in a more flexible and pluralistic manner. Some botanists (e.g., 
Stebbins, 1979:25) continue to feel that the biological species concept, or some modifi-
cation of it, is the only suitable framework for understanding plant diversity. However, 
many (perhaps most) botanical systematists remain rather skeptical about the general 
applicability of the concept in botany (Davis and Heywood, 1963; Raven, 1976; Cron-
quist, 1978; Levin, 1979; Stevens, 1980a).
   The different attitudes of zoologists and botanists towards the concept of species 
may be of interest to historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science. For organ-
ismic and evolutionary biology the “modern synthesis” of the 1930’s and 1940’s may 
have represented a revolution in the sense of Kuhn (1970). For systematists, the prin-
cipal outcome was the biological species concept. Zoologists (especially vertebrate 
systematists) appear to have largely accepted the new paradigm and to have entered a 
period of “normal science’ applying the concept in particular cases (“puzzle-solving”). 
While problems like sibling species, semispecies, and subspecies have become appar-
ent, these have generally not prompted a critical evaluation of the paradigm or a prolif-
eration of alternatives. In contrast, in the botanical community the biological species 
concept was soon found to be inapplicable or of difficult application and likely to lead 
to confusion. This resulted in a groping for alternatives and a defense of older concepts. 
In this regard, the historical development of species concepts in botany seems to fit 
better Feyerabend’s (1970) characterization of scientific change as the simultaneous 
practice of normal science and the proliferation of alternative theories. (P.13)
 4. The zoologists initially responsible for developing the biological species concept were 
aware of the difficulties in applying the concept in some groups of animals and many 
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groups of plants. Dobzhansky (1937, 1972) consistently pointed out the diversity of 
“species situations” observable in nature. Mayr (1942:122) was careful to point out dif-
ferences between plants and animals, and difficulties in the practical application of the 
biological species concept in some cases. Particularly rigid versions of the biological 
species concept have been promulgated more recently, in attempted generalizations 
that have shown a startling lack of concern for the biology of the majority of organisms 
on earth. Mayr (1982) has examined the resistance of botanists to the biological species 
concept and concluded that “the concept does not describe an exceptional situation” (p. 
280). But he grants some justification to the ideas of “certain botanists” who question 
“whether the wide spectrum of breeding systems that can be found in plants can all be 
subsumed under the single concept (and term) ‘species’” (p. 278). (P.14)
 5. The species concepts of Cronquist and of Nelson and Platnick are as follows:
  Cronquist (1978:15): “the smallest groups that are consistently and persistently distinct, 
and distinguishable by ordinary means.”
   Nelson and Platnick (1981:12): “the smallest detected samples of self-perpetuating 
organisms that have unique sets of characters.” (P.20)
 6. Initially the “gene” was considered to be the unit of heredity, but the classical concept 
of gene has been replaced by several concepts which stand in a complex relation to one 
another (Hull, 1965). The use of a disjunctive definition (Hull, 1965) allows a single 
term to designate a complex of concepts. However, this can become so confusing that it 
may be desirable to replace (at least in part) an old terminology with a new set of terms 
with more precise meanings. (P.21)
 7. B.D. Mishler. 1985. The morphological, developmental, and phylogenetic basis of spe-
cies concepts in bryophytes. The Bryologist 88: 207–214. [reprinted by permission] 
(P.26)
 8. B.D. Mishler and A.F. Budd. 1990. Species and evolution in clonal organisms – intro-
duction. Systematic Botany 15: 79–85. [reprinted by permission] (P.39)
 9. B.D. Mishler and R.N. Brandon. 1987. Individuality, pluralism, and the phylogenetic 
species concept. Biology and Philosophy 2: 397–414. [reprinted by permission] (P.54)
 10. We should note at the outset that, contrary to the impression one is likely to get from 
the literature on species-as-individuals, the class-individual distinction is not a distinc-
tion taken directly from logic. First, Hull and Ghiselin are using a restricted notion of 
classes. Something counts as a class for them only if its membership can be specified 
in a spatiotemporally unrestricted way. Logic places no such restriction on classes. 
Although Hull (1978) is reasonably clear on this point, not everyone else has been and 
this has lead to some confusion. Second, the operative notion of “individual” comes 
more from common sense zoology than from logic. (P.55)
 11. As pointed out by Hull (pers. comm.), when the distinction between grouping and 
ranking has previously been made, it was often blurred. This may often be because 
researchers use variations on the same theme for both grouping and ranking; e.g., pat-
terns of morphological similarity or of gene exchange. As will be apparent below, we 
advocate distinctly different criteria for grouping than for ranking. (P.60)
 12. A similar result has been arrived at by Holman (pers. comm.) based on compari-
sons between bdelloid rotifers (which are exclusively parthenogenic) and monogon-
ont rotifers (which occasionally reproduce sexually). Using numbers of synonymous 
species names as an index of taxonomic distinctness of species, he has shown that 
bdelloid species are apparently more consistently recognized by taxonomists than are 
monogonont species. (P.63)
 13.  B.D. Mishler and E. Theriot. 2000. The phylogenetic species concept sensu Mish-
ler and Theriot: monophyly, apomorphy, and phylogenetic species concepts. In Q.D. 
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Wheeler & R. Meier (eds.), Species Concepts and Phylogenetic Theory: A Debate, 
pp.44–54. Columbia University Press. [reprinted by permission] (P.70)
 14. B.D. Mishler. 1999. Getting rid of species? In R. Wilson (ed.), Species: New Interdisci-
plinary Essays, pp.307–315. MIT Press. [reprinted by permission] (P.89)
 15. In Hennigian phylogenetic systematics, “homology” is defined historically as a feature 
shared by two organisms because of descent from a common ancestor that had that 
feature. (P.92)
 16. A strictly monophyletic group is one that contains all and only descendants of a com-
mon ancestor. A paraphyletic group is one the excludes some of the descendants of the 
common ancestor. (P.92)
 17. Note that some of the nested clades will have a formal suffix indicating their previous 
rank (e.g., “-idae” for family). While these ending would be retained for exiting clade 
names, in order to avoid confusion, there would be no meaning attached to them and 
newly proposed clade names would have no particular suffix requirement. (P.94)
 18. B.D. Mishler. 2010. Species are not uniquely real biological entities. In F. Ayala and R. 
Arp (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology, pp. 110–122. Wiley-Black-
well. [reprinted by permission] (P.97)
 19. N. Cellinese, D.A. Baum, and B.D. Mishler. 2012. Species and phylogenetic nomencla-
ture. Systematic Biology 61: 885–891. [reprinted by permission] (P.111)
 20. B.D. Mishler and J.S. Wilkins. 2018. The hunting of the SNaRC: a snarky solution to 
the species problem. Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology. 10: 1–18. [reprinted 
by permission] (P.124)
 21. The observation is due to Jody Hey (pers. comm.). Contrary to Mayr’s and others’ charac-
terizations, Darwin did not intend to define species, but to explain why they existed. (P.126)
 22. It is misleadingly also known as the “Unified Species Concept.” This term is misleading 
because, although all species to the extent they are natural objects form lineages, that is also 
true of taxa at all ranks. It is entirely unclear what kind of lineages uniquely qualify to be 
named at the species rank. So this conception is unified (and general) just to the extent that 
it proposes a necessary but insufficient criterion for a natural species concept. (P.127)
 23. “Good species” form the proof of concept for biologists for concepts of species (the 
rank). Every biologist knows what form good species take in their specialty, but each 
subdiscipline differs in subtle or gross ways from other subdisciplines. See Amitani 
(2015) for a discussion of this and a characterization of “good species” as a form of 
prototypical reasoning. (P.127)
 24. Numerical taxonomy, also known as the phenetics school (from the Greek  phain-
eros  for “appearance”) classified groups according to their “overall similarity.” This 
fell prey to the problems discussed by Nelson Goodman; as he says, similarity is cheap 
(see Decock and Douven [2011] for a discussion): “Similarity, I submit, is insidious. 
And if the association here with invidious comparison is itself invidious, so much the 
better. Similarity, ever ready to solve philosophical problems and overcome obstacles, 
is a pretender, an impostor, a quack. It has, indeed, its place and its uses, but is more 
often found where it does not belong, professing powers it does not possess.” (Goodman 
1972, 437) Depending on the characters used, phenetic groups, known as Operational 
Taxonomic Units or OTUs, could contradict other analyses using different characters 
of the same organisms. (P.128)
 25. Cladism is the approach to classification that defines taxa by uniquely shared com-




 26. Existing species concepts (except the conventional ones) define species in terms of 
some model or process, which is to say, as entities of a particular theoretical kind. To 
treat species as phenomena in need of explanation is to not beg the question in favor 
of a prior mechanism, which we take to be a scientific virtue. Thanks to a reviewer for 
raising this question. (P.128)
 27. Which traits are selected to use for such comparisons depend a lot on prior experience 
rather than theoretic criteria, in traditional societies as well as in modern taxonomy. 
(P.129)
 28. See Scerri (2007) for an example from chemistry, the periodic table. The properties of 
elements were experimentally measured and the periodicity of these properties noted 
before any theoretical explanation (such as valency theory or electron shells and proton 
number) was available. Likewise, plate tectonics was observed as a phenomenal pattern 
before an explanation was offered (Oreskes and LeGrand 2003). (P.129)
 29. There is an extensive literature on folk taxonomy. We simplify here and are not suggest-
ing that the same basic taxa are recognized in all or even most cultures (Berlin 1973, 
1976; Berlin, Breedlove, et al. 1973; Durkheim and Mauss 1963; Medin and Atran 
1999; Sousa, Atran, et al. 2002; Zachar 2000). (P.129)
 30. In taxonomy, a natural group is a real fact about the organisms’ interrelationships. It is 
contrasted to artificial groups, which are merely conventional, or based upon arbitrary 
characters. (P.130)
 31. http://www.phyloregnum.org/ (P.130)
 32. If monophyly is the key, then the name or structure of the including clade is not relevant 
to the identification of that smallest (currently known) clade. Hence a genus name, giv-
ing a binomial, is not necessary. (P.131)
 33. This is similar in some respects to Pleijel and Rouse’s notion of a Least Inclusive Tax-
onomic Unit, or LITU (Pleijel and Rouse 2000), in that there is no rank that is fun-
damental. They say “Identification of taxa as LITUs are statements about the current 
state of knowledge (or lack thereof) without implying that they have no internal nested 
structure.” However, with SNaRCs we restrict the naming of terminal taxa to entities 
regarded as clades, by requiring the author of a SNaRC name to present evidence of 
monophyly. (P.131)
 34. Horizontal genetic transfer can occur in a number of ways, summarized by (Soucy, 
Huang, et al. 2015). However, it is notable that this usually offers a different phylogeny 
and recovers different taxa for the gene tree, not the taxon tree (Degnan and Rosenberg 
2009). (P.132)
 35. This is to be expected since monophyly is only a relatively recent desideratum (for 
some) in taxonomy, many species were named before the cladistics revolution, and a 
large number of practicing taxonomists still do not accept monophyly as a desideratum. 
(P.133)
 36. A recent paper now assigns specific status, Pongo tapanuliensis, to a central Bornean 
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